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ABSTRACT 
 
A NEW MODEL FOR THE ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF CARE 
FOR REFUGEE WOMEN WHO EXPERIENCE  
FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING 
 
 
By 
Sharon R. Higginbothan 
December 2015 
 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Henk ten Have, M.D., Ph.D. 
The United States is rapidly becoming a location for refugee women who are migrating 
from countries that embrace different and distinctive practices. One such practice is Female 
Genital Cutting/ mutilation (FGC/m). FGC is a medical procedure that alters the natural structure 
and functioning of the female body. It is also a cultural tradition and custom. Until recently, 
worldwide studies estimated that approximately 80 to 140 million women have undergone FGC 
and that 228,000 of those women live in the U.S.  However, the estimate of women and girls in 
the U.S. living with or at risk from FGC has grown from an estimated 228,000 to 513,000.  
Globally, FGC has raised justifiable concerns, particularly when the procedure is 
performed without consent. As female refugees migrate from FGC/m communities to a non-
FGC/m reality, women not only bring their customs, beliefs, and values – they bring their health 
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care needs.  FGC is associated with alleged health consequences. A major challenge, then, for 
health care in the U.S. is how to provide care for this group of women whose native ethos is 
countercultural to the practices in the United States.   
When exploring FGC through a medical lens, FGC is considered an immoral practice that will 
result in harm and the need for healthcare. Conversely, however, when FGC is observed through 
the lens of respect for cultural diversity, it is not merely a negative construct, rather, it is a 
traditional cultural practice embraced by women who choose. The right for individuals to 
participate in their culture is a human right.  
 Since FGC is a surgical intervention, care is needed for women who choose. FGC is 
relatively novel and unfamiliar in the United States. In that way, to provide care is realized 
through the Georgetown and the Global bioethics frameworks from which FGC is ethically 
examined. An investigation through the lens of FGC garners what is needed to construct a 
specific model of care. Therefore, the title of this dissertation was changed from “Female Genital 
Cutting: What Should Care Be For Refugee Women Experiencing Female Genital Cutting,” to 
“A New Model for the Ethical Analysis of Care for Women Who Experience Female Genital 
Cutting.” 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
I. Understanding Female Genital Cutting (FGC)                                                                    
The World Health Organization defines FGC as “partial or complete removal of the female 
external genital or other injury to the female genital organs for cultural or non-medical or 
therapeutic reasons.”1 It is estimated that there are between 100 and 140 million women and girls 
in the world who have undergone FGC and it is anticipated that each year 3 million girls are at 
risk of undergoing the procedure. FGC is deeply embedded in culture and is practiced in more 
than 28 countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.  FGC is regarded as a way of life.  There 
are some countries in Africa that experience the highest estimated prevalence of FGC in the 
world.2 In addition, certain countries have become war zones and are unsafe for people to live on 
a daily basis. Therefore, families leave their homes, which are often within FGC communities, 
and migrate to safer environments that are a non FGC reality, namely the United States. Women 
who migrate from their country of origin find ways to integrate their way of living into their 
current environment.  In doing so, not only do they bring their customs, beliefs, and values, but 
they also bring their health care needs.  One problem for women from different cultures and 
traditions, and a focus of this dissertation, is how they continue to practice the rituals of their 
culture when their cultural traditions include customs that are often in conflict with the host 
country.3  One such customary practice is Female Genital Cutting (FGC).   For women not to 
engage in their cultural customs and practices, but rather to abandon these cultural traditions, has 
consequences that include rejection and shame from their families and communities. The 
magnitude of this kind of communal pressure experienced by these women, and the obligation to 
practice cultural customs outside their indigenous country, is quite persuasive.4  This 
predicament makes it probable that women will find alternative ways to assimilate the cultural 
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customs to which they are familiar.  Therefore, attempts to practice FGC underground are likely 
to occur, contributing to the danger and injurious nature of the practice as well as the need for 
care. What model of care will be sufficient for women experiencing FGC will be explored and 
developed in chapter 7. 
II. Historical Background and Overview of FGC 
 While there is much debate about the beginning of the practice of female circumcision, 
scholars, cannot not agree on its beginnings. Not only is there disagreement about the origins of 
both male and female circumcision, there are diverse opinions about its genesis. After an 
examination of the historical scholarship on female circumcision (FC) it is difficult to articulate 
the origins of FC without an investigation on the history of male circumcision. According to 
some scholarship, the beginning of Female Circumcision, (the term used in the historical 
literature), FC is rooted in antiquity, and preceded both Christianity and Islam.5 The genesis of 
male circumcision, however is attributed to particular groups of Australian Aborigines who 
practiced “totemic genital surgeries” but the exact origin of the practice is unknown.6  
 The earliest written accounts of circumcision are in the context of religion. Circumcision 
is referenced and characterized in the Old Testament. Circumcision, namely male circumcision 
was and remains a practice in the Jewish tradition. An example of the historical account of male 
circumcision in Judaism reveals that there are representations of temple priest “in the act of 
circumcision on young noblemen.”7 Circumcision was done on infant boys and symbolized ones 
faith. The mark of circumcision denoted their identity to the community of God. Another feature 
of male circumcision was that infant circumcision distinguished Israelite males from those males  
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who were not circumcised “a concern that grew acute during the Babylonian exile.”8 
Interestingly, the historical accounts of circumcision reveal that circumcision was associated to 
the notion of class, as the surgery was afforded only to the upper echelon of priests.  
 Male circumcision was linked to health, and particularly maintaining health. The surgery 
was aimed at preventing disease, a rationale attributed to the reasons and rationales for Female 
Genital Cutting (FGC) found in current literature on the subject.9 While the surgery was 
recognized medical in nature, male circumcision “failed to find its way into classic Egyptian 
medical text.”10 Even though circumcision did not find its way into classic Egyptian medicine, 
“preventing excessive harm to the patient and producing a satisfactory aesthetic result” was of 
concern to those performing the surgery.11 Furthermore, preventing harm and an aesthetically 
acceptable and pleasing outcome are both current topics in the FGC scholarship. For ancient 
Egyptians and those who emulated the Egyptians, circumcision was not only a matter of 
preventing disease but it was also connected to hygiene, morality, and spiritual and intellectual 
refinement. Egypt incorporated and preserved the practice of circumcision as a religious and 
social custom. It is here that scholars illustrate the trajectory of circumcision to the West and 
note “with respect to its source [circumcision] is a tributary into the mainstream of Western 
culture from the recesses of ancient Egypt.”12 
 It is reported that Female Genital Cutting (FGC) or circumcision, as it is referred to in the 
historical literature, could be as ancient as its counterpart male circumcision. Some writers 
explain that the beginning and the meaning of FGC are as ambiguous and puzzling as male 
circumcision.  Much of the scholarship on FGC illustrates that female circumcision (FGC) dates 
back to at least 2000 years. The first known accounts of the FGC are traced back to the Greeks in 
the fifth century B.C. According to Hosken, “archeologist found well preserved mummies that 
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established clitoridectomy and infibulation, (the most severe of the procedures) had occurred.”13 
Also tracing the beginning of what was referred to as in history as circumcision one scholar 
further writes regarding the history of traditional practice, “Herodotus mentioned this custom 
specifically, informing us that the Phoenicians, Hittites and the Ethiopians as well as the 
Egyptians undertook the practice” of FGC.14 Similarly recorded in the historical scholarship 
Strabo, a greek historian and geographer found evidence of the FGC among Egyptian women in 
the early first century A.D. Other scholarship notes that circumcision was a ritual practice that 
effected both male and female. Historically, the procedure was known as female circumcision 
(FC) and was seen as simply a female counterpart to the male practice of circumcision. In 
thinking about what circumcision means, scholars note that it was “partly about purification” as 
purity was an “Egyptian obsession.”15 It seems to follow then that in the place where 
circumcision of females is most pervasive that one of the rationales for the practice is intimately 
associated with purification and purity as it was in cultural antiquity. As its male circumcision 
counterpart, female circumcision was linked to both religion and medicine where the main 
rationale was to purify, physically and spiritually. It is important to note that the scholarship on 
FGC continues to regard religion as a rationale for the traditional practice. 
 Important to the history of circumcision is the political dialogue that seems very much 
connected to the history of FGC and to the language used to describe it. Linked to the political 
discourse is the conversation about what to call the procedure and is without question central to 
the debate.16 The argument on terminology is why society both tolerates the practice and at times 
defends it.17 It is important to note that the debate on what to call FGC is linked to the status of 
women in society.  Nevertheless, the term female circumcision is but one term used to describe 
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the procedure and specifically describes the removal of tissue around the genitalia of women and 
girls.18   
 In the debate over terminology the juxtaposition of male and female circumcision 
surgeries is used. Circumcision for females and males alike are associated with an initiation into 
adulthood.  The term female circumcision is used in most African communities and is “a source 
of significant controversy among critics of the practice” particularly in the West.19 Female 
Genital Mutilation (FGM) as some refer to the practice, “is a name given to several different 
traditional practices that involved the cutting of female genitals.”20 The scholarship illustrates 
that there are also other terminologies used to describe the practice of female circumcision.  
 Other terms used to describe the practice includes, female surgeries, female traditional 
surgery, and female gentile cutting and excision. One term of fierce debate, and often used to 
refer to the surgery is “female genital mutilation.”21 The literature concerning the history of the 
practice notes that its was the Hosken’s Report that “popularized the expression female genital 
mutilation,”22 and made it available to the media and opinion leaders who were influential in 
communities and groups who opposed the practice. While the literature describes the term 
mutilation as a term that is politically charged, it was adopted by the World Health Organization, 
(WHO) Research, Action, and Information Network for Bodily Integrity (RAINBO) and other 
organizations whose aim is to eradicate the practice. The scholarship illustrates that the reason 
for the use of the term mutilation by those who want to abolish the practice is the term 
“mutilation” technically depicts the practice and makes clear the harmful consequences 
associated with the practice.23 One scholar writing about FGC asserts that the term mutilation 
“emphasizes the harm and makes it a very effective advocacy tool.”24   As it relates to what to 
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call the traditional practice one writer observes that “there has been much misinformation 
perpetuated through the use of different terms.”25 
 Not everyone, including scholars writing on the subject, agrees that mutilation is the most 
appropriate term to apply to the practice. Those who object to the use of mutilation describe FGC 
the term as “offensive, criminalizing, psychically mutilating, and even shocking to communities 
that perform the practice.”26 A further analysis of the term mutilation finds that the term 
“projects a double standard by the West” by publicly disapproving and denouncing the practice 
without condemning the West’s obsession with the many body enhancements ideology and 
surgeries.27 Another problem with the use of the word mutilation is that the word implies 
excessive judgment and promotes an insensitivity toward women who have undergone the 
procedure.  
 In addition one writer notes that using the term mutilation strongly suggests and infers 
“intentional harm and evil intent,” an accusation denied by those involved in the traditional 
custom.28 The scholarship notes that using the term mutilation is rejected by “insiders” (those in 
Africa who embrace the traditional practice, particularly women) and is viewed as a biased term 
constructed by Western feminist and Western hysteria. Some scholars write that to use the term 
mutilation is to “imply that all of the surgeries associated with the practice of FGC are 
mutilating.”29 According to the literature on FGC and specifically the types associated with FGC, 
Type I, called circumcision is not mutilating and is reported to be the lease invasive of the 
surgeries. On the other hand however, to employ the term “circumcision” to describe all of the 
surgeries that are characteristic of the practice affords the reader to liken FGC to the male 
account of circumcision. Relating female circumcision to male circumcision is what some 
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scholars call a “false analogy” and is gives the wrong idea and impression of FGC particularly 
due the differences of the surgeries and the level of harm rendered to each type of surgery.30 
 The World Health Organization (WHO) groups FGC into four categories.  
Type I, clitoridectomy, involves removing of the prepuce or the hood with or without excision of 
parts or all of the clitoris. Type I is called circumcision by some scholars writing about the 
subject and note that Type I can authentically be called circumcision. Efua Dorkenoo describes 
that Type I; circumcision can accurately be described as female circumcision, as it is the one 
surgery that is  “identical to male circumcision.”31 The literature on FGC however includes all 
types of genital surgeries including the most invasive procedure and brands them all as female 
circumcision. In spite of this observation, various countries in Africa do not regard Type I, 
circumcision as “genuine circumcision.”32 This observation may be a factor in why the rate of 
Types II, III and IV are most common in some countries in Africa.  For instance, Efua Dorkenoo 
describes Types II through IV surgeries as mutilation. She further illustrates that the equal of 
these surgeries to male circumcision biologically is “various degrees of penisectomy.” 33  
 Type II; excision removes the prepuce or hood and the clitoris at the same time, with 
partial or or total removal of the labia minor.  Type II; excision accounts for approximately 80 
percent of women who undergo the surgery, and is at times referred to as intermediary 
circumcision. Type III; infibulation removes part or all of the external genitalia. The clitoris, 
labia minor, and parts of the labia majora are removed. Tight stitching after the infibulation 
narrows the vaginal opening leaving a small opening for urine and the menstrual flow. 
Infibulation is described as the most extreme of the surgeries.  
 Type IV, is referred to as unclassified and includes all other procedures. Some of the 
procedures include for example, pricking, piercing, or being cut, particularly with a V shape. 
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Type IV includes all vaginal decorating. It is important to note that the literature reveals that 
these procedures are not exhaustive. When discussing the categories and types of circumcision it 
is helpful to include other names found in the historical literature on FGC. For instance Type I 
(circumcision) is also referred to in the Islamic culture as “sunna.” Type II; (excision) is called 
Khafd. Type III; (infibulation) is also known as “pharaonic circumcision” and this type was 
thought to be practiced during the Pharaoh dynasties in Egypt.34  
A. Prevalence of FGC 
 It was from an early beginning that the ritual practice of FGC spread to parts of Africa, 
the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. The scholarship on the prevalence of FGC illustrates 
that the traditional practice continues and spreads due to the “ethnic, cultural, and religious 
affiliation of neighboring tribes who may live in different countries.”35  An examination on the 
scholarship on the prevalence of FGC describes that another reason for its prevalence is that 
there are “several paradoxes in the reasons behind the practice and perhaps there is a hidden 
agenda as it pertains to women” who embrace and undergo the surgery.36 For example, some of 
the literature written from a Western viewpoint on FGC does not reflect the idea that there are 
women who embrace female circumcision. This acceptance and positive acknowledgment of the 
practice can be attributed to the pervasive nature of the traditional custom. While some women 
agree that the procedure is painful, they further note that there is value in FGC and that 
circumcised genitalia “are considered normal.”37 The value of FGC is connected to their beliefs 
and to their cultural customs. 
 It is estimated that approximately 100 to 140 million women worldwide have undergone 
FGC/c and that most girls who undergo the procedure live in Africa.  It is additionally recorded 
that 228,000 women living in the U.S. have experienced FGC. There are countries in Africa 
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where the prevalence is more pronounced than other places. In addition, some countries practice 
one specific type of FGC, while others practice a combination of the surgeries. For example, in 
Egypt 97% of the women are circumcised. 72% have undergone Type II, (excision) 17% Type I 
(clitoridectomy) and 9% Type III (infibulation). In Somalia 98% of the women have Type III 
circumcision. On the other hand, in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, 5% of the 
women are circumcised with Types I and II. While the prevalence of FGC persists in Africa, the 
traditional practice occurs in various parts of world. Other geographical areas where FGC is 
practiced is in the Middle East and Western Asia. FGC is practiced in ethnic groups in Yemen, 
India, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. There are increasing numbers of women who have 
experienced FGC/c found in Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 
primarily among immigrant women from countries in which it is practiced.38  
B. Reasons and Justifications 
 The most prevailing reasons and rationales associated with FGC can be found in the 
historical context of circumcision, namely male circumcision. The reasons for both male and 
female genital circumcision can be linked back to its origins. One example of the basis for 
circumcision attributed to the history and found in the more contemporary literature, is the 
medical rationale for circumcision. Currently there is fierce debate that the surgery serves no 
medical benefit. Historically, however the surgery was linked to prevention of diseases. The 
most common rationale that typically justifies circumcision is attributed to religion, a reason that 
some scholars writing about FGC disagree. Since the traditional practice is firmly established 
within the context of culture, ethnicity, and geographic location, the reason and rationales for the 
practice are as diverse as the places where the custom is practiced.39 Justification for the practice 
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depends on an entire belief system not just one single factor, and the belief system that is 
attributed to FGC is properly placed in the historical context of the practice.40 
 The World Health Organization (WHO) highlights four categories that illustrate rationals 
and reasons for the FGC. These include, 1) socio-cultural, and conformity 2) hygienic and 
aesthetic, 3) spiritual and religious and 5) psycho-sexual.41 Interestingly, the reasons and 
rationales cited by the WHO are parallel to those reasons attributed to male circumcision. This 
parallel affirms the embedded nature of ritual and tradition, culture, values and beliefs over time. 
Women who have both experienced FGC and who have daughters who are circumcised have 
very compelling reasons for the procedure.  
 An example of theses reasons is illustrated in field studies conducted that highlight two 
main reasons women for circumcising  girls.  The first reason noted is that the practice reduces a 
women’s sexual desire, thus preserving the young girls virginity until she is married.42  In Africa, 
a circumcised female is a prerequisite for marriage. Marriage is associated with security and 
security with the economic nature of the traditional practice. Other scholarship on FGC offers 
that circumcising girls is used as a way of protecting young girls against, namely rape, a reason 
that is not often fully investigated.  
 The second reason for circumcision given by the women who were interviewed is that 
circumcision works as a “catalyst to speed up a woman’s full achievement of her femininity.”43 
Concerning femininity, in some parts of Africa their belief system is one that suggests that the 
clitoris grows to the size of a male organ, an idea associated with the notion of aesthetics. One 
reason for the aesthetic viewpoint is that some women in Africa describe their genitalia as ugly 
and look similar to that of men. It is reported that having genital modification (FGC) not only 
beautifies the genitalia to look more feminine, but the surgery purifies the female genitalia.  The 
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idea of purity, a rationale also linked to the surgery, is that the larger the clitoris the “dirtier and 
uglier it is. The state of being uncircumcised was termed dirty and had to be washed away.”44 It 
is important to note here that both purity and aesthetics are reasons attributed historically to 
circumcision. In the historical literature on the FGC, hygienics is associated with the idea of 
purity, a notion embedded in the early Egyptian culture. Hygienics and purity are named as  
primary reasons for circumcision of both males and female. While most women agree that the 
procedure is painful they embrace circumcision as a rites of passage to being a women.45 
Circumcision then serves as a way for women to embrace their femininity while beautifying the 
genitalia, a third reason for circumcision highlighted also by WHO. 
 Religion is one of the major influences attributed to FGC. Religion is credited to the 
origins of the both male and female circumcision and the transmission, prevalence and 
persistence of FGC. Religious beliefs are also one of the main influences that shapes social 
culture and social norms. It is connected to social conformity and certainly to ones value system. 
When linking FGC to religion, one scholar describes that “religion is one of the reasons 
consistently given for performing the practice but is also a strategy for addressing the issue.” 46 
In a study focused on why women practice female circumcision, the study highlights that 90% of 
women report that religion influences their decision for engaging in the practice.  
 FGC is embraced as a religious ritual surgery and it also meets a religious requirement. 
According to some of the scholarship this religious requirement is most dominant in the Muslim 
faith. Conversely, however other literature notes that FGC “is not a practice required by the 
Koran” and questions the association of FGC to Islam.47 The argument used to question the 
relationship between the Muslim faith tradition and FGC is that certain types of female 
circumcision, for example clitoridectomy and infibulation existed before Islam. Further 
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examination regarding religion as a rationale for FGC describes that the surgery is embraced by 
many faiths including Christianity. The scholarship however illustrates that there is uncertainty 
of the religious mandate in both Christianity and Muslim faith traditions. 
 It is important to note that there are other reasons assigned to FGC. For instance, Rahman 
and Toubia include other factors when identifying reasons for the practice which include 1). a 
rite of passage for childhood to adult hood 2) the need to control a woman's sexuality. 3) a 
cultural practice that has religious identification. 4) social conformity. Social conformity is a 
concept forwarded by much of the scholarship on FGC. It is argued that the FGC aids to preserve 
a place in community. It ensures acceptance in the community which has a compellingly strong 
influence, a notion that is expanded in the chapter on culture. 
 
C. Health Consequences attributed to FGC 
 One of the most fiercely debated topics in the discourse concerning FGC is the discussion 
on health consequences and potential health risks caused by FGC. The health consequences 
associated with the practice are at the heart of the debate and present serious ethical dilemmas 
and queries. There are both physical and psychological complications associated with FGC. 
Some of the scholarship notes that there are also neurological consequences of the surgery. An 
investigation of the literature on health consequences describes both short term and long term 
complications.48 It is important to note here that some of the research on FGC does not reflect 
which type of circumcision is associated with specific health risks and implications, rather the 
literature reflect that there are “possible” immediate complications for all types of circumcision.  
 The short term consequences that are linked to the FGC include severe pain, bleeding and 
shock from the intense pain. If the bleeding extends over a long period of time it can lead to 
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anemia and hemorrhage and if not controlled the excessive bleeding can lead to death. Other 
potential negative health implications are risks of infection such as HIV/AIDS, hepatitis B and C. 
The long term complications are associated more often with Type III, infibulation. These long 
term outcomes include difficulty with menstrual flow and urination, both which can cause 
infections. Untreated urinary tract infections can “ascend to the kidneys and bladder potentially 
causes renal failure septicemia which can lead to death.” 49 
 In some cases, Type III can cause damage to the sexual organs. Other complications 
attributed to the surgery and particularly Type III are painful intercourse, obstetrical 
complications, infertility, and dermoid cysts. The scholarship notes that all forms of FGC are 
alleged to be linked to diminished sexual pleasure, an allegation that is rejected by women who 
have undergone the surgery 50 It is important to note however that scholars writing about FGC 
and the health consequences of the surgeries describe Type I (circumcision) as the “mildest type 
of the surgery and is the one surgery most associated to male circumcision.”51 Much of the health 
risks that are associated with the surgeries result from unhygienic circumstances. One example of 
the unhygienic conditions described in the scholarship is the use of dirty instruments. Often the 
unsterilized instruments are knives, razor blades, scissors, thorns and pieces of glass.52 Some of 
the scholarship especially characterizes un-sterilized to mean that instruments are used over and 
over again, without sterilization, a reason attributed to the high rate infection. Other reasons 
associated with the health risks are the dismal lack of medical treatment, substandard medical 
treatment and care available to women after the surgery is performed.53 Health professionals are 
often unfamiliar and do not have the knowledge necessary to treat and care for women who 
undergo the surgery.  
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 It is critical to note that the literature on the health consequences of FGC is abundant, and 
some scholars argue that it is one sided and unbalanced as there are opposing points of views. 
The conflicting viewpoint of the literature concerning health consequences is that the volume of 
literature on FGC and the health consequences is a dramatization of western views regarding 
FGC that frame the health consequences in such a dismal light. 54 This is not to say that women 
undergoing the procedure have not experienced negative health consequences as is the risk with 
all surgeries. The potential outcomes must be examined in a larger context that includes an 
ethical analysis of care for women undergo the surgeries. 
D. Efforts to Eradicate 
 One of the engines that has fueled advocacy efforts to eradicate the practice of FGC in 
Africa and in the West was the 1995 opinion piece printed in the New York Times. This article 
set the dominant and unbalanced discourse in Western media. The scholarship however, notes 
that the movement to abolish FGC started in the early 1980’s and that it was the Western media 
that sensationalized and created hysteria regarding the practice. 55  
Despite rigorous attempts and strategies to eradicate the traditional practice, FGC still exists and 
persists throughout most parts of the world. The persistence of FGC indicates the resistance 
toward strategies to curb or eradicate FGC, however eradication remains a major theme in the 
FGC debate.  
 Historically, the effort to eradicate FGC was the result of a WHO seminar on “Traditional 
Practices Affecting Women and Children” held in 1998 in Khartoum, the Republic of Sudan. 
The recommendation made in the general assembly regarding FGC was to “adoption of clear 
national policies for the abolishment of female circumcision”56 One major component of the 
strategy was education. The education about FGC particularly the health consequences resulting 
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from the surgeries, were focused toward practitioners, including midwives and traditional 
healers. In some of the more resent campaigns to eradicate the traditional custom, education 
remains a fundamental ingredient to the strategy.  
 There is abundant discussion about the success of the campaigns to eradicate FGC. For 
example, as it relates to trends, an examination of the data reveals that “the prevalence of female 
genital mutilation/cutting has reduced and on average the overall prevalence has fallen across 
generations” in some areas where the surgery is practiced. 57 The area where the decline is most 
significant is Kenya, a country where the focused area of eradication is most targeted.58 
Conversely, however the research demonstrates that in some countries there is an increase in the 
surgeries being done. In addition the surgeries where the increase is most prevalent, FGC is done 
by a health professional. 59 While some of the scholarship on the eradication of FGC shows a 
decrease in the practice, the data also reflects that FGC remains.60  
 FGC is still practiced and some of the scholarship describes that practitioners have 
altered the way the procedure carried out. Scholars argue that the complete eradication of FGC is 
unlikely. One reason for the unlikeliness of the elimination of FGC, is that women of all 
socioeconomic and education levels are in favor of the traditional practice. 61 Not only do women 
in FGC communities embrace the practice, the scholarship illustrates that FGC is typically 
controlled and managed by women. A second reason that the total elimination of FGC is 
doubtful is that the transmission of the practice is carried through the social norms, culture and 
customs, namely that of marriageability, a notion investigated in the chapter on Culture in this 
dissertation.  
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III. Globalization and FGC in the U.S.  
 One avenue for inspiring a more respectful and less ethnocentric discourse concerning 
FGC is to pay attention to the globalization of the U.S. The United States is rapidly becoming a 
more globalized society. According to estimates from the 2011 ACS, the U.S. immigrant 
population, those who now reside in the US, stood at almost 40.4 million, or 13 percent of the 
total U.S. population of 311.6 million. 62 Such countries are characterized by diverse cultures that 
embrace very distinctive practices. One such practice is Female Genital Cutting (FGC). 
Worldwide approximately 80 to 140 million women have undergone FGC. It is estimated that 
228,000 women in the U.S. have experienced FGC.  As females and female refugees migrate 
from FGC communities to a non- female FGC reality, women bring their customs, beliefs, and 
values and they bring their health care needs.   
Women from FGC/m communities, who live in the United States, face very distressing 
adjustments.  An illustration of the adjustment is moving from a community where FGC is a 
social and cultural tradition, to living in an environment where the tradition is deemed taboo and 
even illegal for females under the age of eighteen to undergo. In all cultures there are concerns 
about being able to practice one’s traditions, therefore being included in cultural traditions and 
customs are commonplace whether the tradition is characterized by males or females. Social 
norms and customs are complex, and to not address the complexities of social customs of those 
who migrate to the US from other countries has ethical implications. One implication is 
providing unbiased and non-discriminatory health care to people from different cultures and 
customs. Some of the scholarship on FGC articulates that in the U.S. there is unfamiliarity about 
the custom of FGC. Conversely however, genital modifications and particularly female 
circumcision in the U.S are not new. According to the history of FGC the practice was used in 
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the 1950’s to cure female tendencies toward lesbianism, masturbation and behavior attributed to 
the hysteria of women.  
With regard to the globalization of the U.S., the scholarship reflects that one area that 
globalization has dramatically effected is the image of women’s bodies. 63 The globalization of 
these images has positively positioned female genital modification surgeries in North America. 
For example, in North America and Europe there is a popularized aesthetic ideal of a smooth and 
clean genital look.64 This ideal has implications for the aesthetic reasons reported by women who 
embrace FGC in Africa. For example, “female genital surgeries in Africa are viewed by insiders 
as aesthetic enhancements of the body and are not to judged as mutilations” 65 a posture 
prevalent in the West.  In addition, some genital surgeries, for instance labiaplasty done by 
cosmetic surgeons, is noted to be the “fasting growing form of cosmetic surgery in North 
America and Europe. “66 It is important to highlight that the scholarship describing labiaplasty, 
compares labiaplasty to that of Type I and Type II circumcision.  A consequence of this kind of 
globalization is the need for inclusion of diverse cultural customs and traditions that may be 
controversial to the U.S. ethos.  The globalization within the U.S. is not going away; neither will 
the integration of other cultural practices and traditions, namely FGC.  
IV. Status 
 Female Genital Cutting (FGC) has moral importance. The moral important of FGC lies in 
the fact that the actors of FGC are “human properties.”67 In the investigation of moral status the 
notion of harm seems to be directly related to the idea of moral status, a theme associated with 
the health consequences of FGC. In addition, the scholarship on moral status notes “to cause pain 
is to cause harm.”68 The scholarship on moral status describes that actions that cause harm are 
morally unacceptable and taboo and that actions that cause harm are not permitted unless there is 
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a morally acceptable reason to justify the action that causes the harm, for instance the health 
consequences attributed to FGC. Scholars note about moral status, “experiencing pain and 
suffering are almost sufficiently to confer some measure of moral status.”69  
 One of the main objectives of morality is to minimize pain and suffering. Included in the 
main objective is to prevent or limit indifference toward those who are experiencing pain and 
suffering. Woman who experience the pain of FGC surgeries are intimately linked to the idea of 
preventing indifference.  The notion of indifference mainly refers to the lack of concern and 
disinterest in the actor (women who have undergone FGC) so common found in the scholarship 
on FGC. Indifference therefore can be associated with the moral judgments made concerning 
FGC. Moral judgments however, “cannot be the end of the story; we must also decide what to do 
about our moral judgments”70 and how the moral judgments made support the ethical care of 
women who have experienced FGC. Indifference is a view imbedded in the subject of FGC. The 
indifference is manifested in a number of ways. An illustration observed in the scholarship for 
example is that women who experience FGC are often discriminated against and shunned by the 
medical community in which they live. On the other hand, if women in FGC communities 
choose not to undergo the surgery they are rebuked by their community and indifference is 
created.  
 The lack of enthusiasm, concern and interest by both the healthcare community and their 
indigenous community is compelling. Additionally, it is curious that the main objective of 
determining moral status is to minimize pain. Could it be that the idea of harm reduction and 
autonomy as it relates to FGC is an act of morality and moral judgment that respects the cultural 
diversity and customs for those who are moral agents who desire to embrace their cultural 
tradition? A cultural tradition that is intimately connected to the identity of women who embrace 
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and undergo the surgery, a rationale for engaging in the practice and passing the cultural tradition 
on to future generations. 
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Chapter 2: Refugee Women, FGC, and Care  
 The current plight of refugees worldwide is compelling and complex.  In 2007, the 
number of refugees globally stood at 11.4 million.1 However by the end of 2010, the number of 
the “worlds refugees stood at 43.7 million.”2 One of the complexities of refugees is being able to 
meet the needs and to provide assistance. Meeting the need of refugees and particularly refugee 
women is daunting.3 An equally challenging task is to meet the health care need of refugee 
women. Most problematic in meeting the need for care is that refugee women, suffer a host of 
physical problems that are often compounded by the immoral acts of violence, and dreadful 
persecution that they endure while on the journey to refuge which makes it difficult to provide 
care in settings that are without adequate facilities and expertise.  Another complexity is   
refugees have been displaced from their homeland and the communities in which they lived.  
Refugee women will often migrate to places that may not respect or embrace different cultural 
traditions and customs to which they are accustomed, and invokes other health care needs. One 
factor under examination is what is owed to refugees.  This chapter will give attention to 
constructing the notion of ‘refugees.’ In constructing the concept of refugees the question of who 
refugees are is addressed.  Contextualizing refugee women in North American is the focus of 
section two. The section will consider refugee women who have experienced FGC. An 
exploration of the subject of human rights and its relation to refugees is included.4 The literature 
on refugees gives strong consideration of human rights when working with refugees. FGC and 
refugee women are a prominent feature in the literature on refugee women.5 Some of the 
scholarship regarding FGC, frames the practice as a violation of human rights, therefore an 
examination is warranted.6  FGC is criticized and condemned for the health consequences of the 
procedure, which impacts an already dismal health status of refugee women. For these reasons 
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the health status of refugee women is elaborated. One of the implications of refugee women 
migrating to new environments and integrating their cultural traditions and practices is that the 
customs are pasted on to future generations. The concept of future generations is explored. 
Lastly, it is important to note that in the refugee discourse, the concept of refugee and 
displacement is often used interchangeably, and encompasses a host of factors also elaborated in 
this chapter.   
I. Constructing the Concept of ‘Refugee’  
One framework for constructing refugee status is the United Nations Human Rights Commission 
(UNHRC). The UNHRC defines a refugee as a person who has been “forced to flee his or her 
country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of 
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a 
particular social group. Most refugees cannot return home or are afraid to do so. There is fear 
due to war and the violence that is attributed to ethnic, religious and tribal conflicts. War and 
ethnic, tribal and religious violence are leading causes of refugees fleeing their countries.”7 
Individuals and groups who have been forced from their homes--having lost all ties to their 
communities, traditions, and customs, and forced to live in a countries and communities that are 
foreign to them. In many cases refugees are women. Women account for about half of any 
refugee, internally displaced or stateless population. Women refugees face a host of terrifying 
experiences and have endured the emotional, physical and perhaps spiritual consequences of 
being forced from home. With regard to refugees and how refugees are referred to, the 
scholarship on refugees uses several terms interchangeably that includes displacement, internal 
displacement, internal refugees, territorial displacement and forcibly displaced, terms used 
interchangeably by UNHRC. One scholar writing about refugees refers to the concept as “forced 
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eviction”8 to describe their status as refugees. The use of this term denotes that most often 
refugees are removed against their will and certainly without choice. 
A. Types of Displacement 
 i.   Internal Displacement 
           According to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement internally displaced 
persons (IDP’s) are defined as “individuals and groups who are forced or obliged to flee or to 
leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid 
the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violation of human rights, or 
human-made disasters and who have crossed an internationally recognized state border.”9  The 
Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons highlights two elements that are necessary 
and cannot be overlooked when identifying IDP’s. The first feature used to identify IDP’s is the 
movement against the will of the individual. In other words, “the coercive or otherwise 
involuntary character of movement-that is movement caused by armed conflict, violence, 
disaster, and the like and (2) the fact that such movements take place within national borders.”10 
There is a second prerequisite that should be considered when identifying IDP’ and that 
according to the Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Person should be acknowledged in a 
broader sense, particularly as it relates to where people who have been forced to flee their home 
find a shelter and safety.  For example, an IDP must “first go abroad and then return to their own 
country but cannot go back to their home.  Secondly, an IDP must voluntarily go to another part 
of the country in which they live, but cannot return to their place of origin.”11 The criteria for 
being an IDP are also met if the individuals have to go through a state close by in order to access 
a safe part of their country of origin. The second criterion distinguishes IDP’s from refugees who 
are also involuntarily displaced but across internationally recognized state borders.  
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According to the scholarship an important difference between refugees and IDP’s is the legal 
protection extended to refugees. Refugees have a universal and nonspecific protection under 
international law. However, there are no specific standards covering IDP’s. As it relates to the 
UN, “no UN agency is specifically mandated to ensure their welfare.”12 The scholarship is clear 
about these differences. The major difference reflected describes that refugees have crossed 
international borders and are entitled to protection and assistance from the states into which they 
move and from the international community. Internal displacement occurs typically in response 
to armed conflict, persecution, situations of widespread violence, natural and human- made 
disasters and, more recently, large-scale development projects. However, both the scale of the 
problem and the nature of the response have become far more important in the last two decades. 
While the UNHRC has taken seriously the plight of IDP’s, as evidenced by the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement, scholars note that internally displaced persons do not have 
rights that are enforceable by “hard laws.”13 The distinguishing factor that sets IDP’s apart for 
refugees is that IDP’s remain within the borders of a state where refugees have been forced 
across international borders. This characteristic is not to say that IPD’s are not exposed to some 
of the same threats and dangerous situations that are experienced by refugees. On the contrary, 
IPD’s are also vulnerable, at risk of harm and in need of protection.14  
              Internally displaced persons face horrific challenges. One specific challenge is that 
IDP’s often flee their homes due to the threat that the government of the country in which they 
live is the source of their suffering and their displacement. In addition to the fear imposed by 
their government, IDP’s face “deprivation and dangers associated with being driven from their 
homes.”15 These dangers and the lack of protection and assistance offered by refugee and 
internal displacement agencies leaves IPDs unguarded, vulnerable and open to harm. The 
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implications of the idea that IDP’s are without protection from laws that are unyielding and firm 
is ethically concerning, particularly as it relates to the care of women who are affected by FGC 
and in need of help. It is noteworthy to mention that IDPs have emerged as the largest group of 
people receiving UNHCR’s protection and assistance.  
           At the beginning of 2011, there were as many as 14.7 million IPD’s in 27 countries. Some 
of the literature on IPD’s illustrates however that the total number of IDPs from conflict could be 
as high as 27.5 million. Due to the increase of IPD’s the agency “has increasingly engaged with 
internally displaced people (IDPs), stateless people, populations affected by major natural 
disasters and people displaced in urban areas.”16 Given the scholarship on refugees and IDP’s 
and the controversy about how to call people who are displaced from their homeland, their 
communities, their livelihood, and traditions in which they are accustomed, both refugees and 
IDP’s are in need of assistant and care. 
ii. Forced Migration 
The scholarship on forced migration illustrates that there is a host of debates and 
dilemmas, which are complicated when working with this population of people. One idea 
debated is the how to define the concept of forced migration. According to the literature, scholars 
agree that there is difficulty in producing a definition of “forced migration” that fully satisfies the 
interests, objectives and expectations of all involved, including forced migrants themselves.“17 
The International Association for the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM) describes forced 
migration as a term used in the general sense, and refers to the “movements of refugees and 
internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural 
or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects.”18  
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The term forced migration implies the coerced movement of people away from their 
home or home region. It often denotes violent coercion, and is used interchangeably with the 
terms "displacement" or forced displacement.  
Unlike most refugees, forced re-settlers (I refer here specifically to those displaced by 
infrastructural projects) have no choice about leaving their homes and cannot entertain the 
slightest hope of returning to them. Different from refugees, it is possible for the movement of 
IPD’s to be planned well in advance. The authorities can therefore take steps to ensure that the 
disruptive impact of the move is minimized and that the standard of living of the re-settlers is 
improved, or at least maintained. It is important to conceptualize the notion of forced migration 
as it assists with interpretation and brings more deliberate attention to those who have no 
autonomous choice about leaving home and who are in need of care and assistance. In order to 
determine the connection to care, and the need to respond ethically as to determine what is 
morally best to do, examining this framework of forced migration is useful. Egide Rwamatwara 
writes that the concept of forced migration has “sometimes contradictory interpretations and 
connotations,”19 much like the idea of displaced persons and refugees mentioned earlier.  
One example of the contradictory nature of interpretations used to describe the nuances 
and undertones of migration and forced migration is language. For instance, when describing 
forced migration verses, voluntary migration, the concepts are very different. When displacement 
is view from a place of contrast, forced migration is realized in the context of cause. On the other 
hand, when looking at displacement from the viewpoint of voluntary migration, a purpose for 
electing to migrate is understood.  In this way displacement is viewed from a cause and purpose 
lens.20 In other words, for some there are causes associated with forced migration while others 
migrate voluntarily for a specific purpose. From this viewpoint, forced migration as it were, has 
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root causes where voluntary migration is embedded in purpose. Using the framework of cause 
and purpose, migration can be referred to as migration that is tied to trade, industry, and financial 
viability, as opposed to migration that involve a combination of social and political factors.  
Clearly, one form of migration describes migrants (emphasizing purpose) who leave their homes 
to go elsewhere in search of the opportunity for a better life facilitated by employment, business 
or education.21 On the other hand, (emphasizing cause) migrants flee from their homes and place 
of residence because they must protect themselves and their families from the immediate threat 
of harm. These are different variables that lead to migration.   
As it relates to language, other scholars use the terms “proactive and reactive” migration. 
Some writings about migration classify migrants in two main categories, those with agency or 
choice (autonomy) and those without agency. For example, those without agency are “forced 
migrants with little to no agency”22  who are forced to leave their county against their will. With 
regard to the bioethics scholarship the notion of agency is important and is investigated in 
chapter three of this dissertation. Agency is linked to the right to self- determination which when 
taken away leaves people and groups of people vulnerable. The state of vulnerability has 
implications for providing care and assistance for those in need.23  
According to the UNHCR’s demographic data on forced displacement approximately 
“33.9 million people were ‘people of concern’ to UNHCR at the start of 2011, an increase from 
19.2 million in 2005.”24 While the increase is inclusive of both men and women, the trend 
reflected in the scholarship is that there is an increase in the number of refugees who are women. 
For example, the forced migration research emphasizes that “one of the most significant trends in 
migration has been the entry of women into migration streams that once had been primarily 
male.”25 The literature further illustrates that approximately half of the migrants globally are 
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women. This particular trend is critical to supporting the focus on women who migrant to 
western countries, namely the US. As women migrate from other culturally diverse communities 
they bring their cultural customs, beliefs, traditions, values and practices with them and look to 
integrate them into the place where they have settled. One example of the integration of a 
cultural custom is FGC. 
iii. Asylum Designation 
             Another component of the refugee discourse is the legal designation of asylum. Not only 
is it of foremost consideration in the legal discourse concerning refugees and FGC, but the 
literature shows that FGC has been used as grounds for asylum in other countries and 
specifically the United States. Asylum is defined as the protection granted by a nation to 
someone who has left his or her native country as a political refugee. The International Spectrum 
at the University of Michigan defines asylum in a more specific sense, and notes that asylum is“a 
form of protection extended to individuals by the U.S. government.”26 It is important to note that 
a person must be designated as refugee in order to seek asylum. Distinctive to the idea of asylum 
is that those who seek the asylum must be able to prove that they are in imminent danger and that 
there is well founded fear of persecution. The persecution must be based on race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Specifically, the 
persecution must be imposed by the government or a group the government cannot control. A 
person who is granted political asylum may remain in the U.S. indefinitely and may apply for 
permanent residence after one year. 
 According to estimates from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), since 1998 the United States has processed an average of 46,000 asylum applications 
each year. Winning asylum in this country, however, is not an easy task. On average, only 62 
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percent of applications have been successful. While the idea of asylum has traditionally focused 
on fear of persecution due to one’s religion, race or political association, in recent years Female 
Genital Cutting has been used as grounds for asylum. There is a plethora of scholarship, namely 
legal scholarship as it relates to claims for asylum.27 The 1996 landmark case; In Re Fauziya 
Kasinga is a case that is frequently mentioned regarding asylum and FGC. Fauziya Kasinga is a 
Togolese woman who was awarded political asylum in the United States by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service in order to escape having the genital cutting procedure.28  
 In so far as the literature illustrates, being granting asylum in the United States due to 
FGC is very difficult for a refugee or immigrant women to attain. Further, the U.S. has been 
“reluctant to recognize FGM as grounds for granting asylum.”29 It is not that the U.S. has not 
adopted the doctrine outlined in 1967 Protocol, and the 1951 United Nations Convention Related 
to Status of Refugees, the challenge is determining what constitutes persecution. It is important 
to note that the Refugee Act gives authority to governments to grant asylum, but the person 
requesting must meet the definition of refugee. While the Refugee Act gives this authority to the 
government, a women seeking asylum in the US must demonstrate four factors that include fear 
and well founded fear of persecution that the government or official of the government in which 
she lives will inflict persecution. While fear of persecution must be demonstrated before asylum 
is awarded, the scholarship on asylum and FGC describes that fear of persecution is most often 
difficult to prove. What is equally difficult in linking FGC to asylum is that the traditional 
custom is often referred to as a gender based act of violence. Gender-violence based claims “do 
not fit easily into the statutory definition of refugee because gender is not one of the enumerated 
grounds to define refugee status.”30  
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The consideration to determine FGC persecution and to grant asylum on the bases of it is 
challenging at best. Much of the literature on asylum and FGC also include the human rights 
discourse which at times is used to further the case for asylum when linking the custom as a 
violation of human rights.  Although the viewpoint of the UNHCR is that the violation of human 
rights has the potential to constitute persecution,31 other statutes and legislative bodies of work 
regarding refugee and asylum law are cautious. For example, some of the immigration literature 
discloses that the immigration statutes “do not define the term and thus the courts are faced with 
the challenge of determining whether FGC should be considered a human rights violation thus 
persecution.”32  The literature further describes that in its purest state, FGC is not a form of 
punishment or persecution rather it is primarily an ancient custom. 
iv. Refugee 
One of the major themes in the scholarship on refugees is what the term “refugee” means. 
While the UNCHR gives definition for the term, the literature shows that the term ‘refugee’ is 
weighty at best.  It holds a plethora of nuances and distinction across disciplines.  One scholar 
writes that the term refugee, carries not only empirical sociological and socio-political 
connotation but above all, is a normative and a legal category enshrined as such in international 
law.”33  With regard to international law, Morawa affirms the conclusiveness of this statement 
citing the Convention of Belem do Para.  The Convention reads, “state parties shall take special 
account for migrants, refugees or displaced people, who are vulnerable due to their “liberty 
status”34 a status that deprives them of their liberty.  
Concerning the concept of refugee, and its meaning, some scholars embrace the idea that 
the “territorially displaced person is a category that includes refugees, the internally displaced 
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and forced migration.”35  Other scholars use the word displacement interchangeably to refer to 
refugees.  The UNHRC uses the concept of “forcibly displaced”36 to refer to refugees. A further 
exploration of the literature shows that within the rubric of territorial displacement, there is a 
marked distinction between the concept of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.  
Earlier in this chapter an IPD is defined as a person who has been forced to flee his or her home 
for the same reason as a refugee, but remains in his or her own country and has not crossed an 
international border.  Unlike refugees, IDPs are not protected by international law or eligible to 
receive various types of aid.  
The United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) defines a refugee as 
“someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, violence, 
or a a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, 
or membership in a particular social group.”37 A feature in what is included in determining 
refugee status it that refugees cannot return home. Not being able to return home is most likely 
due to fear of war, religious, ethnic and tribal violence, which are also the leading causes of what 
forces refugees to leave their country. There is an extraordinary and unparalleled number of 
refugees fleeing persecution. As of June 20, 2011, “war and political repression were responsible 
for 43.7 million people being displaced from their homes by the end of 2010.”38 The literature 
further shows that the highest number of refugee populations is found in Pakistan, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Related to where refugees find refuge the UNHCR reports that it 
is the worlds’ poorest countries that have little or no resources that are hosting refugees and 
displaced peoples. Further, “27.5 million people are displaced in their own country with the 
pervasive indicator for the displacement being conflict and there are nearly 850,000 asylum 
seekers one fifth of them in South Africa alone”39 
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 Since the traditional and cultural practice of FGC is extensive in Africa, it is prudent to 
mention the African context as it relates to refugee women. What is interesting in the context of 
Africa, specifically the Great Lake Region (GLR) is that the statistics on forced displacement 
reveal that the vast majority of displaced persons found in the GLR originated from that very 
region. The countries include Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Uganda. The GLR “are the six core countries of the Great Lakes Region of Africa 
and are called the GLR because the countries are located around Lakes Victoria, Tanganyika, 
Albert, and Kivu”40 The GLR is important to highlight as no other region on the African 
continent “has a forced displacement problem of comparable duration or magnitude.”41 The GLR 
is a region that is beleaguered by relentless violence. It is also noteworthy that Kenya is one of 
the countries where FGC is most prevalent.  
As the nature of war has changed in the last few decades, and the onset of more internal 
conflicts replacing wars among countries, the number of IDPs has increased significantly.”42 
Both refugees and IPDs have been mandated to leave the place where they once lived. While 
there are similarities in the experiences of refugees and IPDs, Bushra, and Fish explain, there are 
considerable differences.43  They write, “refugees have crossed international borders and are 
entitled to protection and assistance from the states into which they move and from the 
international community, which is facilitated through the United Nations (UN) and its specialist 
agencies.”44  In other words, refugees are protected under the international law and IPD’s are not.  
B.  The Legal Guidelines for Determining Refugee Status 
 In its legal sense the term refugee represents protection that may be granted to individuals 
who meet the definition of ‘refugee.’ Refugees are generally people outside of their country who 
are unable or unwilling to return home because they fear serious abuse and loss of life. The term 
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refugee is a legal term and implies a legal status. Formally, under United States law, according to 
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the guidelines for determining refugee status 
apply to someone who is located outside of the United States, is of special humanitarian concern 
to the U.S., demonstrates that he or she is persecuted or fears persecution due to race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group and is not firmly 
resettled in another country and is admissible to the United States.45 Since the dissertation 
distinctly explores women who are refugees it is noteworthy that women make up approximately 
half of the world’s refugee population.  
  According to the UNCHR, refugees often live in overcrowded camps. Due to this 
overcrowded environment women are especially vulnerable to atrocities related to sexual 
violence.46 These forms of cruelty and aggression include “rape, forced impregnation, forced 
abortion, sexual slavery, and the intentional spread of sexually transmitted infections, including 
HIV/AIDS. The transmittal of HIV/AIDS is one of the defining characteristics of contemporary 
armed conflict. Its primary targets are women and girls.”47 These acts of sexual violence are 
described in the scholarship as gendered based violence and warrant the need for protection. It is 
important to note here that external threats also include other forms of infectious diseases found 
in environments of extreme poverty, namely refugee camps. In addition to HIV/AIDS infections, 
other infectious diseases include, malaria, tuberculosis. Women and girls who suffer these 
highlighted external threats are powerless and do not have the ability to protect themselves or 
their self interest, therefore protection is needed for the survival of those who are unable and 
powerlessness of protecting their interests as they have inadequate means to do so,48 an are in 
need of assistance. Therefore the legal status of refugee is critical.   
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 Refugees, particularly women who have insufficient means are not only susceptible to 
external threats, for example the oppressive governing social order, but they are open to internal 
threats as well. External threats are vulnerabilities that threaten one’s opportunity to participate 
in the mainstream of life. One example of an external threat that impedes the ability for refugee 
women to participate in life in a holistic way is not having “equal access to food, water, and non-
food items, and are a fundamental issue facing refugee and displaced women and their 
children.”49  An opportunity to participate in the mainstream of life rather than on the margins 
must be afforded refugee women. Seemingly, to provide refugee women with access to 
assistance and support is what morality recommends. The global bioethics discourse advances 
not only the idea of external threats mentioned earlier but also internal threats. Internal threats 
are those internal factors that influence the genetic disposition of individuals who live in poverty 
for instance refugees, namely women, to be able to fight malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV 
infection.50 The authors further explain, “internal factors such as age, sex, and genetics can 
influence a biological response to malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV infection.”51  A global 
bioethical viewpoint on refugees and what refugees are owed is situated in a holistic context, 
which includes the individuals but also recognizes that the individual is part of wider 
community. It is here that the status of refugee granted as a legal status determines that the 
refugee is owed assistance as articulated by UNHCR. 
 i. International documents 
 In July 1951, a conference in Geneva developed and adopted the Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees (‘1951 Convention’). The 1951 Convention was later amended by the 
1967 Protocol. The Convention relating to the status of Refugees is the underpinning and the 
foundation for international refugee law. The legal documents provide a framework and 
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guidelines for determining who a refugee is. The document also highlights the legal protection 
and social rights entitled to refugees, as well as other assistance including the need for care.52 
Not only does the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol make clear what is owed to refugees, 
it also defines the obligatory relationship that refugee’s have to host countries and identifies 
specific categories of people, such as criminals, particularly those who were involved in war 
crimes and others who do not qualify for refugee status. The idea of what is owed to refugees is 
central to the refugee scholarship. As it relates to the focus on what refugees are entitled too, 
according to the provision in the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, “refugees deserve, as a 
minimum, the same standards of treatment enjoyed by other foreign nationals in a given country 
and, in many cases, the same treatment as nationals.”53 In other words, on the authority of the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol refugees who reside in the U.S. for example, are at a 
minimum due the same benefits and provisions enjoyed by individuals who are citizens of the 
United States. Some of these benefits and provisions include, access to food, shelter, clothing 
and medical care. Certainly one provision enjoyed by individuals who are nationals in any 
country is the benefit of protection.  
 Protection is a substantive theme in the scholarship on refugees and is a benefit of 
overwhelming concern to refugees and those who care for refugees. Refugees are vulnerable to a 
number of efforts that are intended to promote harm. While all refugees are open to potential 
harm and abuses that includes human rights violations, and various forms of violence, women 
remain particularly vulnerable. Women share the vulnerabilities that are experienced by all 
refugees however, women and girls have “special protection needs that reflect their gender.”54 
Gender specific need for protection consists of protection from sexual and physical abuse, 
exploration that leads to human trafficking, and protection from gender discrimination which 
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makes gender a barrier to accessing goods and services. One theme that is central to gender 
specific protection is FGC which is described as violence against women and a violation of 
human rights.55 It is important to mention that a significant amount of the FGC scholarship 
describes the traditional culture custom as a form of gender violence against women.  
 A second international document, and one of the most prominent, is the UNHCR 
Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women (GPRW). These guidelines follow the general 
framework outlined in the UNHCR Policy on Refugee Women. The main aim of the policy is to 
“integrate the resources needs of refugee women into all aspects of programming and to ensure 
equitable protection and assistance.”56 The GPRW establishes with certainty that refugee women 
face dangerous situations that are at times life threatening. The risks are enormous. The enormity 
and gravity of the situations present particular challenges related to protection. For example, 
women are often violently attacked, raped and kidnapped. Therefore it is the physical security 
that is needed to protect refugee women. The GPRW allows for collaborative efforts to provide 
interventions when the need arises.  In addition, the Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee 
Women provide a legal framework for protection of refugee women. 
 The Canadian Guidelines is another resource in the international scholarship on refugees 
that assist in providing guidance and help for refugees is Canada’s Immigration and Refugee 
Board (IRB). The IRB issued these guidelines that are entitled the “Women’s Claimant Fearing 
Gender Related Persecution,”57 now known as the Canadian Guidelines. The aim of these 
guidelines is to provide the IRB who make decisions concerning refugees with an avenue for 
interpreting the legal definition of a refugee that pays attention to the issue of gender thereby 
making decisions with sensitivity toward the challenges of women. The source of inspiration for 
the Canadian Guidelines is due to the plight of refugee women made “unsuccessful claims based 
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on gender related persecution.”58 Those who are seeking refuge into Canada must first comply 
with the Convention criteria to be deemed a refugee.  
 In Canada however, the country is concerned with how those coming into the nation state 
will be able to settle in the country. For instance, the government employs a criterion of 
“personal suitability or admissibility.”59 In other words the country evaluates how well those 
coming to Canada will be able to assimilate in terms of education, level of employment skill and 
how well they speak the languages that are used in Canada. Gender is not mentioned in the 
suitability. However the discussion on refugees in Canada is important as the scholarship on 
refugees illustrates that there is a sizable African refugee population in Canada.  Certainly 
employing both the UNHCR, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women and the Canadian 
Guideline will assist and give guidance on what is owed to refugee women, as these documents 
provide a general framework for determining refugees the status of refugee. 
 ii. U.S. Documents 
 According to the United States Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and Under United 
States law, a refugee is someone who is located outside of the United States, is of special 
humanitarian concern to the United States, and demonstrates that they were persecuted. The 
persecution must be attributed to the person seeking refugee status. Also the fear of persecution 
due to race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group is 
key. Lastly, the person seeking refugee status can not be firmly resettled in another country and 
is admissible to the United States. In other words, refugee status may be granted to people as a 
form of protection who meet the definition of refugee as articulated by (UNHCR) and who are of 
special humanitarian concern to the US. These individuals have been persecuted or fear they will 
be persecuted because of their race, religious preference, nationality, and/or membership in a 
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particular social or political group.  What is interesting is that the US law concerning refugee 
status uses the language that the person or persons must “demonstrate” that they were or are in 
fear of persecution.  
  iii. UNHCR 
 The United Nations High Commission on Refugees is the leading agency on the subject 
of refugees and offers a wealth of information and guidelines as it relates to refugees. Much of 
the efforts worldwide concerning refugees have been inspired by the UNHCR. The UNHCR is 
the only global legal bodies explicitly covering the most important aspects of a refugee’s life. 
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), established in 
1950 by the United Nations General Assembly was developed to lead and coordinate 
international efforts and action to protect refugees and to find solutions to problems that are 
specific to refugees. The primary purpose of UNHCR is to safeguard the rights and well-being of 
refugees and to find answers to problems facing refugees globally. It strives to ensure that 
everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum, find safe passage and refuge in another state 
while protecting the option of refugees to return home voluntarily if they choose. The office is 
entrusted with the work of integrating refugees locally or to provide assistance for resettling in a 
third country. One major focus of the UNHCR is the protection of refugees. This center of 
interest and activity for the agency is illustrated in the definition of who refugees are. For 
example, one classification described in the UNCHR is the idea of persecution and more 
specifically gender violence and persecution.  
 While the UNHCR has special interest in the protection of all refugees, the agency has a 
particular interest toward women and their children. To be sure, there is a UNHCR Policy on 
Refugee Women. The Policy intentionally contains four general conclusions that relate 
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specifically to refugee women. For example, the policy describes that in 1985 the Executive 
Committee adopted what is called conclusion No. 39 entitled, Refugee Women and International 
Protection, noting that “refugee women have protection and assistance needs which necessitate 
special attention in order to improve existing protection and assistance.”60 The UNHCR 
encouraged all programs, states and concerned agencies to support its efforts. In 1987, 1988, and 
1989 consecutively, items were added to the policy that included international protection, further 
elaboration on the extraordinary vulnerability of women, the distinct problems of physical 
security, and sexual exploration. In the description of what constitutes the legal definition of a 
refugee, the UNHCR describes that one stipulation is that there is a well founded fear of 
persecution. In the UNHCR literature one of the treatment claims related to persecution is that of 
FGC-(M). The notes explains, “that a women or girl seeking asylum because she has been 
compelled to undergo, or is likely to be subject to FGM, can qualify for refugee status.”61 As it 
relates to contextualizing refugees the scholarship, including the UNHCR literature connects 
refugee women to FGC.  
II. Contextualizing Refugees 
A. Distinct Groups of Refugee Women   
 In an effort to contextualize refugee women, and for the purposes of this dissertation, the 
connection between refugee women and FGC is critical. The scholarship on both refugee women 
and on FGC agrees that North America has become more globalized and is populated with 
immigrants and refugees who bring their desire to integrate their cultural practices with them. 62 
With this influx of people from other countries settling in the US, the characteristics and the 
cultural practices of the migrating populations are important to give attention too. According to 
the Center for Disease Control (CDC), in 1999 the agency estimated that there are over 168,000 
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women and girls who reported that their place of origin was from a country that practiced female 
circumcision. One scholar articulates the growth of people from female genital cutting countries 
and communities observing that “there is an influx of refugee and immigrant populations from 
African societies, many of whom practice genital cutting.”63 This observation gives way to 
identifying one distinct group of women living in the US, women who have involuntarily 
experienced FGC.  
i.  Refugee Women Experiencing FGC Involuntarily.  
 Women who involuntarily experience FGC is one of the leading themes of the 
scholarship on FGC and on refugee women. Involuntary FGC is characterized as one form of 
gender-based violence. The UNHCR considers “FGM to be a form of gender-based violence.”64 
In addition, the FGC literature describes FGM not only as a violent act against women it is 
characterized as a form of persecution, especially in human rights law.65 The UNHCR deems all 
forms and types of FGC a violation of the human rights of women and girls. Furthermore, FGC 
is established by the UNHCR  as a well-founded fear of persecution for both women and their 
daughters.  The literature reflects that there is both the fear of being forced to undergo the 
procedure and the fear of facing persecution for refusing to force their daughters to have the 
surgery. Because sexually based gender violence can occur at any time during the stages of the 
refugee cycle, the idea of “human security raises the awareness of threats against the physical 
security of refugee women.”66 As discussed earlier in this dissertation the need for protection for 
women being forced to undergo FGC is of deep concern. Due to the host of medical issues 
women face as a result of the way that FGC is often performed, the need for adequate health care 
and access to care is critical. It is here that refugee women experiencing involuntary FGC who 
migrate and resettle in non FGC communities are a distinct group of women who need care.  
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ii. Refugee Women Who Voluntarily Choose FGC 
 In contrast to the women who involuntarily undergo FGC, a distinctly different group of 
women becomes clear. This group of refugee women is women who have migrated from FGC 
communities who choose and will voluntarily undergo the procedure. A dilemma for these 
particular women is how to continue to practice the rituals of their culture outside of their native 
geographical context. To abandon these cultural traditions is not something that women choose 
to do, and the obligation to practice cultural customs outside their indigenous country is quite 
persuasive. Another predicament for women that resettle in an environment where FGC is not 
practiced is that the custom at times can be against the law, there is an unfamiliarity with the 
custom and there are strategies to eradicate FGC underway. These kinds of situations make it 
probable that attempts to practice FGC/c underground are likely to occur; contributing to the 
danger and harmfulness of the practice as well as the need for care. It is here that the analysis of 
care must include cultural competency, explained in chapter six. Many immigrants and refugee 
families have established very strong support systems that reflect their social, religious, and 
ethnic practices to which they have strong ties. The idea that there are women who will choose to 
voluntarily undergo FGC is not a theme in the FGC scholarship nor is it given able 
consideration. Nevertheless, there are women who will not abandon the practice and will choose 
to undergo the procedure. FGC is a cultural custom that is associated with diverse reasons and 
rationales and is not going away.  
  The reasons for the custom vary depending upon ethnic groups and not every ethnic 
group shares meanings and motives for the practice, however the reasons and rationales are 
linked to voluntary choice. One reason for voluntarily choice that is not articulated in a 
transparent way is the idea of body image or aesthetics. Aesthetics is mentioned but rarely given 
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focused consideration. In an investigation of the more balanced scholarship for example, women 
embrace and choose FGC, especially in Africa for reasons of body image. Body image is an idea 
that is commonplace in the US. The idea of body beautification and improvement, is a universal 
ideal and “many women who have had gentile surgery view the procedure as a cosmetic 
beautification, moral enhancement or dignifying improvement of the appearance of the human 
body.”67 The notion of cosmetic enhancement is not an uncommon rationale for FGC, and it is a 
reason for all types of body image surgery.  
 One scholar argues, as it relates to aesthetics that, “gender identity is also a frequently 
significant feature of genital surgery from the viewpoint of insiders who support the practice.”68  
Through the exploration of the scholarship we have established that there are a host of reasons, 
meanings, values and features of this cultural tradition. Being able to bring their customs and 
maintain traditional practices unearths the practical need that necessitates paying attention to this 
group of women who support the practice and will choose to undergo the surgery. While the idea 
of body image is not one of the features of this dissertation the notion is relevant to the 
investigation of FGC and deserves further exploration. 
B. Human Rights and Refugees 
Relevant and absolutely crucial to the refugee and FGC discourse is the notion of Human 
Rights. As it relates to refugee women and FGC, the idea of human rights is examined via 
International Human Rights Law (IHRL) as it is this framework that regards FGC as a human 
rights violation of women. It is interesting to note however that the scholarship on human rights 
describes that while the term human rights is often used, it is not been “authoritatively 
defined.”69  The human rights framework includes moral and political claims that all human 
beings have a right to expect from government as a right, rather than as a act of kindness which 
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can be revoked at any time. As it relates to the scholarship on FGC and human rights, the 
literature illustrates that the human rights of women who involuntarily undergo the procedure are 
compromised by FGC. 
In order to highlight some of the rights that scholars argue FGC violates, it is helpful to 
very briefly mention the progression of the evolution of human rights as other scholars writing 
about human rights argue that international human rights law does not give governments the 
authority to interfere with the practice of FGC.70 In the eighteenth century a body of rights 
emerged that are often referred to as “first generation rights.”71 These rights include freedom of 
opinion, conscience and religion, the right to freedom of association and the right to own 
property. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century a “second generation”72 of rights 
materialized that focused on economics, social and cultural rights and included that persons have 
the right to social security, education, and health. Finally, a “third generation”73 of rights pays 
particular attention to the environment, peace, and humanitarian assistance. 
An equally impactful component in the body of literature on human rights particularly as 
it relates to refugee women and FGC is the various sources of International Human Rights Law. 
These sources are significant as they represent the treaties that are enacted by international 
human rights law. These treaties and laws provide the context in which particular groups of 
people especially women are addressed. One of the most reliable and authoritative documents are 
the Universal Declaration treaties at both the international and regional level. The UN 
Declaration of Human Rights “is one of the most influential legal and political instruments of the 
twentieth century.”74 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights is also included.  
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According to Rahman and Toubia, legal action against FGC is found in more recent 
treaties, specifically in the 1979 Women’s Convention and the 1980 Children’s Rights 
Convention.75  Since it is these two treaties that focus on the rights of both women and children, 
these treaties are often used as a strategy to advocate from a humans rights perspective for 
abolishment of FGC.76 It is critical to mention that these treaties do not specifically mention FGC 
rather they promote values embraced by both domestic and international communities against the 
practice. There are also regional treaties that place obligatory constraints, for example the 
African Charter on Human and People Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the American Convention on Human Rights. All 
of the treaties and conventions mentioned above have at their core, the right to life, 
liberty/freedom, and security.  
As it relates to application the human rights scholarship interprets the practice FGC/M as 
“infringement on certain rights.”77 These rights include freedom from all forms of 
discrimination, violence and right to life, dignity and physical integrity. For the purposes of this 
dissertation it is important to mention that there are also other international human rights raised 
by FGC, namely, cultural rights or a right to culture; these will be more fully investigated in the 
chapter on Culture Diversity. However, it is the idea of culture and physical integrity that those 
who embrace the practice argue for a balanced evaluation of the cultural practice. For example, 
while the human rights scholarship regards FGC as a form of violation of physical integrity of 
women who undergo the practice, other scholars writing about human rights and FGC note that 
adult women should be free to choose what makes them happy with their own bodies.78    
In the United States the human rights of all people are legally protected by the 
Constitution of the United States and amendments, conferred by treaty, and enacted legislatively 
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through Congress, state and legislatures.  The literature on human rights in the West reveals that 
“the protection of fundamental human rights was foundational to the establishment of the United 
States.”79 Since that time, “a central goal of U.S. foreign policy has been the promotion of 
respect for human rights, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”80. Human 
rights, as interpreted helps secure peace, deter aggression, promote the rule of law, combat crime 
and corruption, strengthen democracies, and prevent humanitarian crises. However, an important 
observation of the western view point of human rights is it notable focus on individuality and 
economics. 
Concerning the centrality of the individualistic and economic framework of the west, one 
scholar describes, “that economic, social and cultural rights do not have the priority that some 
commentators (in Africa) feel they deserve and is frequently attributed to the alleged bias in 
philosophical thought about rights in the west.”81 The lack of integration concerning social and 
cultural rights (as markets are the major construct) is an important observation when examining 
human rights construct in the West, particularly as women refugees migrate to the US and who 
voluntarily choose to undergo FGC. The significance of the human rights construct in the West is 
found in the reality that people from other cultures settle in the US therefore an emphasis on 
cultural rights and communal focus rather than an individualist one is needed. In fact, 
Hollenbach writes that “indeed during the Bush administration era, there was even stronger 
conviction that markets by themselves are key to development.”82 This is not to say that these 
concepts are not important to human rights conceptualization in Africa. Nevertheless, the 
economic individualistic tenor of western human rights must integrate cultural rights and a 
communal focus which creates a more balanced framework so that human rights is for 
“everyone, everywhere, for men and women, for children and the elderly, for people of different 
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cultures, tribes and backgrounds.”83 In doing so the promotion of human rights is realized in the 
US framework. 
C. Health Status of Refugees 
 According to the Refugee Health Organization in 2010 the U.S. accepted more than 
73,000 new refugee arrivals. Forty seven percent (47.3%) of these new arrivals to the U.S. were 
refugee women. Female refugees represent a vulnerable group who are often survivors of human 
rights abuses, and need special attention and care. The experiences of migration whether it is 
voluntary or involuntary can have profound consequence for the health of refugee women.  
Further, there are specific health complications that are experienced by refugee women, for 
example infectious disease and reproductive health issues.84 To be sure, the research makes clear 
that refugee women are “dealing with special problems such as ritual female genital surgery.”85  
In highlighting some of the health consequences of FGC as a health issue that presents special 
problems, concerns are raised in connection to access to health care that includes an acceptable 
level of reproductive care.86 The refugee scholarship describes that the major problem as it 
relates to the health status of refugee women is that refugee women are more likely to experience 
delays in accessing health services and face disparities in reproductive health outcomes.87  
 Therefore the UNHCR literature make clear that refugees have a right to basic medical 
care and have made efforts to support care for refugees a major priority. In addition to basic 
medical care, the UNHCR has deemed reproductive health as a right. The agency defines 
reproductive health as s state of “complete physical, mental and social well being and not merely 
the absence of disease and infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its 
functions and process.”88 Some of the priorities as it relates to reproductive health are childbirth, 
unsafe abortions and post abortion care and FGC. While health complications related to FGC are 
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fully elaborated in chapter one, it is important here to make the specific connection between 
reproductive health, FGC and refugee women.  
 Refugee women not only suffer from reproductive health complications they experience 
other significant health effects that are physical, mental and emotional. Some of the scholarship 
reveals however that the health problems refugee women experience are not very different than 
those women who live in developing countries.89 One of the similarities, for example is coping 
with life threatening disease. These life threatening diseases include, but are not limited to 
malaria, measles, tuberculosis, and HIV infection. Other commonalities experienced by refugee 
women and women in developing countries are complications related to childbearing, psychiatric 
disorders and problems from the trauma of displacement. The dangerous journey refugee women 
face however complicates the health problems they experience. 
 Health risks and complications of reproductive health are critical when exploring health 
related concerns of refugee women.  The reproductive health concern related to pregnancy is 
important to mention. Pregnancy and giving birth are reflected in the FGC scholarship as a health 
concern for refugee women who have experienced the procedure and remain circumcised upon 
delivery.  Deaths related to obstetric complications are among the primary reason for death of 
refugee women and girls. As it relates to FGC it is women who have experienced Type III 
infibulation who are at risk of obstructed labor resulting in fetal death and further physical 
complications for the mother. Other concerns related to reproductive health that are associated 
with FGC are infertility. The scholarship suggests that the infertility is due to infections caused 
by the use unsanitary instruments. Important to the examination of reproductive health, namely 
FGC, is what the scholarship regards as insufficient and inadequate health care, not only to care 
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for women who are suffering from reproductive health concerns in general, but FGC specifically. 
When working with the complexities of the health status of refugee women, health interventions 
that support reproductive health care are critical.90  A health intervention on the unmet needs of 
refugee women can be met by adequate training of health care providers to provide a level of 
care that is sufficient for women who need help now and for future generations to come. 
D. Future Generations 
 The concept of future generations is a bioethical concept in the UNESCO Universal 
Declarations on Bioethics and Human Rights. The idea of “Protecting Future Generations” is one 
of thirty articles set forth by the Declaration. In its most basic form the article means that all 
bioethical issues should be examined for the benefit of both present and future generations.91 The 
article is intimately linked with another document adopted by UNESCO: the Declaration on the 
Responsibilities of the Present Generations towards Future Generations. The impetus for the 
article comes from the examination of the relationship between both present and future 
generations, the environment, and the life sciences. It asks the question; what is the moral 
responsibility of this present generation for future generations. The work of the present has 
implications on the future, particularly when the implications affect humankind. Humanity here, 
notes one scholar, is not only “the international community, including all people living today, but 
it refers to the chain of generations who will collectively form one community whether living 
now or in the future.”92 This implies that all decisions made particularly as it relates to bioethics 
should consider the impact of the decision on future generations. 
 The Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations towards Future 
Generations is considered a legal instrument. This declaration offers twelve articles. While all of 
the articles are important, some articles are more closely related to the discussion of present 
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generations of women who have experienced FGC, and future generations who will choose to 
undergo the surgery.93 These articles include article two, (2) freedom of choice, article seven, (7) 
cultural diversity, and article eleven, (11) non-discrimination. It is important to mention that both 
article two (2) and article seven (7) are part of the western and global bioethical framework and 
are investigated later in this dissertation. Therefore, the application of the articles to refugee 
women experiencing FGC serve as themes that assist in providing an ongoing ethical analysis of 
care for these distinct group of women now and in the future.  
 The Declaration reflects concern for the destiny of future generations. It further states that 
the fate of generations to come is incumbent upon the decisions and actions employed today and 
that any issue must be resolved in a manner in which future generations are considered. The 
declaration also asserts, “there is a moral obligation to formulate behavioral guidelines for the 
present generations within a broad, future oriented perspective.”94 In other words, there is a 
moral imperative of the present generation to ensure that not only the ecological community is 
safeguarded, but also to make certain that human rights and interests and the bioethical principles 
that guide behavior of the human community are not jeopardized.  An example of not 
jeopardizing human rights is the idea illuminated in the Declaration concerning future 
generations regarding non-discrimination. Some of the scholarship on FGC argues that not only 
is FGC a violation of human rights but the practice is also discriminatory in nature.  
 Conversely however, other scholars, writing about the traditional practice argue that it is 
not discriminatory as both male and females experience circumcision.95 Nevertheless, what may 
be regarded as discriminatory is to take action (eradication) preventing freedom of choice, 
namely being able to choose to undergo FGC. To eliminate the practice could be interpreted or 
viewed as discriminatory in that eradication takes away the freedom to choose or self-
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determination. Taking away the ability to honor a women's cultural heritage and the practices 
thereof for women in this present generation, and certainly in future generations is 
discriminatory. To not apply the non-discrimination article for example to refugee women, FGC, 
and future generations, interferes with the right to education that informs women in future 
generations that the practice in the past had been administered in ways that are harmful (through 
no fault of their own). Yet, in looking to the present generation and more importantly to future 
generations, decisions that are made presently concerning FGC could effect how the surgery can 
be practiced in the future, namely, in ways that are medically appropriate and that reduce harm.  
III. CONCLUSION 
 The refugee population once dominated by males is now made up of approximately half 
women. 96 Many of the female refugees are from FGC communities and have experienced FGC. 
The health related consequences related to the procedure are at the core of the objections 
concerning the traditional practice. Refugee women who have undergone the surgery are in need 
of health care To not provide care is unethical, and to provide sub-standard health care is 
unacceptable. While the current status of women experiencing FGC is one where the procedure 
has been done involuntarily, migrating too, and making a life in a non FGC environment lends 
itself to women having choice and voluntarily undergoing the procedure. Since FGC is a custom 
that is embraced by some women, particularly in Africa,97 it is reasonable to determine that 
refugees who migrate to non FGC communities will look for ways to integrate their cultural 
rituals into their current context. One implication of refugee women integrating traditional 
practices into a new life context is the influence on future generations. Future generations are one 
way to transmit cultural ideals, beliefs and customs.98 Therefore, while some of the present 
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generation advocates for the eradication of FGC, it is ethically important to safeguard both the 
present and future generations right to self-determination and autonomous choice. 
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Chapter 3: Respect for Autonomy, Women Refugees and Care 
 This chapter explains the rationale for considering respect for autonomy in this 
dissertation.1 The respect for autonomy concept provides a valuable and effective construct with 
which moral dilemmas can be analyzed.2 Applying this construct compels us to use a specific 
lens in making distinctions in the groups of women under question. The lens allows for a 
particular demarcation between women who have undergone the intervention voluntarily or 
involuntarily.  The last option is ethically not acceptable.  But the first one requires ethical 
analysis and reflection, weighing the free choice of the women, respect for cultural diversity, and 
non-maleficence.  A second reason to consider respect for autonomy in discerning the moral 
status of FGC is due to its relationship to humanity and its connection to a larger framework, 
specifically the bioethical and global bioethics discourse.  One scholar writes, “it’s the best way 
of thinking about ethical problems in health care permitting a thorough and systematic analysis 
of real bioethical problems.”3 The term ‘humanity’ is used here to refer to the condition of 
human beings collectively instead of individually.  Specific to this dissertation, respect for 
autonomy is used as a guide in how FGC is ethically examined, and to discern the moral status of 
FGC.  Some scholars writing about autonomy assert that autonomy is not absolute, and others 
argue that it should be one of the “first among equals of the four principles”4 creating subtle 
nuances which require rigorous reflection in an attempt to discern the moral status of FGC.  One 
example of the nuances and the conflicting nature of respect for autonomy is the tension 
facilitated between the individual choice of the agent/actor, the health care professional, and their 
governing ethical code to observe the ethical guideline of non-maleficence, the focus of chapter 
six of this dissertation.  
 
  
58 
 
I. Understanding and Constructing respect for autonomy 
This section will examine the scholarship on autonomy. Autonomy is held as one of the 
governing “moral principles in a framework of prima facie principles”5 that works within a larger 
bioethical context. Autonomy as one of the valued standard principles in bioethics involves the 
right of the patient/individual to determine their course of care.  Furthermore, autonomy is 
respect for the individual’s wishes and life plan, which is to be honored.  “[It is] at minimum, 
self-rule free from both controlling interference by others and from limitation such as inadequate 
understanding that prevents meaningful choice, such as inadequate understanding. The 
autonomous individual acts freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan analogous to the way an 
independent government manages its territories and sets it policy.”6 The notion of respect for 
autonomy can be a hard concept to understand when attempting to apply it to FGC. For example, 
women who are refugees have the right to make an autonomous choice to undergo the procedure.  
Application of autonomy to refugee women choosing FGC raises questions concerning how 
autonomy is reconciled with health care professionals who must respect the autonomous choice 
of the patient and honor non-maleficence.  
The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights offers assistance 
in understanding respect for autonomy in an effort to provide good care for women experiencing 
FGC. Article 5: Autonomy and Individual Responsibility states: “the autonomy of persons to 
make decisions, while taking responsibility for those decisions and respecting the autonomy of 
others is to be respected.”7 The article in its most vital sense considers that all human beings are 
equal in dignity and are born free.8 Article 5, in addition, inspires several of the other articles 
having to do with rights, including informed consent, mentioned later in this chapter.9 What is 
different from the Georgetown bioethical treatment of autonomy is the mention of individual 
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responsibility for the choices afforded by autonomous decisions. Therefore, the patient is 
responsible for directing her course of care. Accordingly, not unlike the Georgetown framework 
of autonomy, the patient’s viewpoint of her health circumstances, and her narrative take 
precedence in the relationship between the health professional and the patient. The patient’s right 
to choose is a protection of her autonomy in that she is taking responsibility for her choices, 
namely the choice to undergo FGC surgery10   
The consideration for the patient to take responsibility is critical to the care of women 
who choose FGC surgery. Its critical nature lies in the fact that if there is any disagreement 
between the health practitioner and the patient about her course of care, autonomy gives the 
responsibility to the patient, not to the health care professional. It is the responsibility of the 
health practitioner to respect the decision of the patient and to facilitate a positive outcome in 
care. Respecting the autonomous decision of the patient supports the aim of paying attention to 
and honoring patient preference and quality of life, two notions explored in the proceeding 
chapters. This consideration is particularly important in applying respect for autonomy, 
examined later in this section. In considering the application of autonomy it is important to note 
that the literature refers to autonomy in three distinct ways, the concept of autonomy, respect for 
autonomy and the moral principle of autonomy. The concept of autonomy is a concept used in a 
variety of disciplines that includes philosophy, theology, law, and in the field of bioethics. 
Autonomy is one of the valued standard principles in bioethics, particularly as it is used in the 
North American context.  
Generally understood autonomy or individual autonomy refers to the ability to be one's 
own person, to live one's life according to the values, views and beliefs embraced by the 
individual, without manipulative, oppressive or external forces. In addition autonomy is 
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considered to be a principle derived from and based on a more fundamental principle, human 
dignity. Since human dignity is a fundamental principle, autonomy finds its justification and 
validation for its use in the human dignity framework.11  While the human dignity framework is 
more fully examined in Chapter 6, since autonomy finds it validity in the human dignity structure 
a brief discussion is useful here to demonstrate its association. Regarding human dignity and 
human rights, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights affirms the dignity of all human 
beings, and recognizes that the “inherent dignity of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, and is at the heart of most international 
humans rights instruments.”12 Further, [Article 3] of the UNESCO declaration includes human 
dignity as foundational to human rights and cannot be separated from the human condition13. 
Therefore when employing ethics to life situations, specifically health care, the efforts are to 
determine whether something is right or wrong and the movement toward what is good.14 In 
other words, the decision how morality would recommend care is given to the patient, namely 
women who choose FGC surgery and are in need of care.  
As it relates to bioethics, the principle of respect for human dignity holds a place of 
prominence in the framework.15 Human dignity and human rights can also provide needed 
guidance on challenging issues related to health that effect people and populations of people 
globally.16 An example of how the framework gives direction on challenging health care issues is 
that the human dignity human rights framework can provide direction on the related health issue 
of FGC and the women who choose to undergo the medical intervention. Autonomy and freedom 
are an integral part of the western culture. In western culture autonomy is related to the ideal of 
independence, an ideal central to the cultural heritage of North America.17  The origins of the 
word come from the Greek term “auto” which means “self” and “nomos” which means “law, to 
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govern or to rule”18 and was first associated with governmental rule and the law. Autonomy, 
literally, is “self governance and has acquired meanings as diverse as liberty, privacy, individual 
choice and even economic freedom.”19 In other words, autonomy is the freedom afforded to 
individuals to live their own life, in their own way, on the condition that it does not bring harm to 
others and does not violate the rights of other people. Articulated in a different way, autonomy is 
the right to self-determination.  
Other definitions of autonomy are useful in garnering an understanding of autonomy. For 
instance, according to Jacob Rendtorff there are five meanings of autonomy: “1) autonomy as 
capacity of creation of ideas and goals for life, 2) autonomy as capacity of moral insight, “self-
legislation” and privacy, 3) autonomy as capacity of decision and action with lack of outer 
constraint, 4) autonomy as capacity of political involvement and personal responsibility, 5) 
autonomy as capacity of informed consent.”20 Rendtorff further describes autonomy as a 
principle that show be regarded as “the self legislation of rational human beings taking part in the 
same human world and does not exclude the recognition of pluralism.”21  Not excluding 
pluralism is particularly helpful when constructing an understanding of autonomy that assists in 
respecting the autonomous choice of particular others whose choices are influenced by cultural 
beliefs, values, and practices that may be different from the health care professional. One such 
practice is FGC surgery. Self -legislation can be regarded as self-rule or agency. In other words, 
agency is making a choice on ones own behalf.  
More specifically, as autonomy and respect for autonomy relate to healthcare, it is 
embraced as essential. Respect for the autonomy of patients protects them from abuse or 
exploitation. In the care relationship the person being cared for is in a dependent position, which 
makes them easy targets to serve the interests (e.g., financial, academic, or social influence) of 
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others. Within the specific context of the patient-professional practitioner autonomy contributes 
to the balanced and equitable patient-doctor relationship. By honoring the wishes of patient the 
patient directs the course of his or her care. Concerning the use of the word autonomy the 
bioethics scholarship characterizes autonomy as agency, as a way of illustrating an individual has 
the right to choose. A more formal definition of the term agency is the capacity of individuals to 
act independently and to make their own free choices.22 While individual autonomy is described 
as the right to self-determination, bioethics expands the use of the concept of autonomy to 
respect for autonomy.  
Respect of autonomy is a medium by which the practitioner’s conduct is in the 
framework of supporting the autonomous decision of the patient. In other words, “the autonomy 
of autonomous individual to make decisions is to be respected.”23 The notion reaches further 
than a viewpoint, or perspectives on respect, it is respectful action. What I mean by respectful 
action is that the health care professional does what it necessary not to impede or become a 
barrier to the autonomous decision of the patient.  Additionally, respect for autonomy includes 
expressing appreciation for the right of individuals to embrace views, intentions, to make 
decisions and to live based on their values and belief. Respect for autonomy then is to respect the 
individual autonomy of others and to acknowledge their right to embrace views, beliefs, and 
values of their choosing. Further, employing respect for autonomy means that respect is given to 
the right of individuals to make decisions, life plans and take action based on their beliefs and 
values, even when there is disagreement between the care taker and the cared for. There is an 
obligation to do so. Therefore it is incumbent on the health professional to afford the patient the 
right to choose by honoring the wishes of the patient instead of becoming a barrier.  
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The distinctive feature of respect for autonomy requires that the health professional does not 
interfere with the decisions made by the patient. The practitioner acts in a way that acknowledges 
the value and the right of the patient to make decisions and empower them toward autonomous 
action.  
A third and more distinctive use of the concept of autonomy found in the literature is the 
moral principle of respect for autonomy. The moral principle of respect for autonomy refers to 
recognition that individuals have a moral right to ones own decisions and to independent 
thinking. It is a right is self-governance. The moral principle of respect for autonomy recognizes 
that every individual is a moral agent with moral teachings and standards that are not imposed by 
outside forces, rather these are standards and guidelines employed by the moral agent herself. 
Another feature to the moral principle of respect for autonomy is that the principle takes into 
account various conditions that contribute to the inability for self-determination or autonomous 
choice. The bioethical scholarship refers to this inability as incompetence. There are several 
groups of people often referred to in this way and include the mentally ill, older people who 
suffer from confusion, people who have learning difficulties, people who suffer from trauma and 
children. The principle of moral autonomy asserts that there is a moral obligation for the health 
care professional to make sure that patients are capable of making authentic decisions concerning 
their life plan that can determine directions for care. Autonomous decisions depend upon 
autonomous individuals being able to make decisions. There can be no autonomous decision 
without capacity. Respect must be given for the capacity of the individual to decide. 
The scholarship on autonomy suggests that depending on the theory, there are other 
features and characteristics of individual autonomy. Some of these features include the “abilities, 
skills or the traits of the autonomous person.”24  While the features of the diverse theories are 
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noted, they are not fully considered here. The consideration here is individuals who have the 
abilities, capacity, skills and traits to make autonomous decisions, i.e., decision making that leads 
to autonomous choice of women who choose to undergo FGC.  
According to Beauchamp and Childress respect for autonomy can be articulated as 
having both a positive and negative features.25  As a negative obligation, the concept necessitates 
that the autonomous action taken by an individual is not subject to the restrictive influence and 
control of others. As a guide for the practice and the application of respect for autonomy, there 
are specific perimeters employed for particular contexts. The scholarship describes concerning 
these specific boundaries that respect for autonomy “will need specification in particular contexts 
to function as a practical guide to conduct and appropriate specifications will incorporate valid 
exceptions that may affect rights and obligations of liberty.”26 The negative obligation helps the 
practitioner to stay clear of dogmatic directives that include definitive and at times harsh 
language that can be a barrier to the application of respect for autonomy.  
Respect for autonomy as a positive obligation demonstrates honoring of the opinions 
and values of others without condition or prejudice, especially when disseminating information 
that will assist in helping the patient to make decisions based on their life plan. The consideration 
of respect for autonomy is particularly beneficial in the case where a decision is made by the 
patient to take action that could invoke judgment or prejudice.  One example of an act that may 
engender criticism and intolerance is, refugee women who do not accept the idea of eradicating 
FGC, but favorably embrace the traditional practice and intend to make the decision to be 
circumcised. The judgment and prejudice evoked make for a care environment where competing 
interests between the cared for and the practitioner are present. For this reason, respect for 
autonomy is critically important and a useful framework when reconciling the competing 
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interests of the healthcare professional and the patient, specifically healthcare practitioners who 
encounter women experiencing FGC.27  
The intention of the patient may be considerably different from what the health care 
practitioner can understand or agree. It is at this place in the relationship of care, that respect for 
autonomy is respect for the action taken by the individual rather than just a “respectful attitude”28 
toward the individual preferences of the patient. Respect for autonomy then includes respect for 
the autonomous action of the individual, namely the patient preferences investigated later in this 
chapter. It is the right of the patient to determine their course of care. 
i. The Legal Framework of Autonomy 
              This section examines the bioethical tenet of respect for autonomy.  However, while the 
notion of autonomy is an “ethical prescription, it is also predicated on the fact that it is a legal 
precept.”29  The section will review how the legal structure applies to the bioethical framework 
and the contribution to bioethical conversation regarding autonomy.  The ethical consideration of 
autonomy is a framework that affords protection to every human being in general, and 
specifically for women who are refugees and who choose to be circumcised, and so must be 
considered when discerning the moral status of FGC and how care will be framed.    
The autonomous choice of individuals is ethically significant because autonomous choice 
manifests the value of personal autonomy that is deeply rooted in our culture. There is a “moral 
and legal right to choose and to follow one’s plan of life.”30 To be sure, the bioethical precept of 
autonomy is not only a bioethical one but a legal construct. As described in the prior section, the 
genesis of the word, namely the Greek work ‘nomos’, means law and to govern. In other words, 
nomos means the right to decide and to shape one’s life course. As it relates to health care it 
means to be able to direct one’s course of care. The legal tenet is also used to “regulate the idea 
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of self governance.”31 Central to the idea of autonomy in the context of the law is the right to 
privacy. Some of the legal scholarship explains about the term privacy that the right to individual 
autonomy is in addition referred to as the right to privacy. In a general sense, the concept of 
privacy is used in diverse contexts to describe a variety of rights and privileges. Most notably 
however, the right to privacy concerns the right of an individual to make personal decisions 
about his or her life, free government interference and control. Another term found in the 
scholarship concerning autonomy is the concept of liberty and is used to describe both autonomy 
and privacy. For instance, in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution the 
word “liberty” is used. The term autonomy is not found in the Constitution. The Supreme Court 
however has used the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to devise a right 
to privacy that includes the reproductive rights of women, a right relevant to the women 
highlighted in this dissertation. 
As it pertains to law, the right to privacy concerns the right of the individual to make 
personal decisions about his or her life free from government control, that is, the right to 
individual autonomy.  The right to individual autonomy in American law includes many aspects 
that effect the entirety of the individual and not just medical features although the medical 
features are present. These aspects may include “the right to marry, the right to have a family, the 
right to reproductive freedom, the right to bodily integrity, the right to ingest substances, the 
right to refuse medical treatment, the right to physician-assisted suicide, the right to co-habitation 
and the right to intimate association.”32 It is the right of individual autonomy that makes certain 
that individuals, namely refugee women who choose to undergo FGC, are afforded the right to 
make personal decisions concerning their bodies, for example the right to reproductive freedom.  
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 While the right of reproductive freedom is encompassed in the law it is important to note 
that concerning FGC, it is against the law in the United States when applying FGC to minors.33 
On the other hand women who are not minors have the right to self-determination. This right to 
choose extends to the right of reproductive freedom, which includes FGC. The legal precept of 
autonomy is critical to the idea of refugee women being able to choose to undergo the FGC. 
Autonomy gives agency to women to decide what to do with their bodies even when the decision 
is not embraced by the dominant cultural construct in which refugee woman live (contextual 
marginalization). In medical ethics however, the right to decide is protected by the law. The 
protection mentioned is safeguarded by another concept used in the framework of the law and in 
bioethics, informed consent. This concept protects the right of the patient. Both autonomy and 
informed consent are crucial to refugee women in safeguarding their right to choose without 
interference from others namely, health care professionals. 
ii. Informed Consent 
 The doctrine of informed consent is one of the major features of healthcare ethics. The 
ethical purpose for informed consent is to protect the preferences of the patient in which care is 
being administered. Informed consent prohibits unwanted and unwarranted medical interventions 
and is therefore an indispensable prerequisite for medical care and biomedical research. As 
reflected in the section on the legal framework of autonomy, informed consent also has legal 
underpinnings. In fact, it is law that influences medical ethics. Since American law is based on 
justice and liberty, informed consent is understood as an expression of respect for autonomy and 
self-determination. It is the “willing acceptance of a medical intervention by the patient.”34  
Another feature of informed consent is to provide the patient with all of the information 
necessary that allows the autonomous individual to make a careful and well-informed decision 
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on his or her own behalf.35 Since autonomy is the right to self-determination and to determine the 
course of care, informed consent assures that the construct of autonomy is adhered too. Informed 
consent is the means in which the preferences of are articulated. 
 One of the robust debates found in the scholarship on FGC is that the procedure is at 
times done without the consent of the parents. The FGC literature highlights that there are some 
women who flee from FGC communities and seek asylum in non-FGC communities so that they 
and or their young daughters do not have to undergo the procedure.36 It goes without saying that 
these women have not given consent for the procedure. This approach is against their will and 
ethically not acceptable. While young girls are not the focus of this dissertation, they are 
mentioned here to highlight the argument for the eradication. The focal point and the attention 
here however is women, namely refugee women over the age of eighteen living in non FGC 
communities who choose to have the procedure and the generations of daughters who have the 
choice to undergo the procedure. Informed consent then will apply.  
While informed consent would apply, there is a concern that women who choose will be 
provided with unbiased and accurate information that assists them in making an informed choice. 
Adequate information and full disclosure is one of the standards of informed consent that must 
be shared by the health care practitioner. The implication for informed consent and FGC, 
particularly in the US is that those who are involved in the care of the women must be able to 
disclose accurate and unbiased information regarding the FGC. Informed consent is applicable to 
the FGC procedure and refugee women who choose, as it underscores the need of the health care 
professional to be knowledgeable about the procedure. Whether performed by traditional 
practitioners, midwives or physicians, FGC is a medical intervention and is therefore subject to 
the rules and framework of bioethics. Therefore the autonomous individual for the medical 
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procedure, namely FGC, must give informed consent. However in the contexts where FGC is 
often performed the informed consent construct is not applied. Therefore informed consent is 
relevant when applying the doctrine to women who will choice the procedure, rather than being 
done against the individuals will. The doctrine of informed consent is relevant to future 
generations of women who will also choose to undergo the procedure. Informed consent can 
serve as an avenue by which women are informed and can be used as an avenue by which 
potential harm is minimized. 
 While informed consent has certainly evolved, the concept is now focused on protecting 
the autonomous choice of individuals. As it relates to refugee women whose autonomous choice 
is to undergo the procedure, employing informed consent as one of the frameworks for the 
ethical analysis of the traditional custom, gives way to not only to providing education, it also 
facilitates the need for health care professionals to be educated, trained and to have sufficient 
knowledge and understanding about FGC.37 When thinking about the practical application of 
informed consent to women who choose to undergo FGC, one scholar notes about informed 
consent “informed consent is the practical application of respect for the patient’s autonomy.”38  
II. Applying Respect for Autonomy 
 In light of need for the practical application of respect for autonomy, particularly as it 
relates to refugee women and their choice for FGC, consideration of first and second order 
autonomy is a noteworthy and notable provision. Second order autonomy places importance and 
takes into account the cultural concerns of the individual receiving care. The second order 
autonomy construct lends itself to meaningful application to refugee women and the generations 
of women to come because of the centrality of cultural concerns, an idea elaborated further in 
chapter 6 of this dissertation. To be clear, second order autonomy assists the healthcare 
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practitioner to make room for diverse cultural values and beliefs that will influences the life plan 
and healthcare decisions of individuals. For example, the scholarship on autonomy notes 
particularly as it relates to women, that autonomy or the lack thereof is linked to the role of 
women manifested throughout different cultural contexts.  
 In many cultures, women have been socially dependent upon family, especially their 
husbands, sons and at times other family members. One example of the dependence of women 
on their husbands and sons is the deferment of decisions regarding their course of care . This 
deferment of decision-making, especially when it is a medical deferment is an example of 
“second order” autonomy.  Second order autonomy as described by James Childress is “persons 
who are subservient to church or state would lack self-determination (first order autonomy) 
regarding the content of their decisions and choices because of their exercise of second order 
autonomy i.e., selection of the institutions in which they are subordinate.”39 The distinction made 
between first order and second order autonomy is important to the investigation of FGC. Its 
importance lies in the rationales and reasons related to the traditional ritual, namely the 
connection to the institution of religion, religious beliefs and customs.  
 Therefore when applying first and second order autonomy to women who choose to 
undergo FGC and she verbalizes that one of her reasons for choosing this life plan is to honor her 
religious tradition and beliefs, she employs second order autonomy. Applying respect for 
autonomy to women who choose to undergo the surgery, includes the recognition that individual 
autonomy is rooted in society and history and may influence the autonomous decisions of 
individuals. An example often highlighted in the bioethics scholarship concerning both religious 
history and society is cases concerning Jehovah Witness. An example often highlighted in the 
bioethics scholarship concerning both religious history and society, are cases where the patient is 
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a Jehovah’s Witness. The life plan of an individual embracing this particular religious tradition 
refuses a blood transfusion based on their religious belief and tradition that gives everlasting life 
precedence over life on earth if the latter can be sustained only by a blood transfusion. To be sure 
of the influence of societal and historical impact, an additional example that is raised from the 
bioethics scholarship concerning autonomy and choice is abortion. As it relates to religion, a 
woman may exercise her second order autonomy by choosing not to have an abortion to save her 
own life. She makes this choice because she embraces the values and beliefs of her religious 
choosing, namely the Catholic faith tradition. Having chosen this faith tradition she places value 
and depends on the teaching of her religious faith to inform her decision to forgo the abortion. 
 It is here that the notion of ‘relational autonomy’ is perhaps useful. Relational autonomy 
centers on the conviction that people are socially rooted.  The characteristics and personalities of 
individuals are developed within the context of social relationships and influenced by and shaped 
by social determinants, that as race, ethnicity, class, and gender.  However, as it applies to the 
application of respect for autonomy and to the autonomous choice of individuals, it is critical to 
take into consideration individuals have the right to use their autonomy as they desire, even if it 
means that individuals refuses to assert self-determination. In this way allows for the practical 
application of respect for autonomy to refugee women choosing FGC to be one where relevant 
aspects of autonomy are employed. Specifically, it makes room for the individual to decide and 
for the healthcare professional to take into account that how autonomy is asserted is  “that the 
amount of autonomy exercised may differs depending on the person and the culture in which 
they are accustomed. These aspects of autonomy have relevance when considering the life plan 
and intention of refugee women who choose FGC. 
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 What makes the application relevant is that refugee women who have settled the U.S. 
have done so in a non-FGC environment. Her life plan according to her values and beliefs will be 
different than those women who do not live in a non-FGC environment. Refugee women 
choosing FGC will employ their values and beliefs to come to this autonomous decision. Since 
individuals are influenced by the society and culture in which they live, the decisions made about 
ones life plan contains the principles, beliefs and values embraced by others. When investigating 
the application of respect for autonomy to women who choose to undergo the surgery the 
consideration includes what the literature describes as “a reasonable outcome of a decision”40 
along with other criteria in which autonomy is exercised.  
 These criteria are an effort to ensure the ability of individuals to make decisions. It is 
important to note however that there are groups of women who lack the ability to make 
decisions. Young girls under the age of eighteen are one group who lack the ability to make 
autonomous choices. As it relates to FGC, girls who live in FGC communities according to the 
literature often undergo the procedure and do so involuntarily. As noted earlier, these 
circumstances are unethical and unacceptable. While the aforementioned group of women is not 
the focus of this dissertation, women who have the ability to assert autonomous choice are, but 
unearth a possible dilemma. The dilemma is found in the application of respect for autonomy 
among women whose intentions are counter cultural to the dominant culture, --a culture in which 
they now live and receive care where the objective of care is a reasonable outcome. 
 The evaluation of a reasonable outcome is most often done by the healthcare 
professional. However, in the context of FGC as indicated in the scholarship on FGC, the health 
care practitioner most likely will lack knowledge and understanding of the surgery and may have 
a fierce opposition to the surgery. The difficulty is that the assessment of what is reasonable and 
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rational is made from the perspective of the health practitioner. This perspective conceivably 
creates a difference of opinion about the outcome of the decision. Because of the difference and 
perhaps the strong disagreement between the healthcare professional and the patient, specifically 
women who choose to undergo the procedure, there may be difficulty on the part of the health 
professional to honor and apply respect for autonomy.41  
 Concerning the difference of opinion regarding care some scholars argue that great care 
must be given as to not diminish or sabotage the right to self-determination. This is true 
particularly when the autonomous decision maker wishes to decide differently from the health 
profession. Applying respect for autonomy helps to resolve different experiences, values and 
world views between to healthcare practitioner and the person in their care.42 It is here that the 
values, beliefs, and cultural aspects are contributing factors in the application of respect for 
autonomy and therefore needs a broader perspective beyond the traditional dominant culture 
viewpoint.  
i. Feminism and Respect for Autonomy 
 One criticism of autonomy is that the concept is dreadfully paternalistic. In bioethics 
particularly the dominant construct of autonomy situates human beings as self reliant and 
independent. This dominant viewpoint of autonomy ignores the reality that we are also 
interdependent making it difficult to employ respect for autonomy. The criticism is especially 
applicable to healthcare when the healthcare practitioner usurps the liberty to choose from 
patients, particularly women. In fact, as it concerns healthcare the feminist scholarship explains 
that health care providers have consistently ignored and misunderstood the needs and desires of 
the women in their care. In responding to the needs of the specific group of women under 
investigation, namely refugee women making the decision to undergo FGC, the reality of the 
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paternalistic posture described in the literature needs redressed. A feminist hermeneutic and 
framework brings awareness and reality to the value and worth of women. It affirms the capacity 
and intellect of women to make coherent decisions.43  
 Women have intrinsic worth and goodness, are equal to men and have equal value to all 
human beings. Women embody the capacity for insightful and discerning activity. Therefore, the 
feminist construct of autonomy calls for a revision of individualistic conceptions of autonomy 
through ideas of relational autonomy highlighted in an earlier section. This reconsideration using 
the relational autonomy framework establishes that people are interconnected and interdependent 
and that the individuality and selfhood of people are rooted and shaped in the context of social 
relationships. Individual characteristics are not formed in a vacuum rather are shaped by a host of 
intersecting social determinants, such as race, class, gender, and ethnicity. The feminist 
framework takes into account the presence and influence of social and political critical to 
examination in this dissertation. It is the womanist framework however that works to examine 
the social determinants of race and ethnicity so critical to the subject matter in this dissertation 
and examined further in Chapter seven (7). 
 A second criticism of autonomy described in the scholarship is the tension between the 
individualistic tenor in which autonomy is often applied, and the interconnectedness of people, 
which creates what is called “social-self.”44  The friction and restlessness present is the fact that 
the self’s very identity is determined by communities of which one is part, that is the pervasive 
influence of parents, peers and culture. There are two conditions for autonomy. These conditions 
are liberty and agency. As it relates to liberty and agency, some scholars articulate that an ad hoc 
committee needs to evaluate particular political arrangements and their adequacy for diverse and 
social context, while facilitating the two conditions necessary for autonomy. It is the evaluation 
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of political and diverse social contexts that the distinct features of feminism, and womanist ethics 
converge to bring the needed examination as a means for new paradigms for the ethical praxis 
for the employing respect for autonomy, particularly as it is applied to care.45  
 Even as respect for autonomy is associated with patient care and with healthcare, 
autonomy is experienced in bioethics as extraordinarily independent and doesn’t affirm the 
communal life and the development of person’s overtime. Attention to the development of 
persons over time is critical to the future generations of refugee women who are from FGC 
communities and will make the decision to undergo the procedure. It is at this point that the idea 
of community is illuminated. While community is explored later in this chapter it is noted here to 
affirm the connection of identity to how the social self is shaped and influenced by community.  
 The interconnection allows us to appreciate how each relationship an individual 
participates in fosters or inhibits individual autonomy. The interdependence of individuals is how 
the feminist and womanist frameworks encourage observing respect for autonomy and have 
sought to reconstruct ideas concerning autonomy. For example in the spirit of interconnectedness 
Womanist ethics call for “communal lament.”46 In other words, in an effort to discern what 
morality would have us to do, the womanist construct embraces the relevance of identity and the 
social self, which are often influenced by a larger context, namely community. The employment 
of this approach to respect for autonomy is attentive to the social location and cultural context of 
women and respects the actions and life plans of individuals influenced by other social location 
and contextual features.  
 Conversely however, the feminist and womanist scholarship argue that at times these 
accounts of social location and contextual features can contribute to the oppressive socialization 
and oppressive social relationships that can impair autonomy, a sentiment often communicated in 
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the scholarship on FGC. An example of this impairment for instance is seen thorough forming an 
individual’s desires, beliefs, emotions and attitudes and impeding the development of the 
capacities and competencies essential for autonomy.”47 Although respect for autonomy is critical 
to care, it is important to mention these challenging nuances that are present given the influential 
nature of community life, and the interdependence of individuals. It is the womanist framework 
specifically however that intentionally seeks to deconstruct oppressive socialization and 
oppressive social relationships, while employing the themes of relational autonomy. These 
themes establish that the core of our identity is determined by the community of which one is a 
part and by the influenced of other people, peers and culture. This influence is foundational to 
the development of agency, particularly among refugee women who often live in vulnerable 
communities. The contribution of feminism and the womanist framework to refugee women who 
choose FGC allows for the consideration of the full range of influential human relations, both 
personal and public.  
ii. Community and Individual Autonomy.  
 When thinking about individual and community autonomy the scholarship offers a useful 
construct when considering the nuances of the relationship between community and individual 
autonomy. The discourse on community autonomy and individual autonomy is as times framed 
in the context of participatory research where community autonomy is related to cultural 
knowledge.48 Article 5 in the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
further illustrates that these limitations; that is, the hindrance of or interference with individual 
autonomy by cultural features would constitute disrespect for fundamental freedoms.49 This 
however does not mean that the community, in which one is intermingled, does not have a 
measure of influence on the individual who is asserting autonomy. Notably there is a communal 
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influence on individuals, as people are social being associated with contexts of a social nature. 
Nevertheless, it is when there is the absence of coercion or manipulation that an individual is free 
to voluntarily make the autonomous decisions. 
 The idea of the interference of individual autonomy is courteous, especially as it is 
concerned with prohibiting a woman from making an autonomous decision- that is the legislative 
action to “ban or disallow” a cultural practice such as FGC. Interestingly, some countries and 
communities in Africa have used legislation as a tool to prevent FGC.50 However, community or 
cultural autonomy might suggest that individuals have the autonomous right to enjoy, develop, 
and take part in their culture.51  This right is particularly recognized when the cultural practice 
does not infringe on the human rights and the autonomous rights of others. Women who make 
the autonomous decision to undergo FGC surgery do so as a result of their life plans, which 
include beliefs and values that are inspired by the culture and community. To infringe upon the 
right to enjoy cultural features seems insupportable.  In fact, Gerald Mackie explains, regarding 
the culture practices and customs of community, “you simply can’t outlaw cultural practices, it is 
not possible to criminalize the entirety of a population or the entirety of a discrete and insular 
minority of the population”52  
Many African countries have banned FGC. To date, 15 African countries passed 
legislation that specifically bans it.53 However, in 2015 Nigeria introduced a new federal law 
banning all forms of FGC.54  Does the legislative ban on FGC interfere with the autonomous 
right of women to participate in their culture? Do these laws inhibit the right of a community, 
particularly one that embraces FGC, to develop their cultural customs including diverse reasons 
for the decision to undergo the surgery?  The research supports that women favor the 
continuation of female genital surgeries55 and desire to embrace the cultural traditions in which 
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they live.  It is important to note here that preserving the autonomy of a community is not the 
case when a cultural practice is imposed against the will of an individual. In fact, performing any 
medical intervention without permission and against the will of the individual is ethically 
unacceptable.  
 Much of the feminist scholarship explored in the earlier section affirms that the Western 
framework for autonomy is rendered individualistic and does not consider the influence of the 
much wider context of community. One of the approaches examined and referred too earlier in 
this dissertation is relational autonomy, which takes into consideration the social identity and the 
intermingling of relationships that are nurtured in the context of community. In exploring care 
for women refugees who will make the autonomous choice to undergo FGC, the link to 
community is a critical consideration. Making the connection to community is an important 
consideration. Its significance is found in the rationales and reasons attributed to FGC, 
specifically the community of faith and the strong communal context in which individuals are 
nurtured and belong. 
 When working with refugee women who have migrated from close knit communities the 
connection between individual autonomy and community autonomy are pertinent since the 
behavior of individuals are deeply embedded in the communities value and belief system. This 
close bonded nature of community is particularly true in Africa where communities are 
connected by a strong sense of family pride that includes generations of family, namely the 
ancestors and long cultural traditions. One such cultural tradition is FGC, a cultural tradition 
embraced for years. In view of the fact that there are communal dimensions to identity and the 
social self, and a strong extended family and community exists, it is understandable then that the 
viewpoints, values and beliefs are transmitted through the context of community from one 
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generation, ethnic group or tribe. Since individuals are both interdependent and independent the 
idea of competing interests are again probable and illustrated earlier in this chapter. The interests 
in competition are the interests perhaps of community and the intentions of the autonomous 
individual. For example, these competing interests, (that values and beliefs of the community and 
the intention and interests of the individual), conceivably arise when making the decision to 
undergo FGC surgery in a community where the values and beliefs are vastly different. 
 It can be said that the same competing interests arise when there is a deviation from the 
social norms and behaviors constructed in the society in which individuals are shaped and live. 
An illustration of this deviation is when the intention of women currently living in a FGC 
community do not intend to undergo the FGC surgery. The interest of the community and the 
individual intention of the autonomous individual compete. It is in reflecting on the conflicts of 
competing interest that the scholarship provides an inclusive approach where the interests of the 
community and the individual do not necessarily have to compete. One feature of respect for 
individuals is “respecting persons as an independent end in themselves.”56 However, autonomy 
does not imply that the life plan that an individual chooses excludes the interest of others, 
namely community. The identity and the social self of individuals is formed in community and 
no matter how different the life-plan or autonomous choice is it doesn't exclude the interests of 
other, namely the community.57  
The community and individual autonomy has further implications that are specific to refugee 
women who choose FGC and the health care practitioner. As it relates to the community 
autonomy of healthcare professionals and interests that may be different than those of refugee 
women choosing FGC, there are compelling competing interest that must be investigated. 
However, as it relates to autonomous decisions, the notion of voluntariness must be considered 
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even when there is a vast difference between the intentions of the patient and the understanding 
and action of the practitioner. 
iii. Voluntariness, Autonomy and Care 
 The concept of voluntariness has become an important feature in bioethics58 and is one 
basic dimensions of the concept of autonomy. It is employed as the second element of informed 
consent and third of three conditions of autonomous action.59 Voluntariness as it relates to the 
individual receiving care must be in a position to have the power to choose without outside 
control or coercion. Additionally, voluntariness is the ability of the individual to determine the 
desired intention without being under the controlling interference of another person, illness or 
disorder that can diminish voluntariness. An example of diminished voluntariness is a person 
who is mentally ill and unable to volunteer. Mental illness can interrupt an individual from 
autonomous choice and intention.  
Voluntariness is a concept salient to the notion of care, particularly when applying the 
concept to the autonomous decision of those whose healthcare decisions and intentions may not 
be a normative one. The idea of voluntariness is particularly relevant to refugee women who live 
in cultures where FGC is not part of the established norm and who will voluntarily undergo the 
procedure. Chapter one of this dissertation established that for women to undergo FGC surgery 
involuntarily is ethically unacceptable. One the other hand however, the scholarship on FGC 
makes clear that there are women who embrace the surgery and who voluntarily undergo the 
medical intervention.60 Since the surgery is historically a cultural tradition that is transmitted 
from one generation to another, one ethnic group and community to another, it is probable that 
there will be future generations of women who will also embrace their cultural tradition and will 
voluntarily undergo the surgery.61 The concept of voluntariness is useful in this context of care.  
  
81 
 
 The notion of voluntariness describes acting in accord with one’s intention. When 
employed by an autonomous individual, the person has a desire for a specific action and is 
compelled to do so without being swayed, or under authority or domination of another.62 It is 
important to mention although not addressed in this dissertation that the mental or emotional 
condition is at times a concern and must be taken unto consideration. One of the queries that are 
raised when considering the notion of voluntariness concerns the intentions of the individuals 
influenced by outside factors. For instance, are the intentions or life plans of an individual 
influenced by one’s values and beliefs or are they influenced by the interdependence of 
community and culture in which we live?  
 In the previous section of this chapter the notion of influence was examined and it was 
determined that there are factors that influence an individuals autonomous intention. These 
factors include the social determinants such as gender, ethnicity, and the values and beliefs of the 
community in which an individual belongs. With respect to voluntariness, being influenced by 
non-coercive values and actions does not mean that the life plan or the intention of the individual 
is not an autonomous one. The investigation on influence further determined that the decision of 
the individual should not diminish and that care must be taken to respect the autonomous wishes 
of the individual. Furthermore, due to the nature of the social-self and the social-identity of 
individuals, it is impossible for they’re not to be a certain measure of influence.  
 Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that according to the scholarship on the voluntariness in 
the bioethics literature, influences are both negative and or positive.63 Negative influences are 
associated with coercion, also a subject often reflected in the discourse on FGC. Coercion is 
most often associated with a threat. It is at this juncture that the influence becomes a negative 
one. Importantly, the idea of coercion exists only when the “intended and credible threat 
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displaces a person’s self-directed course of action.”64 When the displacement of an individual’s 
intention occurs the decision is no longer an autonomous one.  
 This understanding of negative influences and coercion is particularly useful when it is 
associated with the autonomous choices of individuals especially as it relates to ethical decision 
making about ones healthcare, namely FGC. When the autonomous decision is made that is not 
normative, meaning the decision does not attend to the standards of the established norm, the 
idea of influence is assumed to be a negative one. An example is the controlling influences of the 
healthcare practitioner who is providing care for a refugee woman who chooses to undergo FGC.  
not only is there an opportunity for disagreement between the patient and the healthcare 
profession there is also a chance for the health practitioner to refuse to provide care. The refusal 
becomes a controlling influence that can thwart the voluntary intention of the woman receiving 
care. The notion of controlling influences is a theme that draws robust debate in the scholarship 
on FGC. However a noteworthy observation is made in exploring the scholarship on FGC. The 
focal point of controlling influences is often toward the community ethos in which women who 
have experienced FGC live, rather than negative influence of the practitioner.   
 Since the notion of voluntariness is associated with autonomy and providing care, the 
health practitioner must take precautions not to become the actor in the controlling influence. To 
facilitate voluntariness, positive influences are employed, namely the type of treatment and 
actions that foster autonomous decision making. Therefore when providing care the  
healthcare professional must be careful not to impose on one’s self directed intention. As it 
relates to future generations of young women who will have intentions to undergo FGC surgery 
the idea of voluntariness is critical when applying it to care of women who will choose. 
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III. Applying Respect for Autonomy to Care  
 In the field of bioethics there are moral theories and approaches that serve as a 
framework and guide for determining moral and ethical decision-making.65 While the ethics of 
care is more fully examined in chapter seven, the notion of the ethics of care lends itself to a 
framework for care in which to work and to apply respect for autonomy. The approach of the 
ethics of care asserts that there is a persuasive moral significance of attending to and meeting the 
need of particular other in which we take responsibility. In other words, it is in the context of the 
relationship (ethics of care) between the practitioner and the cared for that the needs of the 
patient is realized and attended too. The scholarship further explains about care, “care is in the 
first place a relationship between individuals.66” It is within the relationship of the caring 
professional and the patient, namely refugee women who choose to undergo FGC that need for 
the application of respect for autonomy to her care is essential.67  
 Respect for autonomy is intimately linked to the notion of care. It is connected by the  
relationship between the cared and the cared for. Caring for other is the primary goal of health 
care. The aim of healthcare is further articulated as the improvement of quality of life for all 
those who need and seek care. While quality of life is not a topic explored in this dissertation it is 
important to note that this is a goal of care and calls for further examination. One way to 
consider the connection of care and respect for autonomy is through the features of patient 
preferences (autonomy) and how patient preference contributes to applying respect for autonomy 
to care. The scholarship on patient preferences describes patient preferences as “what is essential 
to care.”68 Since patient preferences can also be articulated as autonomous choice, the 
preferences of the patient become the ethical “nucleus”69 of the relationship between the health 
professional and individual receiving care. 
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 There is an unmistakable ethical significance to patient preference, i.e. autonomy that is 
critical to care, but especially to care for the group of women represented in this dissertation. The 
scholarship further explains that patient preferences are ethically significant because they 
manifest the value of personal autonomy that is deeply rooted in our culture. This is particularly 
true and challenging for women who are refugees and choose to undergo FGC, and for the future 
generations of women who will also choose to employ their beliefs and values associated with 
the cultural custom. Respect for autonomy can be challenging in the practical application 
because the ethical ask of a woman to be circumcised is not a surgery familiar to the US and 
most likely becomes an obstacle for exercising respect for autonomy and care. One challenge 
perhaps is that the practitioner has little to no knowledge about FGC. Another difficulty related 
to employing respect for autonomy to care is the difference in the values and beliefs between the 
healthcare professional and the woman choosing to undergo FGC surgery. This difference can 
cause disagreement about the course of care for the patient and the ability of the healthcare 
professional to respect the preferences of the patient, i.e. the autonomous choice of the patient.  
 It is here that an additional feature of patient preferences (autonomy) highlighted in the 
scholarship is useful. This characteristic is referred to as the “expression”70 of an individual’s 
intentions and life plan. This feature of expression as it were, is influenced by the social context 
in which the patient is situated. It is in this light that Rendtorff’s illustrations of the limits of 
autonomy are useful as there are “tensions between the human existence as unencumbered self 
and the embodied, embedded character of human existence.”71 The embedded quality of human 
life is the reality of human existence and applies to women from FGC contexts who now live in 
non-FGC environments and choose to undergo the medical intervention.  
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The idea of patient preferences is critical when considering care for women who choose 
FGC and who are in need of care. The critical nature of patient preferences for this group of 
women lies in the fact that autonomous choice is influenced by culture and social context.  For 
example, FGC is a ritual that conveys meaning in a variety of ways depending on the cultural 
context.72  Furthermore, with FGC, as in other cultural traditions, for example, the embedded 
belief in not accepting blood transfusions honored by Jehovah’s Witnesses mentioned earlier. A 
second illustration of social contextual influences is the absolutely unacceptable medical 
intervention of abortion revered by those who embrace specific religious traditions. These 
perspectives are inspired by the context of culture. In fact, the preferences and health decisions 
of patients are motivated by “cultural and religious beliefs.”73  
The preferences of the patient are fundamental to good clinical care, and especially to 
women who choose FGC.74 Mentioned earlier, according to Jonsen, Siegler and Winslade, the 
wishes of the patient have substantial ethical importance.75 Their importance lies in the fact that 
the desires or wishes of the patient make clear the value of personal autonomy that is deep-seated 
and established in culture.76 One reason that the preferences of the patient are an integral part 
concerning the care of women is the recognition of the desire of women who choose FGC shows 
respect for the value of their personal self-rule and agency in medical care.77  A second reason 
that patient preferences are important is the fierce opposition to the practice in the U.S. The 
disapproval of FGC can cause not only disagreement highlighted earlier but can facilitate the 
patient’s vulnerability in the context of care.78 While vulnerability is the subject of Chapter 6 it is 
relevant to the autonomous choice of women who choose FGC, especially in a non- FGC 
environment like the U.S.  
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When thinking about vulnerability in the context of health care, and particularly as it 
relates to women who choose FGC in non-FGC contexts, the point in which vulnerability is 
associated with care is protecting those whose autonomy is in danger of being jeopardized.79 An 
example of protecting women as it concerns care is, protecting women from ridicule, judgment 
and the refusal of being able to undergo the medical intervention. When autonomy is threatened 
and ignored, the preferences of the patient are disregarded.  The overlooked wishes of women 
who choose FGC surgery impede the moral right to make choices about ones own life intention. 
In addition, to discount the right to self-legislation affects the future generations of women who 
will choose to participate in their culture, namely to undergo FGC surgery as an expression of 
their autonomous life choice.  
In other words, patient preference is this expression that gives meaningful voice to the 
autonomous intentions of the cared for. It is meaningful because it further facilities the 
application of respect for autonomy to care, and prioritizes the expressed desire and an 
individuals life plan which includes culture, religious beliefs, and value. Patient preferences and 
the expression of the preferences of the individual “contribute to decisions about care.”80 It is the 
preference of the cared for that is essential to good care, namely care for women presently, and 
future generations to come who will choose a life plan that includes FGC.  
IV. Conclusion 
 The concept of autonomy is used in a variety of disciplines that include philosophy, 
theology, law and bioethics. In fact autonomy is one of the pillars that shapes the bioethical 
framework in which to support ethical decision-making and assists with employing standards on 
the best way to practice ethics as it relates to providing healthcare.81 It is a valued standard. In 
bioethics it is the right of an individual to determine their course of care. Further, autonomy is 
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literally self-governance and the freedom of individuals to live their own lives, in their own way. 
Autonomy is the right to self-determination. Autonomy is central to the idea that personal 
autonomy encompasses self-rule that is free from controlling interference by others. Autonomy 
is both a legal construct and a bioethical one. It is the legal aspects of the idea of autonomy that 
includes that of reproductive rights intimately connected to refugee women who choose to 
undergo FGC surgeries and must be respected 
 Applying respect for autonomy means to acknowledge and respect that individuals have a 
right to make decisions based on their values and beliefs and that “such respect involves that 
actions toward the autonomous individual are respectful. The respectful action applies especially 
when there are differences in the values and beliefs of the health care practitioner and the patient. 
The health care professional must take care not to become a controlling influence that derails the 
intention of the women who voluntarily chooses to undergo the FG surgery. The voluntariness of 
individuals will be influenced by social determinants prevalent in the context of community. 
Because individuals have both a social self and social identity, being influenced cannot be 
avoided. However these influences do not mean that the autonomous choice of the individual is 
any less autonomous. Therefore the preferences of the individual must be honored. It is essential 
to care. 
 Respect for autonomy is one sure way of meeting the health care need of women 
presently and the future generations of women who will choose FGC. Maintaining respect for the 
individual receiving care keeps the relationship focused on the woman receiving care. 
Furthermore employing the notion recognizes the intentions and the life plan of the patient. In 
this way respect for autonomy is connected to care. This relationship of the carer and the cared 
for fosters the basic goal of health care which is to facilitate the quality of life for the patient 
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which is done through respecting the life plan and intentions of the cared for, namely refugee 
women who choose voluntarily to undergo FGC surgery. 
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Chapter 4: Non-maleficence, Beneficence, FGC and Care   
 The significance of exploring the ‘moral status’ of FGC/c rests in the alleged physical harm 
associated with FGC often described in the scholarship.  The health consequences associated 
with FGC surgeries raise specific dilemmas for both the health care practitioner and the refugee 
women who experience FGC and are in the care of the health professional.  The argument 
advanced in this chapter is consideration for the use of the idea of non-maleficence, as it is part 
of the health care ethics framework that assists in ethically examining FGC and determining 
what care for women who undergo FGC should be. The concept of non-maleficence has 
implications for healthcare professionals who encounter women who, with intention, voluntarily 
choose to undergo FGC.  The chapter is devoted to working through the notion of non-
maleficence, its application, its nuances and the implications for healthcare professionals. The 
following questions help to shape the discussion: might there be certain types of FGC/c 
procedures that present less harm and risk than others, and if so, how can health professionals 
cooperate with practices that inflict various types of harm particularly under the guide of the 
non-maleficence framework? The chapter will conclude with how non-maleficence can influence 
the model of care for women experiencing FGC.  
I. Non-maleficence  
 In advancing the notion of non-maleficence, this section will examine what the bioethical 
construct is and survey how it is applied to women refugees and FGC.  Non-maleficence is both 
a concept and a principle. Conceptually, non-maleficence is described as the avoidance of harm 
or the infliction of the least amount of harm as possible to reach a beneficial outcome. The 
primary goal of non- maleficence, however, is to “do no harm.”1 On the other hand, the principle  
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of non-maleficence designates a moral obligation to refrain from inflicting harm. As it relates to 
healthcare ethics the health care practitioner has an obligation and duty not to harm those who 
are in her/his care.  In the larger framework of health care ethics, non-maleficence plays a critical 
role in patient care. For example, according to Jonsen, Siegler, and Winslade, the principle of 
non-maleficence is linked to the quality of life maxim, and it is the patient who determines what 
is harmful and what is not.2 The concept of non-maleficence is closely related to the concept of 
beneficence.  The concept of beneficence refers to mercy, kindness, and charity and symbolizes 
actions intended to benefit the well being of others. Benevolence, which is associated with 
beneficence, is the attribute and characteristic of an individual and denotes the qualities and 
nature of a person inclined to act on behalf of others. These actions are beneficial rather than 
harmful. The concept of beneficence does not reflect obligation or duty. 
 The principle of beneficence, however, describes the moral obligation to act for the good 
and well being of others.3 Even though the principle of non-maleficence and principle of 
beneficence are closely related, there are distinctions- namely that there is a moral obligation to 
refrain from harm (non-maleficence) and a moral obligation to act to benefit others 
(beneficence). Some scholars organize non-maleficence and beneficence together to form one 
single principle.4 For example, Frankena’s approach to non-maleficence, examined later in this 
chapter, arranges the principle of beneficence into four obligations with the principle of non-
maleficence being last. Nevertheless, these two moral obligations raise a moral conflict and serve 
as competing interests because both principles are involved in caring for patients, namely refugee 
women who choose to undergo FGC surgery. Specifically, the conflict facilitated by the 
principles affects the health practitioner who must take care to refrain from harm and take 
positive actions to help others5 which involves allowing the patient to determine what is harmful 
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and what is not. The vastly different viewpoints become evident when the preference of the 
patient is to choose to risk the harm associated with FGC surgery, while the obligation of the 
health practitioner is to practice non-maleficence.   By employing the two principles conflict 
emerges; the patient’s perspective on the idea of harm and what the patient may view as positive 
steps to help her obtain quality of life.  
 The patient’s perspective on what indicates harm is critical as it relates to care for refugee 
women experiencing FGC.6  Her perspective and outlook concerning her care is what Jonsen, 
Siegler and Winslade refer to as patient preferences.7 The significance of the preferences of the 
patient rests in the fact that patient preferences are “essential to good clinical care”8 specifically, 
care for refugee women who choose FGC surgeries. This is not to say that the patient and the 
health professional do not agree that the procedure of choice, FGC, may cause harm. In fact, 
nearly all surgeries, according to the scholarship, have a level of expected injury.9 The two 
opposing points of view held by the actors are the conflict between the patient and the health 
care practitioner as it relates to the wishes and the care of the patient-refugee women who choose 
to undergo FGC surgery.   
 The second conflict that emerges when considering non-maleficence (to do no harm) and 
beneficence (to take positive steps to do what benefits the patient) is the quality of life for the 
patient. It is said that quality of life is the most fundamental goal of medical care.10 One area of 
tension when considering quality of life is that the patient ultimately determines it. The 
development of any disagreement on quality of life is based on what the patient determines as 
quality of life verses quality of life as judged by the health practitioner.  The idea of surgery, i.e., 
FGC, which brings no health benefits would be difficult for the health practitioner to associate 
with contributing to the quality of life for the woman choosing FGC surgery. In the context of 
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FGC it is plausible that the physician providing care may be biased toward a lifestyle that 
includes FGC.11 Therefore the biased judgment of the health care practitioner concerning quality 
of life for the patient may be influenced by negative attitudes and can affect her/his clinical 
judgment about quality of life. These significantly differing viewpoints do cause conflict 
between the patient and the health care professional. The two differing points of view raise 
ongoing ethical questions about how to proceed with care, the focus of this dissertation.  
 The idea of quality of life is a subjective construct. Since the maxim can be an 
individualistic and personal construct supported by opinion, it can be difficult to define. 
However Jonsen, Siegler and Winslade, define quality of life as a ”multi-dimensional construct 
that includes performance and enjoyment of roles, physical health, intellectual functioning, 
emotional state, and life satisfaction or well-being.”12 The axiom also is referred to as a 
judgment.13 Given the definition offered by Jonsen, Siegler and Winslade, the opinion of what 
quality of life means is influenced by the personal assessment of the patient about how the 
autonomous choice to undergo medical intervention, namely FGC, will affect her life. What the 
patient brings to the personal assessment of what quality of life means are her beliefs, values, 
culture, and customs. It is these cultural features that assist her in determining quality of life.14  
 Since quality of life is defined as a framework that embodies various aspects, which 
include the pleasure and satisfaction of societal roles, and fulfillment of life and well being, 
curiously, quality of life could be observed as a cultural construct, a subject examined more fully 
in chapter 5 of this dissertation. Interestingly however the societal role of women is one of the 
rationales attributed to FGC. The connection of quality of life for the patient, specifically women 
who choose FGC is a noteworthy consideration in exploring what care should be for women 
whose life plan includes FGC. 
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 In the bioethics framework quality of life includes the ethical construct of personal 
autonomy investigated earlier in this dissertation. Quality of life is an expression of one’s own 
life course and closely linked to patient preferences.15 Quality of life then is a critical 
consideration for examining what the care should be for refugee women who choose FGC. It is 
in this light, quality of life, that autonomous choices are made and that wishes of the patient are 
honored. For women choosing FGC surgery, the principle of beneficence facilitates positive 
steps to the well being of the patient. Moving toward a model of care for refugee women who 
choose FGC that includes autonomous choice and quality life are foundational to beneficence. 
 In assessing the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence, particularly as it relates to 
the care of refugee women choosing to undergo FGC, the scholarship considers that at times, the 
obligation to refrain from harm can be inflexible, more so than the duty to help.16 However, 
depending on the medical circumstance, the opposite can apply. For instance, if the health care 
practitioner makes an incision which causes tenderness and bleeding to allow air so the patient 
can breathe: then the “obligation of beneficence takes priority over non-maleficence.”17 While 
this scenario may be plausible, some of the scholarship on the principle of non-maleficence 
cautions that generally non-maleficence trumps beneficence.18 In spite of this caution, the typical 
override is not absolute, and the emphasis placed on non-maleficence depends upon the 
circumstances. In other words, the circumstances will dictate how the principle of non-
maleficence is assigned and applied. Conversely, there will be times depending upon the 
situation that beneficence will override non-maleficence.  
 An illustration of a circumstance where the principle of beneficence has priority over non-
maleficence is a case where a patient has a life threatening allergic reaction. The health  
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practitioner administers a needle that inflicts minor harm for the major benefit of saving the life 
of the patient. The ethical priority for the consideration of the principle of non-maleficence is 
important. The significance lies in the harmful consequences often claimed and associated with 
FGC. It is important to note that the use of the terms harm and injury here are used generally to 
mean “incurring or at an increased risk of incurring pain.”19 One issue in the debate over FGC is 
the harmful consequences associated with the practice. The alleged harm endured by women 
who undergo FGC includes, but is not limited to physical complications for example severe pain 
and bleeding and long-term complications.20 In contrast the research informs that the alleged 
harmful consequences are over emphasized and inaccurate by mainstream narrative.21 This raises 
the question of whether harm and injury are associated with most invasive medical interventions, 
i.e., FGC discussed earlier in the chapter. According to Gillon, there is risk of harm to patients in 
most medical interventions. 22  Drawing on this argument by Gillon the query is raised whether 
the alleged harm associated with FGC is due to surgery in and of itself, or whether the harm is 
related to unskilled health workers and the absence of adequate medical care. If it is the later, 
then non-maleficence obligates to reduce harm and beneficence suggests that reducing harm is 
acting on behalf of women who choose FGC. Avoiding harm is “untenable”23 and non-
maleficence cannot take priority over beneficence.  
 The principles of non-maleficence and beneficence have moral implications as they 
concern the care given to patients, particularly when the care involved may invoke a certain 
amount of injury observed in the previous paragraph. Some examples of care that may invoke 
harm highlighted in the scholarship include, intending and foreseeing harm; killing and allowing 
to die; and withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.24 While these scenarios are 
not the focus here, they represent authentic and tangible examples of moral dilemmas present 
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when considering the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence. The scenarios also bring to 
light the ethical dilemmas and nuances present in the investigation of refugee women who will 
choose to undergo FGC and will be in need of care.  
 One compelling moral implication of non-maleficence and beneficence related to what the 
focus of care should be for refugee women who choose FGC surgery is mitigation or lessening 
the alleged physical health consequences often associated with FGC surgery. Investigated earlier 
in Chapter 1, FGC is distinguished by four types of cutting. The observed types of FGC surgeries 
are also assigned degrees of injury.25 For example, Type I and IV surgeries are described as the 
surgeries that involve the least amount of cutting.26 Type I surgery is known as Sunna and is 
characterized by Sheldon and Wilkinson as the one FGC surgery that may not entail “necessary 
or permanent injury.”27  Type IV surgery is described as ‘unclassified’ and is also comprised of 
less invasive forms of cutting. Examples of Type IV FGC surgery include pricking or piercing of 
the clitoris and/or the labia and at times includes small cutting.28   
 The implications for both Type I and Type IV surgeries are that these two surgeries not 
only lessen the assumed injury involved, Types I and IV allows for the health care practitioner to 
honor both the non-maleficence and beneficence construct. Considering the frameworks of non-
maleficence and beneficence for Types I and IV supports the focus of care of what care should 
be for women who are choosing FGC surgery. This focus on what care should be is facilitated by 
honoring the autonomous choice of the patient and taking actions toward positive outcomes that 
not only support the quality of life for the women choosing FGC, but also afford the health care 
practitioner to refrain from harm, i.e., employing the principle of non-maleficence.  
 Another implication for employing the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence 
observed through the lens of remediation is that remediation fosters prevention of the alleged 
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harmful consequences associated with FGC surgeries, namely types II and III. Types II and III 
cutting are described as the most severe of the surgeries and present the most long-term health 
complications.29 Being able to lessen the harm by using less invasive interventions, namely 
Types I and IV, contributes to help to frame a response to the ethical tension between the health 
professional who is concerned with non-maleficence (do no harm) and the patient whose life 
intention is to undergo FGC surgery.  
 Concerning the ethical response to FGC, health professionals are uncertain of the medical 
ethic, do no harm.30 According to Rebecca Cook, FGC surgeries are safer under the guide of 
medically trained professionals rather than unskilled and unprepared hands.31 Considering non-
maleficence in this way supports shaping a construct of what the care should be for women who 
choose FGC. For example, employing medically trained hands to perform FGC surgeries, 
particularly the less invasive surgeries, facilitates a decrease in injury that contributes not only to 
the harm reduction framework, but also gives skilled professionals the opportunity to become an 
actor in beneficence; to contribute to the positive outcome for the patient. Since a positive 
outcome would be garnered by the lessening of injury, it is critical to observe minimizing harm 
as “an aspect of non-maleficence.”32 Minimizing the harm, i.e., the health consequences 
associated with FGC surgeries as a feature of non-maleficence is embodied in the Hippocratic 
Oath. 
A. Hippocratic Oath 
 The principle of non-maleficence is one of the four pillars in the framework of bioethics 
presented by Beauchamp and Childress and is frequently used in the FGC scholarship as a way 
of drawing ethical conclusions regarding FGC that lead to eradication.33 Obajulu Nnmuchi, for 
example, writes, “the ethical principle of non-maleficence is directly related to the health 
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consequences of FGM-and requires health professionals to “first do no harm.”34 The argument 
used, employing non-maleficence, asserts that, because of non-maleficence or “do no harm,” 
eradication is the only response to FGC. Perhaps the lack of investigation regarding the principle 
of non-maleficence generates a response that is unbalanced and biased. These prejudiced 
assessments and understandings serve as a barrier to the right of women to choose FGC and for 
care to respond favorably to their intention.  In an effort to understand the maxim it is perhaps 
useful to survey the exegetical landscape of the axiom often missing in the scholarship on FGC.  
 The principle of non-maleficence is often attributed to the Hippocratic oath and to the 
maxim Primum non-nocere which articulates, “Above all [or first] do no harm;” however, 
according to the scholarship on the maxim, non-maleficence is not in the oath.35 In fact, primum 
non-nocere is not part of the Hippocratic Oath at all. Regarding the expression however, Albert 
Jonsen explains that the Hippocratic Oath expresses a similar sentiment, which asserts that 
physicians will not use their skill, knowledge and abilities to injure or wrong their patients but 
will use their skills and any treatment to help.36 The scholarship further describes that while 
primum non-nocere or “do no harm” does not appear in the Hippocratic Oath, the axiom “do no 
harm” is found in the Hippocratic literature called the Epidemics, a collection of observations 
made by Greek physicians while they assisted with the therapeutics of medicine.  It is important 
to note that, when translating from the Greek text, the text, at times, does not allow for the 
translation of all words, leaving the translation of the meaning of the word altered. Nevertheless, 
Beauchamp and Childress write about the Hippocratic Oath that the oath “incorporates both an 
obligation of non-maleficence and an obligation of beneficence”37   
 According to Robert M. Veatch, the Hippocratic Oath is part of what is called the 
Hippocratic Tradition. The tradition began as a movement in Greek medicine. Veatch explains 
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that the Hippocratic Oath is a collection of writings often referred to as the Hippocratic corpus. 
Not all writings in the corpus are of an ethical nature; however, the Hippocratic Oath is, and it 
contains an oath of secrecy as well as a set of moral imperatives.38 The most celebrated and well 
known of the rules and obligations is the idea that “the physician ought to act so as to benefit the 
patient and keep the patient from harm according to the physicians ability and judgment.”39 An 
additional and significant observation, unearthed in the analysis of the maxim and important to 
the choice of women to undergo FGC, is that the “above all” phrase was not added to the “do no 
harm,” expression. Rather, the “above all” axiom was added to the phrase that refers to help and 
benefit. Consequently, the maxim read, “the physician must aim above all at helping the sick; if 
he cannot, he should at least not harm them.”40  
 Curiously, the scholarship related to the “do no harm” adage emphasizes that the proverb, 
if you will, is meant more toward helping the patient rather than doing harm.41 This does not 
mean that “do no harm” is not justifiable, and reasonable, it is, rather, it serves to say that 
medicine and the use of surgery are designed to affect a change for the physical well-being of the 
patient 42 and not for the intended purpose of harm. In light of this exegetical help, the maxim is 
better served to say, the expression makes the well being of the patient the priority. The 
expression also guides the health professional to secure good and that which is beneficial to the 
patient, rather to prioritize and place emphasis on “do no harm.”  This is not to say that the 
principle of non-maleficence does not obligate the health practitioner not to do harm, but rather 
the principle of non-maleficence obligates the health practitioner to first consider the well-being 
of the patient, do what is beneficial for the patient (from the patients point of view), and to garner 
what is good. In parsing out the principle, it is clear that non-maleficence is nuanced particularly 
because, in benefiting a patient, at times harm, is encountered.43 One example of the nuances and 
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difficulty in understanding non-maleficence is the idea for instance, of the doctrine of double 
effect, examined later in this chapter. It is important to highlight here, however, that double 
effect “incorporates an influential distinction between intended effects and merely foreseen 
effects”44 often present in the context of surgery, namely FGC. Distinguishing the differences in 
the two principles is helpful, particularly in examining what the care should be for women 
experiencing FGC. Specifically, the principle of non-maleficence refers to the obligation to 
refrain from inflicting harm to others.45 On the other hand, the principle of beneficence can be 
explained as the opposite of non-maleficence since the principle of beneficence is the obligation 
to contribute to the welfare of others and to take positive steps to help others46. The principle of 
beneficence refers to the moral obligation to contribute to the well-being and to the good of 
others. 
 Differentiating the principles assists in determining what care should be for refugee women 
who choose FGC surgeries. However, in the work of distinguishing the two principles some 
scholars writing about the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence articulate non-
maleficence as an aspect of beneficence,47 a framework used in Frankena’s hierarchy of non-
maleficence and beneficence.  
B. Frankena’s Hierarchy of Non-maleficence and Beneficence  
 The principle of non-maleficence is used in the scholarship on FGC as an “absolute 
obligation from which no detour is permitted.”48 Non-maleficence applied in this seemingly 
malignant and unbalanced way suggests there will always be a negative consequence without 
consideration of the beneficial outcome for the patients who choose FGC surgery, therefore 
leading to a conclusion that surgery or a medical intervention of any kind should not be done.  
However, upon further inquiry into the principle of non-maleficence a more balanced and 
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realistic approach is constructed.  
 William Frankena’s representation of non-maleficence assigns non-maleficence as a part of 
the beneficence framework. In this schema, beneficence is the highest aim. It is the obligation to 
do good, and to prevent evil or harm and suggests that if there was no basic obligation to do 
good, then there would be “no duty to realize the greatest balance of good over evil.”49 
Therefore, the ideal is to do only good and not evil. However, in healthcare, it is an unrealistic 
endeavor to ascribe to the ideal to “do good only” and not to “do no harm.”50 At times, some 
harm is experienced in attaining the greatest benefit. Since this is the case, Frankena explains 
that the principle of utility offers and presupposes a more basic obligation, of which is to produce 
good and prevent harm. Therefore, the “principle of beneficence asks us to actually do good and 
not evil.”51 Non-maleficence then, in Frankena’s hierarchy, places the principle of non-
maleficence as part of the larger principle of beneficence, which is the moral obligation to act for 
the benefit of others. For Frankena, the lowest level of beneficence is the obligation not to inflict 
harm. In ascending order, his representation of the principle of beneficence, which includes non-
maleficence, is described in the following way: 
1. Do not inflict evil 
2. Prevent evil or harm 
3. Remove evil 
4. Promote good and do good 
 
Interestingly, in Frankena’s representation of “do no harm” he affirms the exegetical parsing out 
of Hippocratic oath where the emphasis on “above all” in the treaty is to “do good.” 
 Importantly, Frankena’s meaning of beneficence becomes relevant in working with refugee 
women who live in non-FGC communities and choose to undergo FGC surgery. It is relevant in 
two ways. First, Frankena’s hierarchy embodies the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, which grounds both rights and ethics in the inherent dignity and equality of human 
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beings. Further, “inherent dignity is the property of being human that generates the universal 
moral obligation to do good for, and avoid harm to, other humans and the fulfillment of that 
obligation is the basis for the principle of beneficence and non-maleficence.”52 Secondly, the 
relevance of Frankena’s framework of beneficence lies in the priority of promoting positive steps 
to help others and to promote good, a framework perhaps when applied has fewer negative 
connotations for women who intend to pursue FGC surgery.   
II. Beneficence and FGC 
 This section examines the principle of beneficence using Frankena’s hierarchy and the 
application of the principle to refugee women who choose to have FGC surgery.  In the 
preceding section, a review of the literature explains that the notion of non-maleficence is often 
linked with the concept of beneficence. For example, as scholars describe in health care, 
practitioners have to consider and weigh the two principles together.53 While this linkage is an 
integral part of Frankena’s framework, Beauchamp and Childress argue that there is a distinction 
between the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. They should therefore be separated 
into two principles and not melded into one.54 In addition the research describes that the major 
feature of the principle of beneficence is that provision is made, and support is given to 
contribute to the well being of others.55   Frankena’s structure of beneficence does not deny that 
the focus of beneficence is toward the benefit and good of others, but rather the good and benefit 
of others is prioritized and is the first element in his framework, while non-maleficence is last. 
However, in the mainstream framework, the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are 
separated and applied separately.  
Therefore in exploring what the care should be for women who choose FGC, Frankena’s 
framework for beneficence is persuasive particularly for health care practitioners providing care. 
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The implication is that Frankena’ schema considers non-maleficence as an aspect of beneficence. 
In other words, Frankena’s framework prioritizes beneficence. Prioritizing beneficence in this 
way underscores the centrality of autonomous choice of patients and the outcome of quality of 
life and well-being for the women whose life intention is FGC.  The principle of beneficence 
affirms, “morality requires us to make positive steps toward assisting others, and not merely to 
refrain from harm.”56 
 Making positive steps in an effort to help refugee women who will choose to undergo FGC 
will require applying the principle of beneficence as articulated by Frankena. Since the principle 
of beneficence is a moral obligation to contribute to the welfare of others and to make positive 
steps to help others, the idea of reducing the harm that is at times associated with FGC, and 
numerous other medical interventions found in healthcare, is a noteworthy consideration. Harm 
reduction is one way to apply the principle of beneficence to the care of women who choose 
FGC. The construct allows for lessening the harm associated with the surgery. In addition harm 
reduction is an avenue in which to take positive steps to benefit the patient and to honor the 
autonomy of the patient and to engage in care that brings benefit to the patient. 
A. Harm Reduction 
 In determining what the care should be for women who voluntarily choose to undergo FGC 
surgery, the notion of harm reduction is a meaningful concept to consider. In considering this 
concept the specific focus is whether the harm associated with FGC surgeries can be lessened 
and even prevented by guaranteeing safe medical procedures, and if so, whether harm reduction 
is a worthy consideration.  According to Bettina Shell Duncan, the idea of guaranteeing safe 
medical procedures is not new to the debate and faces fierce opposition by those who advocate 
for the eradication of the practice.57 It is “activists, as well as many international medical 
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associations that largely oppose measures to improve its safety.”58 The opposition to improve the 
safety of the surgeries raises the query regarding FGC of whether the disapproval is related only 
to the health consequences or whether there are other objections unrelated to the surgery. The 
research describes that there are other areas of resistance that may be related to the unfriendly 
response to harm reduction. While these areas of opposition are not investigated here, it is 
important to mention, as they are related to the larger discussion on FGC and harm reduction. 
Nevertheless, if the surgery can be done in a way that reduces harm it has implications both for 
healthcare professionals and for women who voluntarily choose to undergo FGC.  
 One implication is that harm reduction quite possibly facilitates guidance for health 
practitioners who encounter women who intend to pursue FGC. Another implication is that the 
surgery can be done in a way that prevents harm incurred by unsanitary and non-medical 
environments that can cause damage to patients. As it relates to the harm reduction and positive 
outcomes for the patient, it is important to approach FGC as the medical procedure that it is, 
therefore ethically bound to all of the standards, processes, values, and norms that other medical 
procedures adhere too.   
 In doing so, the UNESCO Article 4 [Benefit and Harm] offers a framework for thinking 
about and living with the risks of harm. While there is a moral sanction that entitles every human 
being to be free from intentional harm, absolute protection against all harms is not attainable, 
even in the best of circumstances.59 In the aim toward medical treatment that has both a positive 
and beneficial outcome, there is a high probability of unintended harm. Therefore, it is important 
to point out that without a certain amount of unintended yet probable harm, the advances in 
medicine and life saving treatment would not exist. Article 4 of the UNESCO framework also 
makes clear that the possibility of harm is morally acceptable when the benefits are maximized 
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and the harm is reduced.  
 Since there have been small successes made in the eradication of FGC and an increased 
suspicion that the occurrence of FGC in the US is more frequent than previously thought,60 harm 
reduction is a worthwhile and credible response. According to Nancy Kass, harm reduction is 
based on the assumption that when there is an underlying cause of a health problem or health 
burden which remains difficult to eliminate, intervening to reduce some of the adverse harmful 
consequences of the problem, namely the health consequences associated with FGC, can result in 
lessening the harm.61  In other words decreasing the alleged harm related to FGC can result in a 
“net reduction in harm”62 for individuals and the wider community. Therefore, harm reduction 
according to the Article 4 in the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, is 
morally acceptable as the idea of harm reduction is to minimize harm, particularly the harmful 
consequences associated with FGC surgeries.  
 Nevertheless, there is a balance between benefits, harm and risk.63 There are many kinds of 
benefits associated with benefiting the patient. In healthcare ethics, for example, benefits are a 
positive value; however the term is associated with the anticipation of the prevention of cost and 
the decrease of risk. Further, positive benefits can be seen as directly related to the patient and 
include the interests of the patient and the wider community to which the patient belongs. 
Another benefit that can serve the health practitioner is the knowledge of the health professional, 
which will be of benefit to present patients and also future patients, in particular future 
generations of women and daughters who will choose FGC surgery. Some scholarship explains 
that benefits can support the development of policy, which can nurture progress for the common 
good.64 Based on the trends of eradication and the current focus on the prevalence of FGC in the 
U.S., certainly the development of more balanced policy concerning FGC is in order. 
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 On the other side of benefits are risks. Risks are the assessments and estimates of the 
probabilities and chances of injury to either the patient or society and are deemed a negative 
value. An example of risk and risk to society is the Tuskegee experiment. The Tuskegee 
experiment produced harm, which violated the welfare and interests of the patients and the 
society at large.  In healthcare ethics risks are also defined as a “set back to the interests of the 
patient, particularly in life, health, or welfare.”65 This particular characterization of risk is 
compelling. It is compelling because the definition affirms that the idea of risks in health care is 
not only associated with the chance of occurrence of physical harm, but also puts risk in the 
context of the interests of the patient. Positioning risk in this context is an important 
consideration when working with refugee women who will choose to undergo the surgery, 
particularly in a health care setting where the health care practitioner may make biased and 
unbalanced value judgments about the physical risk and harm to the patient without considering 
the interests of the patient.  
 Harm must be evaluated in the context of the financial burden of the patient, along with the 
emotional and spiritual harm of the patient. Further consideration of the financial burden of 
women who choose FGC is imperative. The significance of reflecting on financial aspects of the 
lives of refugee women who choose FGC surgery lies in the reality that one of the primary 
rationales for FGC is related to the cultural construct of marriage. Marriage, particularly in 
Africa is associated with family honor, economic well-being and financial security of women, 
however proof of virginity is a prerequisite for marriage.66 Since the financial security of women 
is connected to marriage, FGC becomes the central avenue and method for ensuring marriage 
and honoring family.  
 Harm reduction is characterized as an avenue to address the primary cause of a health 
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problem that is difficult to eliminate. In addition, the harm reduction approach involves 
interventions that will reduce adverse harmful consequences. The research on harm reduction 
asserts that the harm reduction methodology can be seen not only as eliminating harm, but also 
as a way of garnering steps to improve lives,67 particularly the lives of women experiencing FGC 
surgery. The harm reduction approach can result in the lessening of harm of FGC surgeries and 
therefore is applicable to FGC. In the investigation of harm reduction, harm reduction assumes 
that the strategies to reduce the harm, namely health consequences related to FGC, can garner 
even incremental improvement in the outcome, and incremental improvement is to be valued. 
Medicalization is one such strategy to reduce the alleged harmful consequences of FGC. 
B. Medicalization of FGC  
  Medicalization is a term used in the FGC scholarship to refer to the characterization of 
FGC as a medical condition.68 Formally, medicalization is a process by which human problems 
come to be defined and treated as medical problems.69 Medicalization involves the human 
experience, which includes culture, social context, personhood, and the like. Considering the 
medicalization of FGC, as it is a medical procedure is not new to the FGC discourse and remains 
an affront for some who advocate and develop strategies for eradication of the practice.70  
 Medicalization of FGC has a strong relationship to beneficence. The connection lies in the 
responsibility of the health professional to change what can be changed while continuing to find 
ways and approaches to address larger changes. According to the UNESCO Article 4,[Benefit 
and Harm] changing what can be changed is the practical response.71 Therefore one of the 
practical responses to FGC is medicalization. The idea of addressing larger changes in FGC is 
clearly noted in the FGC scholarship. One such change, for instance, that is highlighted in the 
literature is the eradication of the FGC.72While eradication was explored earlier in this 
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dissertation, it is critical to mention again here, since the larger change particularly as it relates to 
the health consequences associated with FGC could be addressed by medicalization. 
 Advocates for eradication argue that FGC is a violation of human rights.73 The traditional 
custom is often characterized by those who support eradication of FGC as a form of violence 
against women.74 One legal scholar notes that FGC must not be medicalized, but rather the 
practice must be criminalized and made punishable through the process of making laws to 
abolish FGC which will support “elimination and foster an environment that is intolerant to 
FGC.”75 However, scholars argue that some of the legal situations to ban the practice are 
“ethically unsustainable.”76 Similarly, the World Health Organization (WHO), other 
organizations, countries and nations have what is described as a zero-tolerance policy that claims 
that all forms of FGC must be eliminated immediately.77 Further, other anti-circumcision 
advocates argue that medicalization is “not a step in the right direction since it does not imply a 
progression toward less severe forms of cutting.”78 Conversely, however, Obiora contends that 
while the efforts to promote hygiene and sanitation through medicalization may not be the 
decisive or the final strategy for implementation, the idea of abolition is not the solution.79 In 
addition, the FGC scholarship regarding medicalization includes proposals that argue for less 
severe forms of cutting, the use of anesthesia, and pre and post- operative antibiotics.80 An 
example of cutting that is less invasive is demonstrated in some of the proposals for 
medicalization explained later in this chapter. 
 Ellen Gruenbaum explains that due to the culturally embedded nature of FGC, an idea 
investigated in Chapter Six of this dissertation, that FGC is not easily challenged81 even when the 
health effects and consequences are known making medicalization of FGC worthy a 
consideration. In communities where cultural custom is the dominant rationale behind the 
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practice, medicalization can be a “socially acceptable”82 approach.  For example, forms of 
socially acceptable circumcision include the use of anesthesia and less invasive cutting by 
trained professionals, for instances pricking instead of cutting.  In this way the harmful outcomes 
of FGC are reduced facilitating a positive outcome for women who choose the surgery.  
 In the effort to improve safety and the reproductive health of women who undergo FGC, 
medicalization is becoming increasingly common across Africa.83 Efforts to implement the use 
of milder, less harmful forms of circumcision- particularly in the Sudan and Somalia- were 
introduced. In Somalia, for instance, “sunna” is encouraged and is now offered in health clinics 
operated by midwives who have been medically trained. Sudan also ascribes to “sunna,” a milder 
form of circumcision. The scholarship on medicalization of FGC further shows that in other 
countries in Africa where  “medicalized” forms of circumcision are performed, the 
medicalization includes the dissemination of educational materials on FGC and other traditional 
practices.84   
 According to the research the services of trained nurses are in high demand since the 
surgery has been medicalized by the use of sterile instruments and an anesthetic, which reduces 
pain and allows for more precise cutting. 85 An example of the high demand for medicalized 
FGC surgeries takes place in Kenya where FGC is illegal. Even though the custom is banned in 
Kenya, trained nurses perform the surgery on patients who are on leave from the Christmas 
holiday.86 In light of the changing trends of FGC, specifically medicalization, research describes 
that some physicians practicing in Africa advise against having the procedure performed in the 
home as it is traditionally accomplished. The reasons explained for not performing FGC in the 
homes it is that FGC is a surgical procedure and “it would be just like having an abortion done in 
a clinic that is not legitimate or does not have good medical, surgical sterilization and other 
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practices.”87  
 While the medicalization efforts in Africa are important to emphasize, the focus of this 
dissertation is on refugee women who choose to undergo FGC and settle in the U.S. Regarding 
medicalization of FGC in the West, for example, both in the Netherlands and in the U.S., efforts 
to minimize the health risks and outcomes of FGC through medicalization have been proposed.88 
Both proposals offered included a safer alternative to infibulations, the most invasive type of 
circumcision. For example, the FGC scholarship describes that in the Netherlands a plan was 
made to draw a distinction between circumcision that allegedly impairs tissues during 
circumcision and “non-mutilating ritual incisions.”89 In addition, the Netherlands proposal 
included that healthcare practitioners be allowed to perform the surgery under anesthesia, 
making the surgery safer and less traumatic. The Dutch government rejected the proposal.  
 The “Seattle Compromise” was the second proposal in the West to medicalize FGC.  In 
Seattle, doctors and nurses in obstetric practices were surprised and alarmed when “pregnant 
Somali women were asking physicians to circumcise both their boy and girl babies.”90 The 
Somali mothers were also concerned about their adolescent daughters who had not been 
circumcised. Interestingly, the Somali mothers asked physicians to perform less invasive genital 
procedures. The women explained that if they could not have some form of the procedure 
performed on their daughters in the US that they would send their daughters back to Somalia 
where the most severe surgery would be performed, or they would have the procedure done in 
the US by an “imported traditional practitioner.”91 Concerned with the reported severe health 
consequences of the traditional practice of FGC, health practitioners in Seattle decided to try a 
new approach to surgery. The U.S. proposal involved consent by patients from Somali immigrant 
communities to undergo a less invasive and less aggressive form of the surgery.92 The proposed 
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procedure initiated a nick of the clitoris to draw a single drop of blood, and the surgery would be 
completed under anesthesia. Significantly different from the traditional way of performing FGC, 
namely with no anesthesia and more invasive cutting, the intense opposition and “aggressive 
lobbying by anti-circumcision activist”93 impeded the proposal from coming to fruition.  The 
1996 plan for medicalization of FGC was abated. 
 Mentioned earlier, there is opposition to the medicalization of FGC surgeries. The 
research, however, describes that the opposition voiced against medicalization is seemingly 
without the consideration for how the medicalization of FGC advances patient safety and lowers 
the risks of reported health consequences of the surgery. This course of examination is critical.  
The seriousness of the consideration lies in the fact that the strategies designed to sanction the 
practice cannot be maintained, whereas medicalization of the practice can be the avenue in which 
FGC can be performed in a way that is medically less harmful.94 To ignore medicalization, and 
engage in the ongoing opposition without considering the immediate benefits and positive 
outcomes of medicalized FGC surgeries continues to push the traditional custom and practice 
underground.   
 The research on medicalization and the improvement of health-related outcomes suggests 
that there is benefit to medicalization. In a study conducted by Bettina Shell- Duncan et al., the 
data shows that among traditional circumcisers (non medical persons in communities that 
perform circumcision) who use “sterile razors, anti-tetanus injections, and prophylactic 
antibiotics are associated with nearly 70% lower risk of immediate complications.”95 Further, 
according to the data, it appears that given the outcome of the research at a minimum, small 
changes in FGC surgeries such as the implementation of medical interventions significantly 
reduce health consequences associated with FGC.  
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 Medicalization of FGC is a worthy and compelling consideration. Reducing the harm 
associated with FGC is an ethical and practical response to harmful consequences often 
associated with the procedure. Medicalization embraces the tenets of beneficence, which is to 
improve health and make a positive step toward providing benefit to others, namely refugee 
women who choose to undergo FGC surgeries. 
III. Obligation, Non-maleficence and Beneficence  
A. Obligation, Care and FGC 
 The concept of obligation, specifically as it is connected to the principle of non-
maleficence and beneficence, promotes an optimistic, less oppositional view and assists in 
answering the second query of this dissertation concerning how health care professionals should 
respond to the care of women whose intention is to undergo FGC surgery. While the two 
principles of non-maleficence and beneficence are different, in exploring the care of women the 
two concepts do converge. The convergence rests in the relevance and application of non-
maleficence to refugee women and in the care using the framework of beneficence articulated by 
Frankena. Obligation is intimately connected to the principle of beneficence. 
 One of the questions raised in this dissertation is whether care implies that the physicians 
and healthcare professionals have an obligation to the specific health care needs of the female 
circumcised patient, or to the woman who intends to be circumcised. The scholarship on health 
care ethics highlights that health professionals have an obligation of non-maleficence, or “to do 
no harm.”96 After the careful investigation of non-maleficence it is determined that non-
maleficence is more accurately defined as a notion toward helping the patient rather than doing 
harm.  The guidance inspired by the non-maleficence principle, or as it is called “do no harm” is 
to assist in the well-being of the patient, and to ensure that the results of care are beneficial to the 
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patient. Conversely, the scholarship on FGC makes no reference to the principle of beneficence 
as it relates to FGC. In the context of the patient-health practitioner relationship the health 
practitioner has an obligation to act in a fiduciary manner, namely the obligation of beneficence. 
Acting in a fiduciary manner consists of always and without exception favoring the well being 
and interests of the patient.97  
 The principle of beneficence is associated with obligation, obligation with duty, and duty 
with demands. Obligation distinguishes the principle of non-maleficence and beneficence from 
the concept of non-maleficence and beneficence. While beneficence and non-maleficence create 
tension for health practitioners working with women who experience FGC surgeries, the 
principle of beneficence is a valuable ethical principle in determining the justification of the 
obligation. According to the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 
the obligation begins with the inherent dignity of every human being. Further, “inherent dignity 
is possessed equally by every human being and is the basis of equality of human and humans. 
Inherent dignity is the property of every human being that generates the universal moral 
obligation to do good, and avoid harm, to other humans. Fulfillment of that obligation is the 
basis for beneficence and non-maleficence.”98 As the idea of obligation and commitment relates 
to the patient, namely refugee women who choose FGC surgery, it is incumbent upon the health 
professional to do good for the patient. 99 According to Frankena the first obligation is to do 
good.100 
Importantly, many acts of beneficence are not obligatory. Examples of non-obligatory 
acts are kindness, sympathy, and charity. Some may refer to these characteristics as benevolence. 
However, a principle of beneficence, in our use and application of the principle, establishes an 
obligation to help others further their important and legitimate interests.”101 Ross additionally 
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suggests, “Obligations of general beneficence rests on the mere fact that there are other beings in 
the world whose condition we can make better.”102 The idea that in a broad sense, beneficence 
lies in making conditions better for others is helpful. It is especially helpful when considering the 
practical application of the principle of beneficence as it presupposes an obligation to address 
FGC in two ways.  
The first is that the principle of beneficence obligates the health profession to attempt to 
make FGC less harmful for those who choose the surgery.  An obligation to make conditions 
better, to restore functioning, and to relieve pain and suffering is an active engagement in the 
process of beneficence. 103  The second is the application of Frankena’s approach to care. 
Frankena’s approach is critical, as it serves to make clear the level of beneficence that is needed 
to achieve the obligation. In Frankena’s approach using his hierarchy of the principal of 
beneficence does not deny the obligation toward the good of others; it is the first feature in his 
framework.104 The lowest level is the obligation not to inflict harm, placing the level of 
obligation toward the good of the patient first.  
Frankena’s framework for beneficence is compelling for the application of beneficence 
and care, particularly for women choosing FGC surgeries. In addition, Frankena’s framework 
has implications for the healthcare professional and care, namely that which morally requires us 
to “make positive steps toward assisting others, not merely to refrain from harm.”105 However, 
the most critical component in the application of the principle of beneficence by the health 
practitioner is to fulfillment of the moral obligation to do good. In other words, it is the duty of 
the health practitioner providing care for women experiencing FGC to bring to fruition and to 
carry the obligation to do good. The achievement of beneficence rests in the hands of the health 
professional giving care. In this way, there is a more balanced and positive approach rather than 
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the more oppositional view often described in the FGC scholarship. It is a framework that has 
fewer negative connotations.  
 When considering the notion of care, particularly as it relates to obligation and FGC, 
scholars writing about care assert that there are aims and goals of care and depending upon the 
discipline, care is defined differently.106 For the purposes of this dissertation, the goals of caring 
are to help individuals to achieve, at a minimum, the basic level of well-being, survival, and as 
much basic functioning as they are able to achieve.  In addition, goals of care include helping to 
satisfy basic biological needs that are necessary for survival and basic functioning. Included in 
basic biological needs is the need for food, clean drinking water, a clean environment in which to 
live, shelter, clothing, and basic medical care.  
In examining the idea of care, Joan Tronto offers ethical elements of care that are helpful 
in determining the obligation of the health professional to the refugee women who choose 
FGC.107According to Joan Tronto, there are four ethical elements of care; they include 
attentiveness, responsibility (different from obligation), competence, and responsiveness108. As it 
concerns refugee women who choose FGC surgeries, each of the ethical elements have relevance 
for their care. However, due to the countercultural nature of FGC to the cultural context of the 
US, FGC is often met with judgment and lack of knowledge of the medical procedure. It is in 
light of the barriers of a deficiency of knowledge concerning FGC and the negative judgment 
associated with FGC that the idea of competence as an ethical feature of care is relevant. This is 
not to say that attentiveness and responsiveness are not important-they are. However, in 
discerning the obligation to meet the need of women experiencing FGC, the ethical element of 
competency to care is a priority.  
 Competence is an important feature in the FGC scholarship as it relates to FGC surgeries 
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and care.  One of the debates in the FGC scholarship is that untrained medical practitioners often 
perform the procedure.109 In addition, particularly in the West and most specifically in the U.S., 
the health care professional is not adequately trained to respond to women who have experienced 
FGC or those who will choose the procedure.110According to Tronto, “to include competence as 
a part of the moral quality of care”111 is critical. Its importance lies in the ability to provide care, 
and conversely, the inability to do so. The inability to provide care does not meet the obligation 
of beneficence and leaves the need for care unmet.  
B. Refraining from Harm 
Refraining from harm is central to the more mainstream understanding of the concept of non-
maleficence and is the underlying focus of the “do no harm” maxim. This is not to say that 
refraining from harm is not included in the approach highlighted in this dissertation-it is. 
However, as mentioned the refrain from harm maxim is positioned in a way where the obligation 
is to “do good for others” first and then refrain from inflicting harm.112 The alleged health 
concerns associated with FGC have made refraining from harm the focus of the eradication of 
FGC. Conversely, however, there are other approaches to FGC, namely the approach to reduce 
harm. It is important to mention that in the healthcare ethics scholarship refraining from harm is 
not easily accomplished.113 Gillion for example explains, that to ‘do no harm’ and “abstaining 
from harm is untenable.”114 One concept in the bioethical scholarship that is noteworthy to 
mention briefly when investigating the notion of “do no harm” or refraining from harm is the 
idea of double effect.115The concept is not by any means fully exhausted here; rather it is 
emphasized and highlighted as another consideration when thinking about the idea of refraining 
from harm. Double Effect is also mentioned to denote that the idea of refraining from harm is at 
times used in the scholarship in a way that oversimplifies the maxim.  
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According to the rule of Double Effect (PDE), it is sometimes permissible to cause “harm” as 
a side effect of bringing about a good result, even though it would not be permissible to cause 
such harm as a means to bringing about the same good end.116 In other words, PDE is invoked 
when one act, which has a good effect and a harmful effect, is not always “morally prohibited.” 
An example highlighted by Beauchamp and Childress is a patient who is suffering from 
excruciating pain, and the physician wants to help. The patient asks the physician to help 
alleviate the pain by helping to end his life. If the intent of the physician was to alleviate the pain 
of the patient using medication, and did not intend to end his life, then the act of indirectly 
hastening the patient’s death is not wrong.117  David Kelly explains direct and indirect as “once 
actions have been analyzed by the PDE the action is considered either an indirect or direct act.118 
The PDE must meet four conditions; then the act is right.  These actions according to David 
Kelly include: 
1) the intended act-in-itself is not wrong or bad 
2) the bad effect must not cause the good effect 
3) the agent must not intend the bad effect (as an end to be sought) 
4) the bad effect must not out weigh the good effect.  
 
According to the PDE, acts that have both a good and bad outcome may be justified under 
certain conditions particularly when the effect out weighs the bad, and the bad that is done is not 
directly intended.119 Since FGC is often described as a surgery that is immoral and wrong, the 
PDE framework is useful in thinking about the care of refugee women whose choice is FGC and 
how PDE is observed in the context of FGC.   
 It is helpful to note that critics of PDE prioritize the total balance of good outcomes over 
harmful ones and that an appropriate intention is indicated by the mere fact that the 
proportionality, namely that the good out weighs the bad (that was permitted) in the outcome of 
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the act,120 specifically FGC surgery. The positive outcome is especially applicable for women 
whose life plan is to undergo FGC surgery. The surgery is not only a positive outcome; it is also 
the preference of the patient. 
 In thinking about women who choose FGC, one of the rationales for the surgery is 
aesthetics and other socio-cultural reasons. Sheldon and Wilkinson write that defenders of FGC 
can clearly differentiate between the intended effects and those that are unseen.121 The cultural 
rationales for FGC, i.e., the enhanced chances of marriage and ascetics often described in the 
literature are the aim of the intervention or the act. Any injury that is incurred is considered a 
side effect- foreknown but not intended.122  The good effects are quality of life based on the 
personal autonomy of the woman choosing FGC surgeries, the enjoyment of social roles, life 
fulfillment, and well-being. The bad effects are perhaps the alleged loss of pleasure if 
infibulation is done. However, if Type I circumcision (Sunna) is performed, removing the 
prepuce without removal of the clitoris, fewer direct harmful side effects occur.123PDE gives 
another medium by which to observe the alleged harm and/or injury associated with FGC.  
 The scholarship on FGC describes several types of harm.124 The physical harms have been 
expounded throughout the dissertation. However the other harms described in the scholarship 
refer specifically to emotional, psychological, and spiritual harm.125 For instance, Loretta 
Kopelman found that “psychological disturbances in girls due to circumcision are not 
uncommon.”126  The research explains that women, who had the surgery as children, and against 
their will, have psychological effects that can be characterized as anger and trauma.127 The 
psychological effects have the ability to follow a person through their life. For some women, the 
effects of the psychological trauma include a breech of trust and confidence in family and 
community.128  Other women, depending on their age, have a different experience.  
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 When exploring the aforementioned effects of FGC on women who experience FGC 
surgeries, not all women share the same experiences. Ylva Hernlund explains, concerning 
psychological trauma, that the psychological impact and well-being of women who have 
undergone FGC requires more research.129  It is important to note that the some of FGC literature 
that describes the psychological and the emotional effects of FGC are associated with largely 
with young girls and not with women who whose life plan is to have the surgery. Regarding the 
other harms mentioned above, there is little research found in the scholarship on the emotional, 
and spiritual harms of FGC on women experiencing FGC.  The highlighted effects are namely 
the potential physical health consequences of FGC.  
 What is curious regarding the emotional and psychological effects of harm, however is 
whether these effects are due to the FGC surgery itself, or whether the emotional effects are due 
to the loss of autonomy when being forced to undergo FGC without consent. Regarding the 
effects of FGC surgeries on women, scholars note that more investigation is needed on the 
psychological effects of FGC on women.130 Unfortunately, the alleged harmful psychological 
consequences of FGC are often used by anti-circumcision activists to promote allocations of 
harm associated with the surgery. Regrettably, not having a body of sound research that focuses 
on the psychological and mental effects of FGC, promotes the continued inconsistencies and 
inaccuracies that foster ongoing assertions that FGC is not only morally wrong, but also a 
violation of the maxim “do no harm.”  
 In spite of the sparse investigation concerning the psychological and emotional harm of 
FGC surgeries, there has been research in the abortion scholarship that gives some insight on the 
query concerning the emotional and psychological harm related to FGC. Similar to those who 
oppose FGC, the anti-abortion activists make claims that abortions harm women both physically 
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and psychologically.131 In addition, those who oppose abortion assert that abortion causes mental 
instability and even suicide for women who experience abortion, despite the rejection of this 
claim from professional mental health organizations.132  
 According to Susan Cohen, anti-abortion activists will refer to studies that have flaws in 
the methodology and take advantage of the general public and policy makers who do not know 
what constitutes “good science.”133 After a close investigation of the FCG scholarship examined 
in this dissertation, it appears that the attitudes of those who oppose FGC use unreliable research 
to legitimize and promote claims of harm, specifically physical and psychological harm.134 One 
example of the over-accentuated, mainstream narrative regarding the harm that is linked to FGC, 
is argued by the Public Policy Advisory Network on Female Genital Surgeries in Africa. The 
Public Policy Network observes, “the widely publicized and sensationalized reproductive health 
and medical complication associated with female genital surgeries in Africa are infrequent events 
and represent the exception rather than the rule.”135 Further, according to the research employed 
by Obermeyer and Reynolds they explain that harmful health complications are relatively rare 
occasions and that women who have experienced FGC surgeries encounter problems.136 It is 
important to emphasize here that the contrasting viewpoint regarding complications and harm 
associated with FGC is critical in discerning what the focus of care should be for women who 
undergo FGC surgery.  
 An additional consideration concerning the psychological and emotional harm also 
highlighted in the FGC literature,137is found in the abortion research. It is useful and beneficial to 
note that the investigation on whether abortion posed a threat to the physical, emotional and 
psychological well-being of women concluded “the scientific studies do not provide conclusive 
data about the health effects of abortion on women.”138 Given the aforementioned critique on the 
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alleged harm associated with FGC and the conclusions mentioned concerning harm and abortion, 
it is plausible then to expect that acting on behalf of others is met with accurate unbiased 
knowledge mentioned earlier in the chapter and an outcome that is positive in the life of the 
patient. 
C. Acting on behalf of others 
 Acting on behalf of others is the essence of the principle of beneficence. In fact, the 
scholarship on the principle of beneficence refers to the principle as “the moral obligation to act 
for the benefit of others.”139 The significance and the implication of the principle of beneficence 
is that the principle gives direction, guidance and action about how the concept is applied to 
refugee women who choose to undergo the FGC surgery. In addition to the significance of 
beneficence and how it is applied to women experiencing FGC, beneficence gives guidance for 
the care of women who choose to undergo FGC. As mentioned in a preceding section, one of the 
dilemmas raised by FGC in the U.S. is that the custom is quite foreign to the U.S. health care 
system. Due to the unfamiliarity of the traditional practice, the lack of knowledge about FGC, 
and the judgment associated with FGC, these elements create a dilemma for the health care 
professional about how to respond to women in need of care. Perhaps one of the primary 
characteristics in the care of women experiencing FGC is the responsiveness of the health 
practitioner.140 However, it is not only responsiveness, it is also the response, namely to act on 
behalf of the other. 
 Responsiveness, as explained by Tronto, is considering the other person situation as the 
situation is expressed by that person, instead of making an attempt to put oneself into the other 
persons “shoes,” namely the patient.141 In this way, the health professional is involved from the 
perspective and viewpoint of the patient. Given the countercultural nature of FGC, especially in 
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the context of the U.S., the implications of this approach to care are compelling.  It is feasible 
that putting oneself in the position of women who choose to have the FGC surgery is difficult. 
Nevertheless being engaged from the perspective, experience, and understanding of the patient, 
better situates the health practitioner to act on behalf of the patient and to contribute to the 
welfare of refugee women who choose FGC surgery.  
 According to the literature, to attend to the welfare of others represents and exemplifies the 
goal of medicine.142 Acting in the interest of and for the benefit of others is intimately tied to the 
objective of medicine. Explained earlier, health professionals are obligated to act in a manner 
that ensures positive outcomes and that not undermines the patient’s autonomous choice. Using 
Frankena’s framework of beneficence supports the adage of acting on behalf of others, 
particularly refugee women who choose FGC surgeries. It also supports the guidance of health 
professionals where the scholarship shows that the primary concern of care is non-maleficence 
rather than beneficence to discern that the aim is to act on behalf of those who are in need of 
care.  
 It is interesting and noteworthy to make the connection between acting on behalf of others 
(beneficence) and observing the desire of the patient through the lens of the patient discussed 
earlier in this section. Fletcher, Silva and Sorrell for example, explain that when health care 
professionals view the situation or the request of the patient from their own perspective that the 
health care practitioner lacks awareness of the patients life narrative, i.e., culture, value and 
tradition which impedes their ability to garner understanding of the patients meaning of their 
action or choice.143The responsiveness of the health care professional for the woman choosing 
FGC honors the ethical principle of respect for autonomy. Emphasizing the viewpoint of the 
patient, rather the point of view of the health care practitioner facilitates acting on behalf of the 
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patient.  
 In contrast however, not considering the point of view of the patient diminishes and 
devalues the patient.144 Devaluing of the autonomous choice of the women who choose FGC has 
consequences for both the health care professional and the patient. Specifically, according to 
Fletcher, Silva and Sorrell, the implications for devaluing the intention of the patient increases 
the potential for oppression and violence,145 two themes often associated with FGC surgery. For 
the health care practitioner he/she was not successful in acting on behalf of the patient. 
Furthermore, as a result of not acting on behalf of the patient the quality of life that is afforded to 
the patient is lost.146  
 Acting on behalf of others, namely refugee women who choose FGC includes honoring the 
person as patient and the autonomous choice of patient. In doing so care is administered in a way 
that supports the life intention of the patient. When care is afforded in this manner then the 
voluntary aspect of the choice is respected.  
IV. Voluntariness, Non maleficence and FGC 
 
A. Concepts in conflict 
 
Using the bioethical frameworks of non-maleficence and beneficence to examine FGC 
raises ethical tension between voluntariness, which is part of the structure of autonomous choice, 
and the principle of non-maleficence. The tension lies in the practical application of non-
maleficence to FGC surgeries, namely that the voluntary choice of the patient, and the obligation 
of non-maleficence for the health practitioner create opposition.  For example, when exploring 
FGC/c through a medical lens, FGC/c is considered an immoral practice that, according to Fran 
Hosken can result in harm and the need for healthcare.147 It is however important to include that 
not all of the research on FGC describes that there are long lasting harmful health consequences 
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related to FGC surgery.  
Fuambai Ahmadu writes concerning the alleged health consequences, “assertions of 
alleged harmful physical, psychological and sexual effects have more to do with deeply 
embedded Western cultural assumptions regarding women’s bodies and their sexuality than with 
the highly disputed health effects on genital operation on African women.”148  Ahmadu further 
describes that the mainline examination of FGC is overinflated and unfounded.149 Highlighting 
the opposing argument in the debate on the harmful consequences associated with FGC provides 
a more balanced discourse that is not negative. It also gives way to a different kind of analysis 
that supports that women are capable and able to make their own decisions regarding FGC, 
rather than the one that promotes patriarchy as the reason for FGC and that women are seen as 
passive victims who are engaged in FGC against their will.  
Conversely, however, the research explains that women not only support FGC but they 
preserve, protect and defend the traditional ritual.150 Since women uphold FGC, and are engaged 
in the practice, “because they want to”-151voluntariness and the autonomous choice of the women 
choosing FGC surgery is entirely reasonable to consider.  Through the lens of respect for 
voluntariness, a less negative response is possible.  It is the involuntary designation typically 
assigned to FGC that makes FGC ethically unacceptable. However exploring FGC through the 
lens of voluntariness creates new possibilities that can facilitate the conflict and imbalance 
between the health care practitioner and the patient.  
Voluntariness investigated in Chapter 3 is a concept salient to the notion of care, 
particularly when applying the concept to the autonomous decision of those whose healthcare 
decisions and intentions may not be a normative one. Importantly voluntariness is the third of 
three conditions necessary for autonomous action. The idea of voluntariness is particularly 
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relevant to refugee women who will voluntarily undergo the procedure. The voluntary choice of 
women who choose FGC unearths ethical dilemmas for the health care professional. For 
example, how does the health practitioner move forward with the choice of women who choose 
FGC surgery when there are health risks? The importance of working through this ethical 
dilemma lies in the reality that the conflict raised in the concepts of the voluntary nature of 
autonomous choice and the idea of non-maleficence for health care practitioners will not 
dissipate. However, what is helpful is the re-consideration of the application of non-maleficence 
using Frankena’s framework and the guidance of Article 4 in the UNESCO Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. In addition, consideration of cultural diversity, a 
concept examined in Chapter 5 is paramount.   
In an effort to continue to grapple with the two bioethical frameworks in conflict, perhaps 
attention is also given to patient preferences and quality of life.  If not continually explored, the 
ethical concepts in conflict have the potential to serve as barriers to care for refugee women who 
will choose to undergo FGC. The ongoing attention and the practical application of the concepts 
in conflict continue to assist in the ongoing effort to work through the question raised in this 
dissertation-does care imply that the physician/healthcare worker has the obligation to honor the 
specific health needs of the female circumcised patient in a culture that is in opposition to FGC?  
B. Non-maleficence and care 
 
The ethical concept of non-maleficence has been the focus of this chapter. The critical 
nature of non-maleficence, to do no harm, is highlighted in the FGC scholarship when explaining 
the assumed health consequences of FGC surgeries. Further investigation of the idea of non-
maleficence demonstrates that, without a more balanced and positively situated framework for 
applying non-maleficence, the intention of the patient is undermined, and other important aspects 
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are ignored which contribute to the formation of barriers to care.  One example of these barriers 
is that without a strong framework in which to apply non-maleficence then the mainstream 
application of non-maleficence remains.  
For instance, in Frankena’s framework of beneficence, the obligation of promoting and 
doing good is prioritized which can facilitate a positive outcome for the patient. Non-maleficence 
in Frankena’s schema is integrated into the principle of beneficence. Applying non-maleficence 
to care of women experiencing FGC in this way makes the obligation of beneficence, the 
primary focus and draws attention to facilitating a positive outcome and assists in removing 
barriers that can leave the needs of the patient unmet. To be sure, Edmund Pellegrino writes, “the 
physician’s obligation to beneficence is binding.”152 The obligation to beneficence is what 
facilitates meeting the goals of care and ensures that good care is administered to the patient. 
One of the ethical features of care is competence, described earlier in this chapter. 
Observing non-maleficence through Frankena’s framework, which is to promote good first, links 
competence to care in the following way. First, in promoting good and a positive outcome for the 
patient, and preventing harm means that the health professional is competent. As it relates to 
FGC, competence means that the health professional is obligated to be educated about FGC in 
general and FGC surgeries specifically. The research describes that the education of the health 
care professional in the West, and particularly in the US where FGC is “happening in New York 
and Boston”153 is deficient and is not sufficient.  
The education of health care professionals concerning FGC is critical to the ethical care 
of women experiencing FGC, and to those women who will choose to undergo the surgery. In 
addition, education must be balanced and must include the practical application of non-
maleficence employed by Frankena, rather than a panic-stricken, overexcited and narrow version 
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of non-maleficence often found in the FGC scholarship. This type of rendering of non-
maleficence to care does not take into account the many nuances of the concept or the “universal 
moral obligation to do good for and to avoid harm of all humans.”154  In this way, non-
maleficence is applied in practice to the care of refugee women who choose FGC where the goal 
of medical care is the improvement of quality of life for those who seek and need care.155 
V. Conclusion 
The principles of Non-maleficence and Beneficence FGC and Care have considerable 
and noteworthy implications for the care of women who intend to undergo FGC surgery. One of 
the promising effects of the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence is the framework 
offered by Frankena. In Frankena’s schema, non-maleficence is included within the construct of 
beneficence, which is the moral obligation to “do good” and to work toward a positive outcome 
that is beneficial for the patient. The approach of this specific framework garners a more 
balanced and less negative response to FGC. In addition, the focus on beneficence facilitates 
honoring the autonomous choice and wishes made by the patient, in particular, women refugees 
who choose FGC surgery. Non-maleficence is then practiced in a way that is more toward 
helping rather than doing harm. In other words, non-maleficence is focused on promoting help 
and providing care that fosters positive outcome and change that is beneficial for the well-being 
of the patient. Beneficence in this framework gives opportunity for ways to reach better 
outcomes for the patient.  
An example of the application of beneficence in the context of FGC is harm reduction, i.e., 
medicalization. The harm reduction approach and medicalization is an avenue in which patient 
preferences and life intentions are prioritized and honored. Beneficence applied in this way gives 
voice to the patient and supports good patient care. The harm reduction approach works to 
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reduce the alleged health consequences related to FGC surgeries. Medicalization encompasses 
the human experience, which includes cultural, contextual, and social notions explored in 
Chapter 5.  
Important to discerning what care should be for refugee women choosing FGC surgery, 
medicalization situates human problems, i.e., FGC health consequences into medical problems 
which supports the application of the principles beneficence and non-maleficence using 
Frankena’s framework.  The research shows that there are benefits to medicalization, namely 
improvement in health outcomes for women who undergo FGC surgeries and advances in safety 
while lowering the risks.  
The principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are part of the healthcare ethics 
framework designed to assist in solving dilemmas that arise in healthcare facilitating a standard 
of care, which prioritizes quality and ethical care for patients. The principle of beneficence 
obligates the health practitioner to prioritize positive outcomes for her/his patient. Positive 
outcomes are characterized as the preferences of the patient and the priority of honoring the 
intentions of the patient.   
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Chapter 5: Respect for Cultural diversity  
I. Understanding Respect for Cultural Diversity 
 In ethically examining FGC, respect for cultural diversity is a construct worthy of 
consideration.  Through the lens of respect for cultural diversity, FGC is not purely a destructive 
and off-putting construct, as it is reflected in the literature; rather, the subject is observed from a 
point of view of relevance and applicability.”1 This section will focus on fashioning a working 
definition of cultural diversity and will discuss the reasons and rationales highlighted in the 
literature for FGC, as the motivation for the practice is often attributed to culture, custom, and 
tradition.  Within the scholarship on FGC, there are robust cross-cultural ethical judgments about 
the subject that render the question: why should we pay attention to cultural diversity? 
Furthermore, respect for cultural diversity raises questions about the right to practice the customs 
and rituals of tradition, but it is not without moral reflection and examination, particularly when 
the custom is, for the most part, associated with harm and the un-voluntary and coerced 
participation. Cultural and moral relativism and the concept of contextual features are explored 
which allow for taking into account both cultural and religious influences of others in our care. 
A.  What is cultural diversity? 
 Most populations today are made up of a variety of races, ethnicities, cultures, languages, 
customs, and traditions.  Countries are no longer homogeneous; rather, they are pluralistic. 
According to recent estimates, “the world’s 184 independent states contain over 600 living 
languages, and 500 ethnic groups”2 This melting pot of numerous cultures, ethnicities, races, and 
religions have implications for the U.S. cultural context. One implication is that in the pluralism 
present in the U.S requires that health professionals, practitioners and students in health 
professions the ability to communicate, understand and respect the diversity of cultures.3 Paying 
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attention to the complexities of the subject of respect for cultural diversity requires an 
interdisciplinary approach that can give consideration to the dialectics between the culture of the 
individual and the culture in which the individual, namely refugee women experiencing FGC, 
resides.  Social context and culture are an undeniable prerequisite in considering what morality 
recommends in providing care. Women from FGC communities, who live in the United States, 
face very distressing adjustments.  An illustration of the adjustment is moving from a community 
where FGC is a social cultural tradition to living in an environment where the tradition is deemed 
taboo and even illegal for females under the age of eighteen to undergo.  One scholar notes, there 
is an “eruption when people from societies practicing female circumcision /female genital 
mutilation settle in other parts of the world and bring their rites with them.”4 In the U.S., there is 
unfamiliarity about the custom of FGC, and therefore, if there is going to be a model of care that 
is sufficient for women who experience FGC, it must include respect for cultural diversity. 
 There is a cadre of meanings, descriptions, and definitions of what constitutes culture and 
cultural diversity. For example, some of the literature on cultural diversity describes cultural 
diversity as learned and transmitted values, beliefs, and practices of a particular group of people.5 
However a more expansive framework is employed in examining and applying respect for 
cultural diversity in the context of care to refugee women who choose to undergo FGC surgery. 
According to the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, “ the defense of cultural diversity 
is an ethical imperative, inseparable from respect for human dignity…culture should be regarded 
as a set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social 
group and encompasses lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and 
beliefs.”6 Culture, it is said, is the lens with which individuals see the world, and the lens extends 
to health and healthcare.7 Paying attention to the multiplicities of cultures and respect for the 
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diversity requires an interdisciplinary approach particularly when the values, traditions, beliefs 
and lifestyles are different between the health care practitioner and the patient. An example of 
how cultural diversity impacts healthcare is choices women make concerning care. Women who 
choose FGC do so, based on their customs, values and beliefs embedded in society and a culture 
to which they belong.  In Ethiopia for instance, circumcised female genitalia are considered 
normal just as males who are circumcised are considered normal to Americans.8 Refugee women 
who settle in the U.S. bring their customs with them and transmit cultural customs to their 
children particularly daughters who may choose to honor the cultural tradition of FGC surgery.9 
In this context, respect for cultural diversity becomes one of the ethical lens and frameworks by 
which FGC for women who are no longer minors is examined and applied. 
 In health care ethics, respect for cultural diversity is associated with the care of the patient. 
Respect for cultural diversity is also one of the features of global bioethics. Within the 
framework of the patient-health practitioner relationship, both the health practitioner and the 
patient bring to the relationship duties and responsibilities to the larger world in which their 
relationship takes place.10 In the context of care, the contextual features of their culture influence 
the preferences of the patient, especially women whose life intention is to undergo FGC surgery. 
These aspects of culture include lifestyle, values, beliefs and traditions. As it relates to the 
scholarship, in the case of FGC, the health practitioner observes the contextual features of the 
patient in conflict not only with his/her culture, but also their commitment to the patient.11 The 
scholarship describes that some health practitioners disagree that contextual features, i.e., 
cultural considerations of the patient are important in determining ethical decisions about care, 
namely to consider the care of women experiencing FGC. However, scholars argue that the 
beliefs and practices of the patients cultural orientation that are culturally different than the 
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health practitioner’s is “real and in varying degrees obligatory”12 for the patient. Therefore it is 
incumbent upon the health practitioner to respect the cultural diversity of the patient and   to 
consider cultural diversity in determining care for women experiencing FGC. Health 
practitioners have a moral obligation to do so.13 Women who have chosen to undergo FGC 
surgery do so based on their experiences, ideals, values, and their beliefs.  Respect for cultural 
diversity that includes an understanding of the beliefs and ideals of the patient and how they 
guide thinking, actions, decisions,14 are vital and necessary for good patient care. Not only are 
these cultural characteristics integral to care, they frame how individuals view health and the 
need for care.15 
 In examining the literature to secure a definition of cultural diversity the term multicultural 
or multiculturalism is observed. It is important to highlight the difference in the two terms 
although at times they are used interchangeably. Cultural diversity, as explained earlier in this 
section, is a distinct set of features that is shared by a group of people. These features are known 
as custom and traditions and they impact the patient’s perspective on health, particularly refugee 
women who choose FGC. An example of this shared view on health is FGC surgeries, where 
women, particularly women in Africa do not share the same unbalanced and hysterical responses 
to the cultural custom.16  
 Multiculturalism, on the other hand, denotes several cultural or ethnic groups within a society. 
Multiculturalism incorporates ideas, beliefs, or people from many different countries and cultural 
backgrounds and encourages interest in many cultures within a society rather than in only a 
mainstream or dominant culture.17 Further, multiculturalism is an expression that describes a 
framework that supports responding to cultural diversity. For example, Radka Neumannova 
writes that the “multiculturalist perspective [multiculturalism] responds to the cultural diversity 
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brought in by immigrants as a consequence of their migration.”18Alternatively, Kymlicka notes 
that ‘polyethnic’ better describes where “cultural diversity arise from individual and familial 
immigration.”19 Neumannova further explains that multiculturalism is a model of defense of 
cultural rights and has its underpinnings in the universal rights of an individual.  
 It is in the diversity of culture nestled in the dominant cultural construct that makes respect for 
cultural diversity a strong framework for discerning what the care is for women who choose 
FGC. Paying close attention and giving priority to respect for cultural diversity in the context of 
care requires sensitivity to the differences transmitted by individuals from various cultures, 
which influence decisions concerning care. It is in the framework of cultural sensitivity that 
positive and beneficial outcomes are realized. 
B.   Cultural Sensitivity 
Cultural sensitivity refers to an awareness of different cultures; each culture is different.20  
Differences and similarities have an effect on values and behavior. Culture is a dominant feature 
in the FGC discourse and many of the reasons for the custom are embedded in culture. 
Understanding the cultural context of women who experience FGC and those who will choose to 
undergo the procedure assists in garnering respect for cultural diversity.  When refugee women 
come to the United States, now a multiethnic society, they bring their health care needs. 
Sensitivity to values, beliefs, and behavior and applying understanding can improve 
“communication and care.”21  
 One important feature concerning culture, especially in the context of FGC, is that there is 
diversity within cultures. An example of the diversity of cultural practices is the different types 
of FGC surgeries that take place within cultural groups.  According to Toubia and Izett, in 
Somalia where the rate of FGC is 98 percent, approximately 80 percent of the surgeries are 
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infibulations, the most invasive of the FGC intervention.22 The remainder of the FGC operations 
performed is clitoridectomies, a less invasive FGC procedure.23 These cultural difference 
between groups within a culture is an illustration for why assumptions cannot be made in caring 
for women who are experiencing FGC and why sensitivity must be employed.  
 Cultural sensitivity is the awareness of people from other cultures and includes 
thoughtfulness and tolerance without judgment about how the values, beliefs, and customs of 
cultures, different from the dominant culture, impact how others live and make decisions that 
affect their lives.24 The Committee on Health Care for Underserved Women defines cultural 
sensitivity in the following way- it is the “knowledge and interpersonal skills that allow health 
providers to understand, appreciate, and work with individuals from cultures other than their own 
and involves acceptance of cultural differences, and self-awareness.”25 Because culture includes 
many aspects of an individuals life, i.e., faith, gender, ethnicity, race, socioeconomic status26, the 
health practitioner, particularly when working with women who choose FGC, a traditional 
cultural practice that is at odds with the U.S. medicine, must employ strategies that allow for 
care, namely cultural sensitivity. Cultural sensitivity is one vehicle that facilitates needed 
communication between the health professional and the patient who is in need of care.  
 Many cultural groups live in the U.S, contributing to the pluralistic ethos rather than the 
homogeneous one. In fact, “the world in which we live is by nature pluralistic.”27 
This melting pot, if you will, of individuals and groups of people who have a plurality of 
religions, ethnic and racial backgrounds, political views, and cultural traditions and practices live 
together, requiring sensitivity and acceptance. The pluralistic environment is considered valuable 
and promises living together in a way that brings respect and a shared common understanding.28 
Related pluralistic environment is that the values and the differences experienced and shared by a 
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pluralistic and culturally diverse society are equal and unable to be organized and arranged by a 
hierarchy or judged as it relates to an absolute standard.29 In other words, the degree of value 
placed on all customs and beliefs etc. are the same, and the cultural features of one group are not 
more important or held in higher esteem than another.  
 On the other hand, however, the views, beliefs, and values of one culture may be different 
than those of another- for example the beliefs and values of the cultural tradition of a women 
who life intention is FGC versus the health practitioner who does not understand these values 
and beliefs which are in conflict. There are limitations to diversity and plurality. One of the 
limits is that cultures are unable to exist together in harmony. What I mean by this is that at times 
differences cause conflict that seems unable to be resolved. Often at the root of the 
disagreements between diverse cultures is that one culture believes that their values, beliefs and 
practices are right while those that are different are wrong, namely ethnocentrism. An example of 
the limits of diversity can be found in the context of diverse religions.  The incompatibility of 
cultures causes opposition, misunderstanding, and discord.30 The discord often experienced in 
differing cultures is that one culture believes that their way of doing things is the right way. This 
viewpoint is also known as ethnocentrism. It can also be defined as judging another’s culture 
specifically by the values and standards of one's own culture or ethic group.  Specifically there is 
judgment related to language, behavior, customs, religion, and behavior. Interestingly, the 
judgment concerning customs can be observed in the debate over FGC. In as much as it relates to 
western ethnocentric response and dialogue of FGC surgeries, Lane and Rubinstein make the 
following observation. While western feminist writers are credited with much of what is known 
about FGC, African and Arab women have found the majority of Western narrative degrading 
and reflective of ethnocentric and Eurocentric preoccupations with sexual functioning and other 
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concerns valued in the Western culture and society.31 Further, the manner in which western 
writers characterized the culture, women, men and families who practice FGC was seen as, 
“intolerant and insensitive.”32 An example of cultural insensitivity is the use of term “mutilation” 
first coined by Hosken and later adopted by the World Health Organization to describe the 
cultural custom.33  
 In exploring the scholarship on FGC surgeries, other offensive and insensitive terms are 
observed to describe to traditional cultural custom. Terms used to characterize the traditional 
practice include but are not limited to torture, barbarism, cruelty, savagery, and ritual torturous 
abuse.34 Certainly the hurtful and judgmental language used to describe FGC polarizes the 
discussion. The polarization fosters the mainstream negative viewpoint of FGC and imposes 
labels on people who live in FGC communities. It is in this light that the ethnocentric construct 
that describes the superiority of one's own ethnic group or culture, is damaging. The redress 
needed includes the cultural sensitivity framework, which includes tolerance, acceptance, 
communication, mutual understanding, and respect for cultural diversity.  
 Since we have established that there is no absolute standard as it relates to cultural 
diversity and plurality, it is in this light that cultural sensitivity as it relates to care is a necessary 
framework. Cultural sensitivity and respect for cultural diversity is necessary for those women 
who choose a cultural tradition practice that is incompatible with the dominant cultural 
sensibilities of, for example the U.S and who are in need of care.  
Important to parsing out cultural sensitivity, in order that it may be applied to care for women 
who undergo FGC surgeries, is the idea of responsiveness explored in chapter four of this 
dissertation. As a way of continuing to better articulate cultural competence explored in chapter 
seven of this dissertation, Betancourt et al., offers the use of term responsiveness among others to 
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encapsulate the meaning of cultural competence and sensitively.35 It is important here to note 
that the use of the terms cultural sensitivity and cultural competence are used interchangeably.36  
Responsiveness is highlighted to make the connection to cultural sensitivity and to care, which is 
a construct needed in determining what care should be for refugee women who choose to 
undergo FGC.  
 Responsiveness is related to the communication with and mutual understanding of the 
patient whose cultural context is different from that of the health professional. According to Joan 
Tronto, responsiveness is not putting ourselves in the position of others rather it is considering 
the others position from the place where it is expressed,37 namely from the position and the 
cultural context women who choose to undergo FGC surgery and in need of care. In this way the 
health professional is involved from the perspective of the patient and not from the assumption 
that the patient’s viewpoint is the same.38 The position and viewpoint of others is the cultural 
context in which the patient views and lives in the world. Understanding the cultural context of 
the patient who is choosing to undergo FGC surgery can improve communication and care.39 The 
cultural sensitivity framework and approach assists in advancing the occurrence of cultural 
connectedness between the health practitioner and the patient who is in need of care.40  
 Respect for the diversity and plurality of culture is an integral part of what care should be 
for refugee women who chose FGC surgeries. Respect for cultural diversity is critical even when 
the values, beliefs, customs, and traditions are in conflict with the health profession- especially 
when it comes to what constitutes quality of life for the patient, a topic investigated in chapter 
four. The cultural sensitivity framework allows for the garnering of mutual understanding and 
appreciation for other, which facilitates the application of cultural diversity, particularly in 
fostering care for women who choose FGC surgeries. 
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II. Applying respect for cultural diversity to refugee women choosing FGC 
 In reflecting on what the care should be for women who choose FGC surgeries, the concept 
of respect for cultural diversity is a significant consideration.  Its significance lies in both the 
culturally embedded nature of FGC surgeries and its continued cultural persistence despite 
ongoing attempts to eradicate the traditional cultural custom.41 However, there are those who 
defend the practice and draw support for their position, for example the right to autonomous 
choice, respect for a person’s particular cultural and individual identity to cultural traditions and 
practices. Those who defend FGC do so from the perspective of protection for the rights of 
minority cultures.42  Supporting the right to autonomous choice and respecting the particular 
cultural identities, particularly for women who choose to undergo FGC surgeries in cultural 
environments that do not share the cultural tradition, is at the heart of the bioethical construct- 
both the western construct and the global one.43 These bioethical frameworks facilitate care that 
allows for the patient's perspective and life intentions to be primary and for the outcome to be 
one that facilitates medical treatment that improves the quality of life for women who are in need 
of care.44  Respecting cultural diversity takes into account the plurality of values, beliefs, 
customs, and traditions of those who seek care, particularly women who experience FGC 
surgeries. 
 The cultural landscape in the U.S. is changing. In so far as applying respect for cultural 
diversity, the principle denotes that the framework and ideology of bioethics are applicable and 
necessary for all people regardless of the culture the patient represents.45 As a result of the 
changing landscape in the US there is a pluralistic environment where cultural groups have 
traditions and customs that are often unfamiliar to health practitioners. Since the goal of medical 
care is to improve the quality of life for patients by having positive outcomes for those who seek 
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care, there is a need for the practical application of respect for cultural diversity. What I mean by 
practical application is the need for a “hands on” approach for respect for cultural diversity in 
caring for women who choose FGC. In reflecting on how respect for cultural diversity is 
practiced consideration for the use of an “emic perspective”46 is useful.  
 Because of the intricacy of FGC, the investigation of what care should be for women who 
choose FGC is an interdisciplinary endeavor.  The terms “emic” and “etic” are used in field of 
anthropology and refer to viewpoint and perspectives.47 The emic perspectives refer to the 
indigenous views of their own behavior, or the “insider viewpoint.”48 On the other hand, the etic 
perspectives are the viewpoints of those who are outsiders.49 Interestingly, there is a correlation 
of the emic and etic perspectives to FGC debate. In the FGC scholarship it is known as the 
insider/outsider conflict. According to Mary Nyangweso Wangila, there are a number of scholars 
who have contributed to the FGC scholarship, however these scholars come from cultural 
contexts where the traditional custom is not practiced or they themselves have not experience the 
procedure.50 With regard to the FGC debate, it is apparent that western writers, particularly those 
who identify as western feminist writers, do so with what appears to be a lack of sensitivity and 
respect for difference and with an ethnocentric underpinning. Ethnocentric underpinnings mean 
that anything other, for instance any practice or custom other than western ideologies, is wrong 
and unnatural. In other words, the judgment inferred seems superior and without balance. To this 
end, Wangila explains that outsiders have been criticized for interfering in the internal affairs of 
communities who circumcise and that their critique on FGC is based on the assumption that 
“western culture is a dominating culture self-appointed to be the barometer of morality and 
ethical standard.”51  
 Likewise Fuambai Ahmadu, an African feminist writes concerning the “etic” viewpoint or 
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the outsider perspective is the assertions often found on the harmful affects of FGC are often 
alleged and are no more than misrepresentations.52 Ahmadu further adds that the aversion of 
some western writers to FGC has more to do with the deeply imbedded western cultural 
assumption regarding women’s bodies and their sexuality than with the “disputable health effects 
of genital operations of African women.”53 One example of the hypersensitivity regarding 
sexuality in general and African women’s sexuality specifically is the focus on what is 
considered a “natural” vagina. The term natural seems subjective and can be defined according 
to what is deemed conventional or acceptable to the culture. The term natural needs further 
definition not attended too here.  
 However the word natural/nature denotes existing because of or caused by nature. A 
sentiment often articulated in the FGC debate is that the cultural custom is unnatural. Not only is 
circumcision a custom that defies nature but the cultural tradition also disturbs the natural 
appearance of the vagina. What is important to note here is that some cultures believe that the 
female clitoris can and will grow to mirror the male penis,54 and the surgery is done because 
having a clitoris that a penis is unnatural. According to Ahmadu the concept of “nature” and 
“culture” in Africa and particularly within the Kono culture, the meanings differ significantly 
from western ideas of the terms and it is the insider or the “emic” understandings of nature and 
culture that compels both female and male circumcision.”55 The relationship that different 
cultures have with nature is not only diverse, it is critical to care.  
 The United States culture, for instance, believes that people can control nature. Geri-Ann 
Galanti argues that this way of thinking about nature also relates to the culture of health care in 
the US. She explains that the view of health care in the U.S. is that the body is a machine, if the 
heart for instance does not work, turn it over to the mechanic (health care practitioners), and 
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replace it.56 The “emic” perspective regarding the U.S. culture of healthcare is helpful. Its 
usefulness lies in the fact that that not all cultures have this belief in this way, and the difference, 
particularly in the context of care, can cause dismay on the part of the health professional.  
Conversely, concerning nature as it relates to the “emic” perspective of nature and the body, 
Asian and Native American cultures see human beings as part of the nature; therefore, when 
these cultures experience illness they will look to the earth treatment.57 It is in the context of 
culture, particularly FGC communities that an “emic” perspective can be applied.  
 It is important to note that the “etic” or the outsider perspective is also a valuable 
consideration. Because the two viewpoints, “emic and etic” represent differences according to 
Galanti, being familiar with both perspectives, the viewpoint of the health professional and the 
patient affords a more comprehensive picture, a necessity for health practitioners when caring for 
patients,58 particularly women who experience FGC surgeries who are from different cultures. In 
this way the health professional can attempt to comprehend and appreciate the perspective of the 
patient as it relates to the choices made and the life intention of the patient.59 Recognizing and 
understanding choices and life intentions from the “emic” perspective of different cultures 
facilitates respect for cultural diversity in a way that values the traditions and beliefs of others. 
Understanding the “etic” perspective of that the health professional brings may assist in 
dismantling biases that can facilitate the dishonor of patient’s autonomous choice and the dis-
respect for cultural diversity which can lead to cultural marginalization. What I mean by cultural 
marginalization is that the patient, namely women who choose FGC and are need of care are 
deemed insignificant due to their cultural traditions, customs and practices which place them in a 
seemingly powerless position within US health care culture. This place of cultural 
marginalization impedes the care of those who are from different cultural contexts, particularly 
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women who experience FGC, and it inhibits the “fundamental goal of medical care; the 
improvement in the patient’s quality of life.”60 Without the integration and application of respect 
for cultural diversity, which allows for mutual understanding of the cultural significance of FGC, 
care is not realized.  
A. Cultural significance; Rationales and Justifications for FGC 
There is a cultural significance to FGC.  The importance is related to the various reasons and 
justifications for the procedure and is connected to value.  This section will examine and 
consider the justifications in detail, and will elaborate on the religious influences and the 
influence of tradition, as much of the influence exists due to religious beliefs and traditional 
values.  Rosemarie Skaine illustrates various reasons and justifications for the FGC procedure.  
For instance she explains that FGC is comprised of four categories: socio-cultural, 
hygienic/aesthetic, spiritual/religious and psychosexual.61 Rahman and Toubia explain that the 
reasons for FGC are complex.62 The complexities related to the rationales lie in the intimately 
woven beliefs and values of the community.  
 In fact, Rahman and Toubia describe that the justifications and reasons for FGC “depend 
upon an entire belief system, not a single factor.” 63Since the traditional practice is firmly 
established within the context of culture, ethnicity, and geographic location, the reason and 
rationales for the practice are as diverse as the places where the custom is practiced. An example 
of the variation in practice due to geographic location and reasons for FGC is observed when 
examining the prevalence of the traditional practice in African countries. In an analysis of the 
prevalence and reasons for FGC surgeries in geographic locations in Africa, Toubia and Izett 
found that the estimated prevalence of FGC and reasons for the surgery are diverse. For example, 
Toubia and Izett explain that in Mali there is a 94% prevalence of the practice, except in the 
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regions of Gao and Tombouktou. Types I and II FGC surgeries are predominant.64  
 Interestingly, FGC is practiced by all religious groups ranging from 85% Christian and 
94% Muslim. FGC is common across all ethnic groups. However, in the Sudan, while the 
prevalence is estimated at 89% the research shows that 89% of the women who were married had 
been circumcised.65 There are diverse reasons and rationales to be investigated in more detail 
below. Nevertheless, what is a persistent theme is marriageability and religious tradition. 
Important to the discussion on reasons and rationales for FGC are chastity and fidelity. Chastity 
and fidelity is referred to in the FGC scholarship and are included in the reference to marriage as 
a rationale for undergoing FGC.66 In a study conducted by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) they concluded that the prevalence of FGC could vary substantially within the same 
country.67 For instance, reports of FGC are common in the southern regions of Nigeria but are 
substantially less frequent in its northern regions.  An important finding in the report reveals that 
educational level of women engaged in FGC, wealth, and religion are indicators of the increased 
rates of FGC.68 Religion is one of the major influences attributed to FGC and is fully examined 
in chapter one of this dissertation. It is credited to the origins of the both male and female 
circumcision and the transmission, prevalence and persistence of FGC. Religious beliefs are also 
one of the main influences that shape social culture and social norms. It is connected to social 
conformity and certainly to ones value system. When linking FGC to religion, one scholar 
describes “religion is one of the reasons consistently given for performing the practice but is also 
a strategy for addressing the issue.”69 In a study focused on why women practice female 
circumcision, the results highlighted that 90% of women report that religion influences their 
decision for engaging in the practice.70 In considering the cultural significance of the traditional 
practice, it is important to note that FGC is embraced as a religious ritual surgery.71 The FGC 
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surgery meets a religious requirement often juxtaposed to the symbolism of male circumcision in 
Judaism.  
 As it relates to religious beliefs, spiritual practices, and health care Geri-Ann Galanti 
explains that while religion is not a subject of conversation in hospitals; the customs, traditions, 
and beliefs of patients are. These aspects of religion are often sources of conflict, disagreement, 
and misunderstanding;72 however, they play a fundamental role in how patients make decisions 
about care and about quality of life. Since religion is one of the most common themes that 
typically justify the cultural significance of FGC, health practitioners would do well to gain an 
understanding of the religious influences. For example religion is connected to cultural heritage 
which influences religious beliefs and practices connected to of FGC, much like the cultural 
heritage linked to the practices of Jehovah’s Witness. Being aware of religious influences assists 
in the effort to have a culturally sensitive and culturally competent approach to care. 
In addition, recognizing the diversity of reasons and rationales and the cultural significance of 
them, instead of assuming that there is just one reason, can serve to have a better understanding 
of the patient and in discerning what the care should be for women who choose FGC surgery and 
are in need of care. 
i. Aesthetics/ hygiene 
 The aesthetic rationale concerning FGC surgeries dates back to antiquity.73 The aesthetic 
reason for FGC surgeries is associated with a belief system in parts of Africa that holds that the 
clitoris grows to the size of a male organ. As a result of this seemingly unnatural occurrence 
some women in Africa describe their genitalia as ugly and their genital area was similar to that of 
men. A number of authors writing about FGC in ancient times explained FGC surgeries were 
strictly an aesthetic measure used to either correct or improve the appearance of the female 
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genitalia.74 It is reported that having genital modification (FGC) not only corrected the enlarged 
genitalia, the surgery also beautifies the genitalia to look more feminine. The corrective surgery 
explains Gollaher, was to correct where the labia minora seemed unnaturally large.75 Important 
to the cultural significance of aesthetics to FGC is that for much of history women were thought 
to have the same genitalia as men. According to Gollaher, the only real difference between 
women and men was that the genitalia of women, namely the clitoris, was on the inside of their 
body, while the genitals of men, that is the penis were on outside.76  Having noted the historical 
suggestions regarding the claimed similarities between male and female genitalia, it seems that 
the aesthetics rationale for FGC surgeries was not only cosmetic but also medical.  According to 
Gollaher the “deformities of the female organs were caused by the sweltering and hot climate 
which rendered circumcision medically necessary.”77 In fact, the historical account for the 
rationale of medically necessary circumcision dates back to the sixteenth century.78 Important to 
the historical features of aesthetics and its relationship to the medical necessity for circumcision 
is the association of aesthetics to religion.  
 In the sixteenth century, Catholic missionaries in Ethiopia worked to prohibit FGC. 
Because marriage was considered customary, difficulty emerged when uncircumcised Christian 
women were not able to get married and were considered unmarriageable, 79 a theme 
investigated later in this dissertation. However, provisions such as medical intervention were 
made. David Gollaher describes that a surgeon sent from Rome determined that the deformity of 
the clitoris of Ethiopian women was abnormal “provoking a natural aversion in men and thus 
appropriate objects of surgical revision.”80 
In facilitating the FGC surgery for Christian women, women were made desirable for marriage 
and connecting the practice to marriage and religion. 
  
155 
 
 Specific to the aspect of aesthetics and pertinent to the cultural significance of FGC is the 
gender identification issue apparent in many cultures. Gender identity especially in FGC 
communities is one reason for circumcision. The rationale is focused on the “protruding clitoris 
and other tissues.”81  FGC is practiced to absolutely distinguish the sex of a person,82 
contributing to the pervasiveness of the practice. For example, Marie Bassili Assaad describes 
there is a belief within Egyptian culture which has been transmitted to other parts of Africa that 
“a boy is ‘female’ because of his foreskin; and a girl is ‘male’ by virtue of her clitoris.”83 Having 
this insider or “emic” perspective of this aspect of the culture helps in seeing why there may be 
the necessity for FGC surgery, from the perspective of the patient. Importantly, since marriage is 
a valued cultural standard and the aim is the removal of male-like feminine organ, it critical if 
marriage is to be achieved, a subject explored later in this dissertation. The clitoris and labia, in 
cultural contexts where they are considered male parts, must be removed lest they produce 
ambiguity.84 The circumcision would also apply to males. For males the foreskin (considered 
female) must be removed before the stage of manhood to disregard any uncertainty about 
gender.85 
 In considering gender and aesthetics, FGC surgeries in Africa, are viewed by insiders 
(emic) as aesthetic enhancements. However, it is important to say that there is human desire 
across all cultures to shape and decorate the body to accomplish a culture’s aesthetic ideals. 
Examples of these aesthetics are ear piercing, body tattoos, and other forms of surgical body 
modifications and enhancements. This desire is what is at work in the case of FGC surgeries.86 
The FGC surgery enhancement is aimed at making the genitals more “attractive-smooth and 
clean.”87 It is important to note that FGC communities who support and promote type IV, i.e., 
infibulation or Pharaohnic circumcision, find the smooth infibulated vulva highly feminine and 
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aesthetically pleasing.88  Mentioned earlier, not only is the FGC surgery associated with 
enhancement, it is also related to hygiene and purity. The relationship of hygiene and purity to 
FGC is due to the belief that the larger the clitoris the “dirtier and uglier it is. The state of being 
uncircumcised was termed dirty and had to be washed away.”89 It is important to note here that 
both purity/hygienics and aesthetics are reasons attributed historically to circumcision. In the 
historical literature on the FGC, hygienics is associated with the idea of purity, a notion also 
embedded in the early Egyptian culture.90 In some FGC communities, for example in northern 
Sudan hygienics and purity are named as primary reasons for circumcision of both males and 
female. Bacterial or fungal infection is also considered important to the hygienic reasons for 
FGC. Some FGC communities believe that circumcision is the one way of making the vagina 
much cleaner.  
 While most women agree that the procedure is painful, especially when there is no 
anesthesia, they embrace circumcision as a rite of passage to being a woman. Circumcision then 
serves as a way for women to embrace their femininity and increase marriageability while 
beautifying the genitalia. Many women who have had FGC surgeries view the procedure as a 
“cosmetic beautification” that improves the appearance of the human female body.91 
ii. Prevention of infidelity 
     At the time of marriage in FGC communities, virginity is of critical importance. In addition to 
virginity at marriage, the prevention of infidelity, i.e., marital fidelity is fundamental in FGC 
cultural contexts.92 Prevention of infidelity is a theme often observed in the scholarship on FGC. 
The idea of virginity at marriage is not only an ideology embraced in FGC communities, it is 
also an ideal in the cultural context of the United States. While some scholars admit that virginity 
at marriage is less of a custom as it once was, “virginity remain symbolic by virtue of the white 
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wedding dress and veil.”93 In this regard the ideal of marriage is a shared custom, both in FGC 
communities and in non- FGC environments. In the U.S. cultural context, marriage denotes 
stability. Marriage and virginity at marriage is often part of a religious tradition both in FGC 
communities and in the U.S.   
     The importance of virginity, especially in Islamic FGC communities such as the Sudan, 
virginity is linked to Islamic prohibitions on sex outside of marriage.94 The same can be said for 
some protestant religions and the Catholic tradition. Observance and faithfulness to the cultural 
custom of virginity at marriage if you will, is part of a persons morality. In other words, 
faithfulness to tradition depends upon the values held by an individual, which assist her/him in 
discerning behavior that is characterized as right and wrong, or actions that are good or bad. 
Concerning the vow of virginity at marriage, especially in FGC communities, Ellen Gruenberg 
explains, “adherence to virginity is considered both a social requirement and a religious 
obligation.”95 According to Gerry Mackie, FGC is necessary for proper marriage. In this way, 
there is proof of fidelity and prevention of infidelity before marriage. What is meant by infidelity 
before marriage is the belief in women not having sex before marriage. Virginity at marriage and 
fidelity in marriage are an important place of honor and decency- to maintain it, one must have 
decency with respect to sexual behavior.96 
       In an effort to maintain the decency and honor, FGC ensures that women (and young girls) 
have not had sexual relations before marriage. Premarital chastity is undoubtedly linked to FGC. 
It is important to mention here that the idea of virginity at marriage and prevention of infidelity 
as it relates to FGC can be proven most often by undergoing infibulation or Pharaonic 
intervention. The reason virginity can be proven is that the infibulated vulva creates scare tissue 
sometimes referred to an “ordinary” barrier making it nearly impossible to penetrate.97 In 
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addition to the barrier created by scare tissue, the removal of the clitoris allegedly reduces sexual 
desire. The reduction of sexual desire will simply help to keep women from having sex prior to 
getting marriage. If women in FGC communities are not having premarital sex then they are less 
likely to have illegitimate children.98 In addition, not only does the literature note that FGC 
promotes fidelity in marriage, “infibulation is more likely to make sex less appealing and 
therefore less of a temptation”99 to women to go outside of their marriage. In some FGC 
communities proof of virginity is celebrated. However in Western Sudan, proof of virginity is 
customary.100 Proof of virginity is by way of a spotted cloth on the bride and grooms wedding 
night. The show of cloth spotted with blood symbolizes the bride’s virginity and success of the 
family to protect the virginity of the daughter via FGC.101 Having done so, the bridegroom pays 
the mother with cattle or money, adding to the family’s economic success.  
iii. Economics 
        One economic feature of FGC is linked to marriageability (marriage). While there is not an 
abundance of research related specifically to economics and FGC, economics is highlighted as 
justification and sometimes is motivation for FGC and therefore should be mentioned. The 
motivation for FGC is linked to the strong cultural value of marriage.  
As mentioned in the earlier section on aesthetics, marriage is one primary rationale for FGC 
surgery, although in the literature marriage is not specially mentioned. Rather it is implicit in the 
discussions on custom and tradition, social pressure and religion.102 
       For example, as it relates to custom and tradition, FGC is performed as a rite of passage. The 
rite of passage marks the transition from childhood to adulthood. In fact, in FGC communities a 
girl is not able to become a mature adult unless her clitoris is removed.103 It is the process of 
entering in to womanhood. According to Anika Rahman and Nahid Toubia, during this time of 
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transition from childhood to becoming a woman, the girl is said to be equipped with the abilities 
to handle marriage, a husband and children.104 The process of becoming a woman, thus being 
able to marry, is incredibly important economically to women and to families in Africa in 
general and in FGC communities specifically. 
    The economic security for women is not only linked to marriage, but it also intimately 
connected to reproduction and to social status.105 Therefore the role of family plays a tremendous 
part for why FGC surgeries are performed. The economic landscape in Africa, and particularly in 
the Sudan strongly favors men. For example, Ellen Gruenbaum explains that livestock ownership 
is in the hands of men.106 FGC enables the marriage of women therefore facilitating economic 
security. The significant economic security is in her role as a wife and as a mother and in the use 
of the animals.107 Further, for women who have no education, there are very few opportunities 
for employment. Loretta Kopelman writes concerning economics and FGC, that in order for 
women to survive economically, women in FGC communities must marry. Furthermore, women 
are not “acceptable marriage partners unless they have undergone the ritual surgery.”108 Olayinka 
Koso-Thomas writes, concerning marriage and FGC, that men from FGC communities insist that 
in order for women to be acceptable wives they must be circumcised.109 This is true even for 
women who have an education and are able to find prestigious employment, i.e., teachers, 
according to Gruenbaum, “employment is no guarantee of social respect or long-term economic 
security.”110  There is no other way to provide stable economic security or achieve a place of 
respect in society but to have a family. 
        There is a second aspect of the economics concerning FGC that is interesting to note. That 
is the importance of FGC to older women who are for performing rituals.111 Women performing 
FGC surgeries are often referred to as midwives or elders. Scholars write about FGC that the 
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custom is a practice controlled by women. There are women who are proponents and supporters 
of the practice. Because FGC is often a ritual ceremony denoting womanhood, midwives are 
often the one who typically perform the surgery while other women in the community are 
present. The midwife also provides a certificate certifying that the circumcision was 
completed.112 As mentioned in the section about economic security and respectability, the 
midwife or as she is sometimes referred too, the circumciser/matron makes her living by 
performing FGC surgeries. It is noteworthy as previously mentioned, FGC, is controlled by 
women. In other words, mothers, grandmothers, and other female kin dominate FGC.113 
Recognizing that in many African societies FGC is a prerequisite for marriage and children are 
vital aspects of the roles of women and the economic survival helps to contextualize FGC in a 
larger social setting. 
iv. Social status 
The idea of social status is one of the dominant features concerning the cultural 
significance of FGC surgeries. What is meant by social status is the amount of honor or prestige 
attached to an individual’s position in society. Status implies the position one holds in a social 
group, namely a community. An illustration of status within FGC communities is that, in certain 
situations, FGC is an important symbolic marker that identifies women who belong to privileged 
ethnic groups.114 In addition, FGC is used ideologically to exclude lower status groups who seek 
cultural assimilation necessary for upward mobility by adopting the cultural tradition.115 Status 
and position are important as they determine what function a person will have within a group. 
Tyler refers to social position as the location of the individual within the group – their place in 
the social network of reciprocal obligations and privileges, duties, and rights.116 Social status is 
embedded in the cultural context of FGC communities. FGC is a cultural custom, related to 
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marriage, and it contributes to the cultural significance of social status. In fact FGC is symbolic 
of a change in the initiated person's social position.117 Gaining an understanding of the social 
meanings of customs and traditions helps in appreciating the cultural practices of others, namely 
FGC. Garnering a different perspective by gaining an understanding assists to give insight into 
belief systems on which FGC is based or supported.118 To develop an “emic” perspective rather 
than an “etic” viewpoint regarding the cultural significance of FGC helps the health practitioner 
apply respect for cultural diversity to the care relationship. Furthermore, being able to grasp an 
emic perspective assists the health professional in realizing and appreciating the influence of 
social status particularly in the FGC cultural context. In addition the emic viewpoint facilitates 
awareness about how social status precipitates FGC surgeries.  
 According to the World Bank, women make up more than half of the population in 
world.119 However, the status of women in most societies and cultures is lower than that of 
men.120 This is most likely because of the particular attributes, roles and responsibilities related 
to gender imposed by society. Mary Nyangweso Wangila describes that the low status of women 
is due to social factors that include patriarchy, sexism, cultural stereotypes, education and 
illiteracy, and religion.121 Much of the literature on FGC attributes the practice and the persistent 
presence of the practice to patriarchal structures and male dominance.122 On the other hand, L. 
Amede Obiora explains that the viewpoint that perceives the patriarchy paradigm that men exert 
complete and total dominance over societal life can obscure the variety of ways in which men 
and women are intricately interwoven together as social units and institutions that cut across 
gender lines in all areas of social life.123 
         In light of the discussion on marriage highlighted in an earlier section of this chapter, it 
isn’t problematic to appreciate the priority and importance of marriage for women in FGC 
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communities. It is particularly less difficult to see how the idea of ritual cutting plays a major 
role in the social status of women, especially when it appears that the only thing that guarantees 
social status or social respect for women is marriage. Certainly social status is critical to social 
integration and to honor the value of family. Women who are uncircumcised risk becoming 
outcasts in their community and in society.124 Women find their social indispensability not as 
partners, rather, they find it in their ability to reproduce, i.e., give birth to children and namely 
sons.125 In this way, women are socially important people. They have status and position. The 
role they play is vital to family and cultural heritage and to having an heir, mainly a son to pass 
the family wealth if any and to pass down the family ancestry. In fact, women are “cofounders of 
lineages,”126which carries social respect, social status, and a place of honor in the community.  
Taking into account the association of the reproductive nature of women to social status and 
honor in the community, the idea of social status is embedded in the cultural significance of 
FGC.  
         The idea of social status is connected to the religious beliefs of all cultures. As it relates to 
the cultural significance of FGC, the influence of religion is especially linked to cultures that 
embrace FGC. It is important to note however that there are arguments that reflect both sides of 
the debate, namely that FGC is linked to religious beliefs and that FGC is not associated with 
religious tradition. For instance, Rahman and Toubia argue that FGC is a cultural practice and 
not a religious one.127 They assert that FGC predates the arrival of religious traditions, 
particularly Christianity and Islam in Africa.  
         Conversely, however, other scholars argue that religion is a reason for the practice of FGC 
and that women and men alike embrace this belief. FGC is practiced in religious traditions that 
include Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and indigenous religions particular to Africa. According to 
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Aida Seif El Dawla, there are not only supporters of FGC- there are women who have 
experienced the surgery who refer to the cultural custom as a religious edict.128 An example that 
describes the connection of FGC to religion is the Keno people who live in Sierra Leone. Most of 
the Keno people uphold and maintain their indigenous religious beliefs, which are embedded in 
their culture, and include the ritual initiation of FGC.129 Moreover, Ellen Gruenbaum explains 
that based on Egyptian religious scholars, FGC is an “Islamic practice mentioned in the tradition 
of the Prophet and sanctioned by Imams and Jurist.”130 Forbidding sexual relationships outside of 
marriage is fundamental to the Islamic faith. The prohibition is connected to the use of FGC. The 
adherence to this religious cultural tradition inspires the use of FGC to meet the obligation. The 
religious rationale for FGC remains at the seat of the debate on FGC. While the rationale of 
religion is explored earlier in this dissertation, it is important to note here because of its cultural 
significance to FGC. Its significance is in FGC’s link to identity and identity to social status. 
Considering the cultural significance of religion and its association to social status is relevant. 
The relevance is in thinking about the practical use of respect for diversity when caring for 
women who choose FGC. 
v. Improvement of male sexual pleasure and performance 
Improvement in male sexual pleasure and performance is not one of the main reasons or 
rationales cited for FGC surgery.  Nevertheless the brief but frequently mentioned theme of male 
sexual pleasure and improvement in performance is ongoing. It is curious that the subject is 
mentioned in a way that influences opposition to practice often juxtaposing the circumcised 
female and the absence of sexual pleasure and satisfaction with the increased pleasure of men. 
The query is raised- is the heightened sexual pleasure allegedly experienced by men a 
consequence of circumcision, therefore attributing to the improvement of sexual performance in 
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men? Does the theme of improved sexual performance and pleasure for men matter? It is 
important to note before moving further in the discussion that sexuality in the traditional African 
contexts is different from the perceptive of sexuality in the Western context.131 Furthermore 
scholars explain that there is no known specific research related to African sexuality and FGC, 
therefore to solve any sex related problems for Africans is done so in the context of Western 
understanding of sexuality leaving the sexual information regarding FGC antidotal. 
       Interestingly, on the idea of sexual pleasure and improvement in men, scholars inform that 
there is another perspective. Rendering her research on FGC and the subject of male sexual 
pleasure and improvement, El Dawla describes that Egyptian women have a different experience. 
Egyptian women feel entitled to sexual pleasure and report that they are sexually compatible 
with their partners and acknowledge that there is no difference between them and uncircumcised 
women.132 El Dawla further notes her research found that men often report, “it is harder to satisfy 
an uncircumcised women,”133 and had no reports from men regarding increased improvement or 
pleasure. On the other hand, however, Asma El Dareer explains that doctors have commented 
that when the vaginal orifice is tight the pleasure for men is more acute, but of shorter duration. 
The sexual stimulation of men mentioned in the debate raises the query how the non- therapeutic 
surgery is any different than the vaginoplasty: a cosmetic procedure that some surgeons claim the 
surgery improves sensitivity.134 Some Muslim scholars according to David Gollaher have argued 
that FGC, namely the removal of the hood of the clitoris makes both men and women more 
sensitive during intercourse and more likely to please her partner.135 From Gollaher’s point of 
view the surgery has the potential to have heighten sexual stimulation for both partners and not 
just men. It is interesting to note that with regard to the sexual implications of FGC, both the 
positive and negative, some writers criticize the western feminist writers whose emphasis on the 
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sexual enhancement is nothing more that an exaggerated western obsession with sex.136  What is 
additionally unsettling about the intensified focus on sex is that this obsessive focus portrays 
African and Arabic men and women as hypersexual and takes away from the embraced cultural 
ritual so embedded in tradition. This Eurocentric attitude, which perhaps imposes the sexual 
obsessiveness of western society, namely the U.S., cheapens and dilutes this traditional cultural 
practice which has been inherited, passed on from generation to generation and is part of the 
cultural heritage of many FGC cultures. 
vi. Cultural heritage and social integration 
Cultural heritage is one of the principles of global bioethics. It is defined by UNESCO as the 
“legacy of physical artifacts and intangible attributes of a group or society that are inherited from 
past generations, maintained in the present, and bestowed for the benefit of future 
generations.”137 According to UNESCO, the term cultural heritage encompasses several main 
categories of heritage: 
 Tangible cultural heritage 
 Movable cultural heritage (paintings, sculptures, coins, manuscripts) 
 Immovable cultural heritage (monuments, archaeological sites) 
 Underwater cultural heritage (shipwrecks, underwater ruins and cities) 
 Intangible cultural heritage: (oral traditions, performing arts, rituals) 
 
Adhering to the UNESCO framework of cultural heritage, FGC is connected to intangible culture 
heritage, which specifically encompasses cultural rituals. Intangible cultural heritage is the 
customs of a particular culture that people practice. As investigated in chapter one of this 
dissertation the history of FGC, i.e., ritual cutting dates back to 2400 B. C. Gollaher explains 
about the history of male circumcision that carvings show that circumcision of males dates back 
to 2400 B.C where the carving explicitly shows the depiction of a surgical operation on the male 
genitalia. The inscription, according to Gollaher, reads, “ hold him and do not allow him to faint- 
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I will cause it to heal.”138 Circumcision, whether of males or females, seems part of the cultural 
heritage of circumcising communities including the U.S. where male circumcision is embedded 
in the health care culture.  
In Egypt, however, the religion of Islam has acknowledged FGC as a rightful counterpart 
to male circumcision.139 While there are scholars who argue that FGC is not a religious custom 
but a cultural one,140 nevertheless, in the historical context, Egypt revered and consecrated 
circumcision. Circumcision was preserved, protected, and given a place of honor as a religious 
and social practice.141  As circumcision is related to ritual and traditional customs and practices 
to intangible cultural heritage, it is critical to note the ceremonial custom was established in the 
form that would become familiar to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam by the religion of one of 
Egypt’s subject peoples the Israelites, and thus has been handed down through the years.142  
What is often noted in the literature, rather than fully explored by western feminist 
writers, is the ceremonial ritual aspect and celebration associated with FGC and the changes that 
have taken place over the years. One significant change noted in the scholarship on the 
celebratory aspects of FGC is that, in modern times, after the celebration and the circumcision, 
since the girls now have access to education, the time spent in the “bush” is now a couple of 
weeks instead of the several months.143  The ceremonial ritual is important to the culture and to 
the heritage of FGC communities, as the practice symbolizes a change in the initiated persons 
social position.144  
Cultural heritage is an expression of a way of life of established by a community and passed on 
from generation to generation; it includes customs, practices, places, objects, artistic expression, 
and values. Cultural heritage includes traditions inherited from the ancestors and passed on to 
our children, for instance the cultural tradition of FGC. Is the cultural tradition one that can be 
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called cultural heritage using the UNESCO framework it is evident that FGC and male 
circumcision are part of the cultural heritage passed on through the generations of FGC 
communities. It would seem that FGC is part of the cultural heritage of religions, including 
indigenous religions, tribes, ethnic groups and communities. FGC is a cultural expression that 
embodies a way of living architected by a religious community and passed on from generation to 
generation. While the custom has been performed in ways that are allegedly harmful, i.e., the 
harmful consequences associated with FGC, there are frameworks that reduce medical 
consequences. Medicalization of FGC is one framework being used in FGC communities. In 
addition, scholars writing about FGC argue that the conflation of varied practices of FGC that 
results in an overemphasis on infibulation is unjustified.145  They further explain the reality that 
infibulation is a rare practice that is associated with a specific region and interpretation of 
Muslim purdah ideology.146 Moreover, according to Ahmadu, gynecologists explain that FGC 
does not pose any significant adverse long-term effects to women and that, on the whole, 
traditional circumcisers are “well trained and are experts” at what they do.147 Observing FGC 
through the lens of cultural diversity is useful in observing FGC as intangible cultural heritage 
(ICH). 
 What is curious is that FGC must meet particular standards to be recognized as an 
intangible cultural heritage; it must be consistent with human rights and exhibit the need for 
mutual respect.148 The human rights debate is quite often argued as a reason to eradicate the 
practice of FGC. According to Rahman and Toubia, the provisions of some of the human rights 
treaties have been interpreted in such a way as to support abandonment of the practice.149 In 
addition, other scholars have argued that, not only is FGC a violation of human rights, it is 
unethical- a subject investigated earlier in this dissertation. Concerning the recognition of FGC 
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as an intangible cultural heritage, Kurin further explains that both the human rights and the 
mutual respect framework are very high, calling them both standards that are idealistic and 
impractical.150    
 While the recognition of FGC as an intangible cultural heritage, has a long way to go, the 
concept of intangible cultural heritage has meaning for FGC, and specifically for women in need 
of care who choose FGC. One of the implications of intangible cultural heritage for FGC is that 
ICH helps to influence cultural diversity and respect for cultural diversity. While mutual respect 
is one of the standards for recognition, ICH can support and facilitate respect for differences 
among cultures and their cultural customs, especially in non-FGC communities. ICH is an 
important aspect in maintaining cultural diversity, as it encourages mutual respect for other ways 
of life.151  
 An understanding of the intangible cultural heritage of different cultures, ethnic groups, 
and practices facilitates respect for the values of others even when there is disagreement. In FGC 
communities, the community plays an important part, as mentioned in the earlier section. The 
cultural custom is identification with the cultural heritage, and the ceremony is an initiation into 
the cultural heritage of the community. FGC establishes the identity as a member of the ethnic 
group and unites those who are undergoing FGC with the ancestors, a feature in African cultures 
that is essential to the values and beliefs of the people. 
B. Cultural Rights and FGC 
This section will focus on the idea of cultural rights.  Cultural rights are a prominent feature in 
the scholarship pertaining to FGC and are, at times, paired with human rights.  Michel Revel 
refers to the idea of human rights and cultural rights as a “dual relationship”152 This section 
focuses on the cultural rights and human rights relationship as it relates to women who will 
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choose to undergo FGC.  The dilemma for these women who now live in a non-FGC reality is 
how to continue to practice the rituals of the culture to which they are accustomed. Are these 
women protected by cultural rights- in other words do they have a right to culture? To abandon 
these cultural traditions has consequences that include rejection from their families and 
community, and rendering them outcasts. The weightiness of societal pressure, and the 
obligation to cultural customs outside their geographic location, are quite persuasive, making it 
probable that attempts to practice FGC underground are likely to occur, and further contribute to 
the danger and alleged harmfulness of the practice and the need for care.  
Cultural Rights are rights related to art and culture, both understood in a larger context. The aim 
of cultural rights is to guarantee that people and communities have an access to culture and can 
participate in the culture of their election. Cultural rights are human rights that aim at assuring 
the enjoyment of culture and its components in conditions of equality, human dignity, and non-
discrimination.153 They are rights related to themes such as language; cultural and artistic 
production; participation in cultural life; cultural heritage; intellectual property rights; author’s 
rights; minorities and access to culture, among others. 
The Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity highlights the dual interdependence of 
human rights and cultural diversity. Article 4 titled ‘Human rights as guarantees of cultural 
diversity’ explains the defense of cultural diversity is an ethical imperative, not able to be 
separated from respect for human dignity and implies a commitment to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms…154 This indication of human dignity, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms is very much linked to the women who choose to undergo FGC surgery. This is 
particularly true when women make the choice for FGC in cultures that are non-FGC 
communities. Since FGC is often deeply associated with religious traditions, do women not have 
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the right to undergo the procedure based on their faith and religious beliefs? The same is true for 
women whose religious beliefs do not require them to undergo FGC.155 Is choice not a human 
right and a bioethical imperative? It seems that much of the application to the human rights 
framework used against FGC is linked to health consequences and women who have no choice.  
If the alleged health consequences are debunked, especially through medicalization, and women 
indeed make a choice to undergo the FGC, is this not an infringement on the rights of women to 
exercise their religious freedom?  
According to the Declaration, universal Human Rights afford expression of individual 
cultures, as long as they do not violate the human rights of all people as guaranteed by 
international law.156 Individual cultures that have characteristics that distinguish themselves as 
spiritual, material, intellectual, or emotional features are what make up culture. 157  These aspects 
of individual cultures also embrace and embody “lifestyles, ways of living together, value 
systems, traditions and beliefs,”158 all features of FGC communities. Human rights are rights that 
apply to all people. Furthermore the Declaration notes that, since human rights are universal, 
they “guarantee the particular expression of individual cultures.”159 It is here that the dual 
interdependence of human rights and cultural rights seems at times to be in conflict with each 
other, perhaps creating competing interests.160 The competing interests of each other foster 
different areas of tension.  
For example, the assurance to express one’s culture on the one hand, and on the other the 
need to protect the universality of human rights of all people without violating them. 
Additionally it is the mutual dependence of cultural diversity and human rights that raises the 
question about the value of cultural diversity.161 There are both helpful and constructive aspects 
and adverse aspects of the concepts of cultural diver162sity and human rights that cause 
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uncertainty or indecisiveness. However, as it concerns discerning what the care should be for 
women who choose, using the lens of cultural diversity is helpful. It is helpful in observing that 
the autonomous right for women to choose is at stake if cultural diversity and human rights are 
not considered in the construct of care. Therefore, the right to culture vis-a-vis human rights, 
must be included in establishing a model of care for women who choose FGC, especially in non-
FGC communities.   
 Another concern relevant to the care of women, who choose FGC, is the issue of the right 
of members of minority groups. The Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity states that 
there is a specific commitment to protect the rights of peoples who belong to minority group.163 
The minority status is particularly relevant to women who live in non-FGC communities and 
choose to practice FGC. In non-FGC contexts, the surgery is often practiced among immigrant 
i.e., refugee women. A decision made by a person of power, for instance the health care 
practitioner, who does not do the surgery could be regarded as infringement of the cultural rights 
and the autonomy of the refugee or immigrant women. Ignoring or not taking into consideration 
the autonomous decision of the patient does not foster the goal of medicine- the improvement of 
quality of life for the women who seek care.164 Minority groups, especially women whose life 
intention is FGC, are often powerless to refute the decisions and judgments made about their 
cultural practices by those in the majority group.165 Minority communities have the right to 
practice their culture i.e., FGC. The right to practice cultural rituals, however, cannot violate the 
human rights of others.  
 Applying cultural rights to FGC, specifically to women who live in non-FGC contexts and 
choose to participate in cultural rituals and practices in which they are accustomed is an integral 
feature of respecting cultural diversity. It is in the discussion regarding culture that cultural and 
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ethical relativism are raised. In addition, due to the interdependence of cultural rights and human 
rights, cultural diversity serves as part of the framework of care for women who choose FGC 
surgeries. The cultural practice endures because it makes sense to the members of the culture.166 
III. Forms of Relativism and FGC 
This section will study the concept of relativism, particularly cultural relativism and ethical 
relativism.  The analysis will focus on the question of how the two notions are employed in 
discerning the moral status of FGC and what should be the model of care for women who 
undergo the surgery.  The framework of relativism argues that truth and morality occur in 
relationship to culture, which includes the historical context of a specific culture.  Scholars will 
also assert however, that relativism is not absolute. Other scholars explain that relativism to 
“mean different things to different academic cultures”167 Cultural and ethical relativism are 
features of the ongoing debate and scholarship concerning FGC and therefore they require 
further exploration as both have implications for discerning a model of care for women whose 
autonomous choice is to undergo FGC surgeries.  Therefore, it is important to summarize with 
intention, the difference between cultural and ethical (moral) relativism, Ethical relativism is the 
concept that holds that morality is relative to the norms of one's culture. That is, whether an 
action is right or wrong depends on the moral norms of the society in which the action is 
practiced. The same action may be morally right in one society but be morally wrong in another. 
According to Manuel Velasquez, anthropologists describe a host of practices and traditional 
customs that are considered morally acceptable in some cultures but criticized in others, 
including infanticide, genocide, polygamy, racism, sexism, and torture.168  Velasquez further 
suggests that the diversity of differences may lead to the consideration of whether there are any 
universal moral principles or whether morality is merely a matter of the cultural preferences and 
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perceptions.169  
 Loretta Kopelman would agree with Velasquez that ethical relativism means morality is 
something that is relative to the norms of ones culture. That is, “if an action is right, it is 
approved by the culture; and conversely if an action or behavior is wrong, it is disapproved by 
the culture”170 The culture makes the moral judgment. For example, as it relates to FGC, the 
implications of ethical relativism would suggest that since the culture approves the custom, the 
practice of the FGC is morally right, within the culture where it is approved and likewise, if there 
is disapproval, then FGC is morally wrong.171  
  Cultural relativism on the other hand means that in a particular cultural context certain 
behaviors and actions are right, as they are relative to the culture. The fundamental point in 
cultural relativism is that the action or behavior is right in the context of a particular cultural.  
However, that is not to say that the concept of cultural relativism means that all customs are 
equally respected and valued, they are not. For instance FGC is an accepted cultural practice in 
some cultures, particularly in Ethiopia, however in other cultures in Africa the practice is now 
forbidden.172 According to Kopelman she observes cultural relativism as another version of 
ethical relativism.173  Kopelman asserts “to say something is right means it has cultural approval; 
to say something is wrong means it is disapproved by the culture.”174  
Kopelman further explains, “Relativism means different things to different ‘academic cultures,’ 
because the term is used in so many different ways.”175 Nevertheless, for the purposes of this 
dissertation cultural relativism considers that people’s perceptions, viewpoints, behaviors, beliefs 
and values are relative to their specific culture. Therefore, certain actions are right according to 
the cultural context. If the culture approves, the action is right. On the other hand, ethical 
relativism concentrates on what a specific culture judges or approves to be right or wrong. 
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However, to say something is approved does not settle whether it is wrong or right. An action 
can be wrong even though it is approved by most of the members of a culture. For example 
slavery was approved but its approval did not settle whether the action was right or wrong. 
Kopelman further argues there is no way to evaluate moral claims across cultures if cultural 
relativism is the standard by which to make judgments.176 In fact they are not expressing 
judgments rather they are conveying their point of view. 
           One of the implications of cultural relativism for FGC is that the cultural tradition must be 
analyzed in the context of cultural diversity examined earlier in this chapter. Another implication 
for FGC and ethical relativism is what is judged unethical by one cultural, for example FGC in 
non- FGC contexts, could be viewed as morally acceptable in another which is at the seat of the 
debate. A third implication for FGC as it relates to both cultural and ethical relativism is the 
theories offer ongoing examination of defensible reasons, and explanations related to the 
research for the cultural practice that can help assess moral judgments across cultures in a way 
garners authority, particularly for women to choose FGC. The examinations of defensible 
reasons as highlighted throughout the dissertation make room for a less negative and hostile 
response to FGC, which facilitates a more balanced dialogue that includes the right for women to 
choose. 
A. Cultural Relativism 
Cultural relativism affirms that all cultural beliefs and values are equally justifiable depending on 
the cultural environment.  Scholars of cultural relativism argue that all religious, ethical, 
aesthetic, and political beliefs are completely relative to the individual within a cultural identity 
and that an individual’s human beliefs and activities should be understood by others in terms of 
that individual's own culture.177 It has high regard values, beliefs, etc., from the point of view of 
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the culture, namely the insider or the emic perspective, discussed earlier in this chapter. Cultural 
relativism also means that no one culture is superior to another culture. That is: no one culture 
ranks higher than another culture or having the judgment and final say on what is right and what 
is wrong for all cultures. Cultural relativism is one way of avoiding ethnocentrism and judging 
another culture by the standards of one's own culture. Cultural relativism contends that groups 
and individuals hold a diverse set of values, beliefs and practices that must respected. Cultural 
relativism holds that culture is the primary and major source that validates a moral rule or what is 
morally right.178  
 While the cultural relativism approach appears unassuming in its assertion that values, 
beliefs, and practices for example should be understood in the context of the individual’s cultural 
identity, Lane and Rubinstein, describe that cultural relativism is complex and encompassing. 
According to these authors, cultural relativism questions how much can be understood of the 
realties of other cultures and what might be the avenues for appreciating and understanding 
realities that are different.179  Cultural relativism can also be understood as the reality of being 
able to fully relate too or comprehend the experience of other cultures in order to make a 
sufficiently balanced evaluation and judgment is extremely difficult. Its difficulty lies, according 
to Spiro in that “cultural patterns provide the template for all human action, growth and 
understanding, including what we think and feel, then all human social characteristics are 
culturally determined.”180 It is important to note here that this is one perspective, however a 
compelling one as it relates fully being able to understand the reality of others, namely women 
who choose FGC surgeries.   
 It is compelling because it makes tangible the reality that variation and diversity of cultures 
are limitless.181 An illustration of the variations and inexhaustible nature of culture is FGC. 
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While FGC is often attributed to Africa, FGC can be found all over the world as noted in chapter 
one of this dissertation. Due to transmittal of FGC from tribe to tribe, country to county, and 
religious tradition FGC surgeries are not same, although the current scholarship would support 
this claim. For example, there is a tendency in the FGC debate to claim that most of the surgeries 
are infibulation.182 However, after further investigation there is a variation of the cultural 
tradition. The variation includes a minor prick to draw a small amount of blood to the removal of 
the clitoris, i.e., infibulation. In addition there are differences in religious traditions and the 
practice of FGC. An additional variation not visible in the literature on FGC is the insider or 
emic voice of those women who embrace the cultural tradition practice.183 From the cultural 
relativism viewpoint, that is, taking into consideration the difficultly in comprehending the 
reality of others in order to make unbiased judgment, it is possible to view FGC for women who 
choose through the lens of cultural diversity. In doing so the cultural practice can be better 
understood from an emic perspective.  Culture is valuable. It is through having access to culture 
that people, namely women who choose to embrace their cultural traditions and practices have 
access to a diverse range of meaningful choices.184 
 Concerning cultural relativism, a typology is useful that reflects the complexities,185 but 
also illuminates frameworks for the consideration of cultural relativism. Lane and Rubinstein 
explain that there are three types of cultural relativism-descriptive, normative and 
epistemological, however it is descriptive and normative forms of relativism that are relevant to 
this dissertation.  On their account, descriptive relativism suggests acknowledgement of the 
diversity of cultures that include behaviors and beliefs; normative relativism suggests an 
acceptance across cultures of their moral judgments as acceptable for that culture; These two 
types of cultural relativisms are helpful in discerning what the care should be for women who 
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choose FGC, particularly when the care needed is in non-FGC environments. 
 Descriptive relativism describes what is present in the current U.S. health care culture in 
the U.S. There is an acknowledgement of the differences in practices, beliefs, values, and 
religions of other cultures; however, the recognition does not lead to an appreciation or 
acceptance of cultural diversity. Descriptive cultural relativism is a result of the judgment 
concerning what is true for one culture and not another,186 for example, FGC. According to Spiro 
social characteristics are corollary to culture and descriptive relativism is a by-product.187 In 
other words the customs, beliefs and values of human groups depends on the culture and the 
range of variations between the cultures. 
The rejection of diversity of cultural norms, and values causes moral disagreements between 
culture and individuals who chose to embrace beliefs, religion and cultural ritual traditions, 
namely FGC.  
 On the other hand cultural normative relativism implies an acceptance of the diversity of 
cultures and the variations of values, practices and beliefs of cultures.188 In addition cultural 
normative relativism looks favorable regarding the moral judgments for that culture. That is, 
normative relativism allows for judgment of behavior according to the cultural context and 
respecting the evaluation of practices by the cultures own standard. Cultural normative relativism 
asserts since all standards are culturally constituted there is no available transcultural standard by 
which different standards are judged on merit or worth.189  There is no standard pan-cultural 
standard by which cultures can be judged. That is, there are no standards across cultures that 
apply to cultures regardless of race, country or religion. One of the tensions in the FGC debate is 
that much of the discourse and evaluation of the FGC surgery is not done in the cultural context 
of FGC communities;190 rather it is done using an ethnocentric gage. This is not to say that 
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cultural practices, particularly FGC should not come under ethical examination, it should. 
However, the examination must be balanced and evaluated through the lens of cultural diversity 
rather than solely an ethnocentric one.  
B. Ethical Relativism 
 Ethical relativism, sometimes referred too as moral relativism is often a controversial 
position concerned with the differences in moral judgments across cultures, societies, and 
communities.191 Ethical relativism is the theory that holds that morality is relative to the norms of 
one's culture. That is, whether an action is right or wrong depends on the moral norms of the 
society or culture in which the action is practiced. The action is right if it is approved in an 
individual's culture and wrong if the action is disapproved by the person's culture. If something is 
right, this means that the action or behavior has been approved by the culture, and if it is wrong 
the act, value, and practice. It is culturally disapproved. Loretta Kopelman explains that ethical 
relativism is sometimes called cultural relativism and implies that it is impossible to judge moral 
claims across cultures.192  She contends that positions taken by international groups, for example, 
WHO, merely reflect a group of particular societal opinions and have no moral standing in other 
cultures.193  Further, according to this view it doesn’t make sense to say that practices, beliefs, 
and values in another culture are wrong, when in fact, these things are approved- or to say that 
something is right, yet it is disapproved within the culture.   
 For instance, the same action may be morally right in one culture or society but morally 
wrong in another. An example is polygyny. The marital practice of polygyny is quite prevalent in 
Nigeria.194 Polygyny is practiced across educational, socio-economic levels and religions, 
however most are Muslim. In the U.S., polygyny is taboo and by law it is illegal. A second 
example is FGC, also a cultural practice that is both taboo and illegal in the US. The subject of 
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FGC raises a plethora of robust opinions and vigorous moral judgments. To have moral opinions 
and judgments about beliefs, customs, values and practices within one's culture is an expression 
of that particular individuals cultural point of view. Importantly, the opinion, judgment, or 
perspective has no moral authority in another culture.195 
 One of the debates concerning ethical relativism is that there is no determination on what 
constitutes universal moral judgments. In the FGC scholarship, however, it is argued that human 
rights, is one such judgment.196 On the other hand, some scholars describe that the meaning of 
human rights remains abstract and obscure.197 Nevertheless, what is important to determine is 
how cultural diversity assists in discerning what the model of care should be for women who 
choose FGC.   In considering care, ethical relativism offers valuable insight. In thinking about 
care, the value is in Macklin’s explanation about making moral judgment. Macklin argues, “if we 
begin with the assumption that making moral judgments of other people actions is a legitimate 
enterprise, then the chore is to justify such judgments by appealing to shared values.”198 Starting 
at this point offers Macklin, “allows for discerning the source of disagreement when it 
occurs.”199 Protecting human right, namely the autonomy of women to choose FGC can perhaps 
be embraced as a shared value. Concerning shared values, Kopelman offers that shared values 
and goals can be used to “assess whether FGC is more like respect or oppression, more like 
enhancement or diminishment of opportunity.”200  It is in light of the notion of shared values that 
respect for cultural diversity is realized and relevant for discerning a model of care for women 
experiencing FGC. 
 Related to sources of disagreements in making ethical judgments, Macklin identifies that 
the first disagreement concerns the facts about the situation under analysis, namely FGC. The 
ethical debate concerning FGC is associated with the health consequences of FGC surgeries. 
  
180 
 
Ethical debates most often count on the evaluation and consideration of the consequences of the 
action.201 For instance, opponents of FGC robustly contest the alleged health consequences 
linked to FGC. On the other hand, there are those who argue that the health consequences are 
rare, and the assessments of the consequences of FGC are untrue. For example, the Public Policy 
Advisory Committee on Female Surgeries in Africa writes, “mainstream reports and highly 
sensationalized complications linked to FGC surgeries are infrequent events and are the 
exception and not the rule.”202  
 The second disagreement regards the moral status of the object or individual key to the 
situation.203 It is important to note at this point that the idea of the moral status concerning FGC 
was more fully examined earlier in this dissertation. The third basis for disagreement occurs 
when values and priorities in a particular situation conflict or compete, also examined earlier in 
this dissertation.  What is noteworthy about these sources of disagreements, relative to women 
who choose FGC surgeries and are in need of care, is that ethical resolution in intercultural and 
transcultural contexts may or may not happen. However, the contribution that an ethical analysis 
can make is to identify the source of disagreements and determine where a solution is 
forthcoming.204 Relating to the sources of disagreements and discerning a model of care for 
women who choose FGC, the facts about the alleged health consequences must receive ongoing 
analysis.  
 In addition, since the ethical debate is dominated by the alleged health consequences, the 
medicalization approach becomes an approach that gives resolution. Ethically the approach 
supports the bioethical construct of autonomy and the global bioethical construct of cultural 
diversity, which demonstrates the recognition of cultural values and its application discussed in 
the next section.  In transcultural contexts, for instance, in Africa where FGC surgeries are most 
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prevalent, it is vital that the ethical viewpoint from “outsiders,” includes respect and acceptance 
of the values and beliefs within the cultural context of women who choose FGC. For example, 
outsiders or the “etic” perspective are those viewpoints from individuals who are not part of the 
FGC communities. This line of thinking denotes that the customs, beliefs, and values of other 
cultures, particularly FGC communities have meaning to the individuals who live in that cultural 
context. Within the context of care, especially for women who will choose FGC, respect for 
cultural diversity is promoted by insisting that cultural values and beliefs have deep significance 
and meaning to those who are in FGC contexts, and that cultural customs and traditions must be 
understood within the context of each culture.  
 One reality is that different cultures have dissimilar and diverse perspectives about what is 
right and wrong and what is good and bad. These differences are integral features of cultural 
diversity.205  In other words, whether an action is right or wrong depends on the moral norms of 
the society in which it is practiced and being judged.  
Interestingly, there are numerous accounts for ethical and moral relativity. One in particular is 
concerning. It is the application of ethical or moral relativism that denotes that ethical standards, 
morality, and positions can be considered right or wrong based solely on culture and therefore 
subject to a person's individual choice. What is concerning about this use of ethical relativity in 
this way is that moral disagreements about culture, its practice or traditions, do not come under 
ethical consideration which makes it difficult for ethical or moral relativism to be considered as 
an effective model for discerning what is right and what is wrong.206 What is concerning about 
ethical relativism particularly as it relates to FGC, is that some scholars assert that moral 
relativism makes the claim that it is morally neutral.207 A morally neutral position is not 
acceptable, particularly for women who choose FGC and is in need of redress. If not, atrocities 
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such as slavery, the holocaust, and Tuskegee for example would go ethically unchallenged. 
There are two moral versions for consideration, especially as they are concerned with discerning 
a model of care for women who undergo FGC surgeries. An implication specific to women who 
choose FGC surgery and in need of care is protection of their human rights, i.e., their autonomy. 
That is, if the standard for a health practitioner is morally neutrality then the principles under 
examination, i.e., respect for human vulnerability, non-maleficence and respect for autonomy 
would be debatable. 
According to Edmund Pellegrino, the strong version of ethical relativism determines that 
there is no set of universal moral norms that can be applied with any authority or legitimacy for 
every human being universally.208 The strong ethical relativism framework appears to be a closed 
framework. The closed frame fosters exclusivity in that the moral framework resides inside the 
confines of the culture and only that culture. A cultural framework that is closed inhibits any idea 
of a universal set of principles because there is no way to assess one set of principles against the 
other and no way to judge the moral status of culture.209 That is, whatever a culture or society 
accepts as its practices, for example FGC, is what determines its morals. With regard to FGC, 
this line of thinking is unacceptable. For example, for girls and women to undergo FGC 
involuntarily and against their will is unethical and violates their right to autonomy and self-
determination. Cultural practices must be able to stand up against rigorous moral scrutiny and 
ethical analysis. However, as mentioned earlier, the ethical analysis considers the values and 
beliefs within the culture in which the ethical analysis is taking place. All cultures are subject to 
ethical analysis. 
A weak form of moral relativism, which begins also with cultural diversity, involves the 
use of principles. An example perhaps is the use of bioethical and global bioethics principles 
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examined in this dissertation that include autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and respect 
for cultural diversity. Principles used in the weak form of moral relativism do not change.210 
Principles are the most basic and primary source for ascertaining what is good or bad, right or 
wrong. Therefore, they serve as the groundwork for the judgment of a culture.211 The weak form 
of moral relativism allows for diversity of practices and customs but the moral principles are 
static- they remain the same. According to Pellegrino, the more fragile form of relativism 
promotes meaning discourse within the same cultures and between different cultures. Since 
principles are foundational or fundamental to the more fragile form of moral relativism and allow 
for dialogue among and between different cultures, the weak form of ethical/moral relativism is a 
consideration and relative to what the model of care should be for women who autonomously 
choose FGC surgeries outside of FGC cultures.  
The relative aspects include the use of principles, as they are essential to discerning what 
is right and wrong, good or bad. The cultural diversity framework, applied to intra cultural and 
transcultural contexts, allows for respect for diversity of cultures. The weak version of 
ethical/moral relativism makes room for dialogue. This feature, allowing for conversation, is 
critical if cultures are going to attempt to understand and appreciate the difference in values, 
beliefs, and practices from a point of view that is less biased, hostile, and judgmental and is 
essential to care for women who undergo FGC surgery. Ethical relativism in this sense, for 
instance a weak form of moral relativism, assists in the application of cultural diversity to care.  
IV.  Applying Respect for Cultural Diversity to Care 
 The global bioethics principle of respect for cultural diversity is a framework and model of 
care for refugee women who choose to undergo FGC.  While the ethics of care is more fully 
examined in chapter seven, the ethics of care lends itself to a model of care that includes respect 
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for culture diversity.212 The ethics of care framework's underpinning is predicated on the grounds 
that there is moral significance of attending to and meeting the need of others in which we take 
responsibility, namely the health care practitioner providing care for women who undergo FGC 
surgery. That is, applying cultural diversity to the context of care.  It is in the context of care that 
the needs of the patient are realized and attended too. Since care is a relationship between the 
carer and the cared for, it is in the relationship that respect for cultural diversity is applied.  
 There is undeniable ethical significance to cultural diversity and care. Its significance lies 
in patient- centered care where the focus of care is on meeting the needs and preferences of the 
patient. In addition, when observing FGC through the lens of respect for cultural diversity FGC 
is not purely a destructive and superficial practice. Rather FGC is a traditional practice 
embedded in culture which has significance related to religious beliefs, values and ideals.213 
Respect for cultural diversity facilitates observing FGC within the context of culture where it 
finds it relevance.  Therefore, in applying respect for cultural diversity, cultural sensitivity and 
cultural competency are also included. The cultural sensitivity framework and approach assists in 
advancing the occurrence of cultural connectedness between the health practitioner and the 
patient who is in need of care. Respecting cultural diversity takes into account the plurality of 
values, beliefs, customs and traditions of those who seek care, particularly women who choose to 
undergo FGC surgeries. It is a way of recognizing the cultural difference instead of refusing the 
difference. 
 Recognizing and understanding choices and life intentions from the “emic” perspective of 
different cultures is critical in applying respect for cultural diversity to care. Thoughtful 
consideration and appreciation of the insider's or “emic” viewpoint is key. It is essential to the 
relationship between the health professional and the women who have chosen FGC. It is this 
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viewpoint that can assist with a more accurate understanding of FGC. On the other hand, the 
importance of applying respect for cultural diversity is also in understanding with the “etic” 
perspective, that is, the viewpoint that the health professional brings to care relationship. The etic 
or outsider view will assist the health practitioners in their biases and support dismantling them. 
Gaining an understanding and appreciation of values, beliefs and customs from the viewpoint of 
the patient as they voice them rather than a place of sameness can help the health professional to 
dismantle biases and prejudices. These prejudices have implications that can affect the patient-
health professional relationship, as these biases can facilitate the discrediting of the patient's 
autonomous choice.  
 Another aspect in applying respect for cultural diversity to care is in what Charles Taylor 
refers to as “recognition.”214 According to Taylor, there are two forms of public recognition, 
“weak” and “strong.” Weak recognition is a form of acceptance of all people. People are 
formally considered equal regardless of their cultural or other differences. Individuals of all 
cultures are equal under the law, however, this does not take into account the special features and 
needs of the culture.215 This endorsed and sanctioned form of recognition, if you will, is not 
enough to allow or support respect for individual differences. What the weak form of recognition 
does allow as it relates to differences, is a superficial recognition that has the potential to permit 
differences to be glossed over and ignored by the health practitioner, especially for women 
undergoing FGC.   
 As a result of this weakness, Taylor offers an alternative, strong recognition.216 Taylor 
explains that strong recognition means that all difference must be respected and accepted by 
society. It is important to say however that cultural customs and practices that are imposed 
against the individual’s desire, namely women who un-voluntarily undergo FGC, is 
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unacceptable. Respecting cultural diversity namely the variety found in culture customs, and 
practices of patients who are different is central to providing quality care. Respecting cultural 
diversity is undergirded by cultural competency and sensitivity toward the diversity in values, 
traditions and the beliefs of others. Since providing care takes place in relationship, which means 
taking responsibility to meet the needs of the patient, and then responsibility takes into account 
competency.217 In other words, there is a responsibility for the health care practitioner to be 
competent in the areas that affects the relationship between the health professional and the 
patient, precisely cultural competency.218 
 It is in the diversity of culture nestled in the dominant cultural construct under investigation 
that makes respect for cultural diversity a strong framework for discerning what the care should 
be for women who choose FGC. A sharpened sensitivity to culture and the right to embrace 
one’s culture will enable respect for differences and similarities in the health care context.  In so 
doing, care can be focused on the whole person who brings to the care relationship their values; 
beliefs, customs, and traditions that often inform their health care choice. In this way, the health 
professional can comprehend and appreciate the perspective of the patient as it relates to the 
choices made and the life intention of the patient, which facilitates the goal of care- to provide 
optimal care for all patients.219 
V. Conclusion 
 In the context of health care ethics, respect for cultural diversity is an ethical imperative.  
Respect for cultural diversity is an intimate feature of the patient-health care practitioner 
relationship, namely those patients who are refugee women choosing to undergo FGC surgery. 
Through the lens of cultural diversity, FGC is not merely a negative traditional custom worthy of 
ication. Rather it is a cultural practice that has relevance and meaning.220 The meaning found in 
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FGC is associated with identity, status and religion for example. The meaning and value is 
embedded in its cultural significance which has been transmitted from tribe to tribe, country to 
country, and generation to generation. Because FGC is a custom that has value and importance to 
the cultures engaged in the custom, cultural sensitivity and competence are necessary.  
 In the context of care, the importance of cultural diversity particularly when caring for 
women221experiencing FGC, lies in understanding the patient and the contextual influence at 
work in how she makes health care decisions. It is here that the cultural significance of FGC 
finds its worth in the care relationship and in constructing a model of care for women who 
choose FGC surgery. The social, societal, and the religious aspects associated with FGC are 
central to understanding a refugee woman living in a non-circumcising community requesting 
the surgery. The traditional custom is not merely an insignificant custom left behind from 
antiquity that has no worth or meaning. To communities who practice FGC, it is a deeply 
meaningful custom embraced by both current generations and future generations to come. 
 As FGC concerns care, respect for cultural diversity is critical to discerning a model of care 
for women who choose FGC surgery.  An additional feature of the principle is that respecting the 
diversity of values, beliefs, traditions, and lifestyles of the patient impacts the goal of care. To 
foster an outcome that positively affects the quality of life for the patient is in the hands of the 
health practitioner. Therefore, it is incumbent on the health professional to be culturally 
competent so that he/she has the ability to respond effectively and positively to the needs of the 
patient.222 Cultural diversity is promoted and realized by embracing the cultural values, 
traditions, and beliefs that have meaning for the patient, and by specifically understanding FGC 
within the context of culture. 
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Chapter 6: Respect for Human Vulnerability, Refugee Women and Care  
This chapter will argue that the concept of respect for human vulnerability should be regarded as 
a significant tool in framing an adequate model of care for refugee women who will choose to 
undergo FGC.  International Human Rights Law and the UNESCO Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights allow to connect the idea of human vulnerability to female refugees 
through its “ethically grounded” precept that asserts the inherent dignity and equality of all 
human persons.1 Scholarship on human vulnerability describes the concept as ambiguous and 
argues that it is applied in a myriad of ways; therefore, the notion of respect for human 
vulnerability needs further investigation and clarification.  Considering the weight that the notion 
has come to bear, especially in this dissertation, respect for human vulnerability is important to 
analyze.   
I.   Human Vulnerability 
A. Defining Human Vulnerability  
Scholars have offered a variety of definitions on the meaning of vulnerability. To affirm 
this assertion, the literature describes vulnerability as a notion that is unclear and ambiguous, 
especially because of the significance of the concept across disciplines.2 Respect for human 
vulnerability can be difficult to understand and needs further clarification so that a working 
definition can be engaged. While the notion of respect for human vulnerability does not appear in 
the four underpinnings that make up the western construct of bioethics, it is a feature of both 
global bioethics and the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. As it 
relates to bioethics, the concept of human vulnerability is found to be a most prominent feature 
in human research subject discourse with progress made toward health care ethics. According to 
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Henk ten Have, vulnerability is “no longer only relevant for medical research but also 
healthcare.3 
 According to the Oxford dictionary, “vulnerable” comes from the Latin term vulnerabilis, 
which means, “wounding,” and from the word “ability,” which means, “being able.” Essentially, 
at its roots, vulnerability means the ability to receive injury. In other words, vulnerability can be 
defined as the “susceptibility of being wounded.”4  A common thread used in explaining 
vulnerability is susceptibility to injury and harm: mentally, emotionally, spiritually, and 
physically. There exists a broad spectrum in the use of the term vulnerability.  It is a concept 
used across disciplines and in various areas of study.  In some disciplines, for example the 
concept is used to make special note or reference to people or populations who are exposed to 
particular “risks or high risks”5.  Health organizations for instance use the term vulnerable 
populations to refer to people and populations who are more susceptible to specific diseases or 
conditions more than others are.   
 The World Health Organization (WHO) uses the term vulnerability to describe threats to 
particular environments, for example in the context of climate change, nutrition, and disaster 
preparedness.6 Furthermore, WHO and other health care organizations and agencies employ the 
term to describe human health vulnerability and the vulnerability, for example, of human 
research subjects.  Environmentalists also use the term vulnerability.  Most often, they use the 
term to describe threats to particular environments.  Nevertheless, the current concept of 
vulnerability remains ambiguous no matter the frequency of its use. One scholar suggests, 
“vulnerability is a notion that is rather vague, especially considering the weight it has come to 
bear.7   
 The concept of vulnerability is often used in general terms without specific guidelines or a 
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framework for its application.  One author notes, “It is one of the least examined concepts in 
research ethics and fails to address less settled situations arising for the context in which 
contemporary research is conducted.”8 Vulnerability seems to mean something different for 
everyone. While some scholars, practitioners, researchers, clinicians, and authors find common 
ground on the ideas of wounds and injury, both associated with the term vulnerability, others 
propose distinct differences in their definitions of vulnerability.  Carol Levine, for example, 
includes in her definition of vulnerability “the concept of incapability,”9 a notion used in health 
care ethics to describe an individual’s inability to make medical decisions.10  She further 
discusses that vulnerability is associated with an individual’s ability to protect his or her own 
interests and explains “incapability of protecting one’s interest (health) exists because 
individuals have insufficient power, intellect, education, resources, strength, or other needs that 
attribute to protecting one’s own interest.”11  Similarly Barry Hoffmaster offers that vulnerability 
means, “that one is controlled by, rather than in control of the world and marks the limits of our 
individualism.”12 
Robert Goodin offers a more distinctive illustration of vulnerability by considering the 
concept of vulnerability as a “relational concept,”13 important in discerning a model of what care 
should be for women who choose FGC. The concept of vulnerability cannot be realized outside 
of relationships.  Whether the relationship is doctor/patient, clinician/client, researcher/subject, 
or the like, these linkages of individuals are relational.  To expand the relational concept 
described by Goodin, Tricha Shivas explains, “our understanding of relationships includes power 
dynamics and social and political circumstances.”14 The perspective offered by Goodin and 
Shivas can be applied to a diverse context, specifically FGC communities and women who 
choose FGC surgeries in non-FGC environments. Alexander Morawa’s investigates vulnerability 
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from the lens of international human rights.  Morawa asserts there are no definitive definitions 
for vulnerability or how it is used and no classifications that are useful in its application.15 Carol 
Levine, for instance, argues that the concept of vulnerability is “both too broad and too narrow to 
be valuable or helpful,16 making its application difficult.  
On the other hand, however, Maria Patrao Neves not only describes the relevance of the 
concept of vulnerability, she explains vulnerability as a principle and not only a concept. 
According to Neves, [Article 8]: Respect for Human Vulnerability and Personal Integrity, is 
included in the construct of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights. The Article describes the “principles that should be observed and also makes clear the 
obligation of ‘respect for human vulnerability and personal integrity.”17 The UNESCO 
Declaration develops a framework for vulnerability in which to observe the condition of FGC, 
particularly for women who choose the FGC surgery. In this construct, vulnerability is regarded 
as a human condition, characteristic of and intrinsic to the fragile state of being human, and 
therefore cannot be eliminated, requiring the care and responsibility of others.18  
Human beings are susceptible to being wounded. The Barcelona Declaration of 1998 
articulates that the notion of vulnerability encompasses both the finitude and the fragile nature of 
life. Further the Declaration explains that vulnerability is the object of a moral principle, which 
necessitates care for those who are in need.19 In addition, the Barcelona Declaration expresses 
that “the vulnerable are those whose autonomy, dignity, or integrity is capable of being 
threatened.”20 In discerning what the care should be for women experiencing FGC, the Barcelona 
Declaration offered and incorporated into the UNESCO Declaration has positive implications for 
care. One example of the positive implications of care is that the Barcelona Declaration, 1988 
specifically notes that vulnerability is applied to those who are prone to their autonomy being 
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refused. That is, for women who are requesting FGC in non-FGC communities such as the U.S., 
care requires sensitivity to her choice being disregarded. The concern is one articulated in 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation on autonomy.  
The framework for vulnerability articulated by the Declaration is linked to Robert 
Goodin’s expression of vulnerability in that he describes the principle as one that is relational. 
Another significant feature of the principle of vulnerability articulated by the Declaration is that 
vulnerability is tied to autonomy, a principle needed in establishing a model of care for women 
who choose FGC. Included also in the framework is morality, another feature in this dissertation 
as it relates to what decisions should be made on behalf of women choosing FGC who are in 
need of care. In other words, the moral judgment must be in harmony or agreement with 
autonomy.21 In constructing a working framework related to FGC, it is important to mention that, 
according to Jan Heige Solbakk, the Declaration operates from an anthropocentric idea of 
vulnerability in that the Declaration functions from the place of human life and human 
vulnerability rather than from the perspective of the fragility of life.22  Using the UNESCO 
framework for vulnerability assists in determining a model of care that focuses on human life 
and human vulnerability. It serves as an ethical anchor23 that allows for stability and guidance in 
a situation that might otherwise cause indecision about how to process with care.  Human life 
and vulnerability requires responsiveness, which takes place in the form of protection for those 
whose autonomy is capable of being impeded. In doing so, care works with the vulnerable 
among us, which can include populations of refugees, women, and children. 
B. Who are the vulnerable populations among us?  
According to some scholars, all human beings are vulnerable.24 The vulnerability scholarship 
illustrates that vulnerability is not only regarded as a concept applicable for individuals, rather 
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vulnerability applies to communities, families, and groups who are also vulnerable. 25 The 
application of vulnerability offered by UNESCO explains that there are certain circumstances, 
which render vulnerability. These examples include disease, disability, other personal conditions, 
environmental conditions, and limited resources.26 For the purposes of this dissertation, perhaps 
the category of other personal conditions is appropriate since the women in question are not 
research participants.  One of the criticisms offered in the scholarship on vulnerability has to do 
with categorization.27 For example, Morawa describes that there is an absence of a list and 
classification of individuals who can be classified as vulnerable.28  Morawa further explains the 
interrelatedness of the criteria for each classification.29  This interrelated nature of categories can 
be daunting in an attempt to assign vulnerability and the need for protection. An example of 
interrelatedness of classifications in defining those who are vulnerable will be described further 
when observing women and refuges examined below. 
 The list offered by Morawa is by no means exhaustive; however, it supports the claim that 
refugee women are deemed a vulnerable population and that employing respect for human 
vulnerability is critical in ethically examining FGC and in determining a sufficient model of care.  
A protocol for the use of assigning vulnerability includes the context of the individual or 
community at the time of application. For example, because of the diverse use of the term across 
disciplines, cultures, and fields of study, the term vulnerability will continue to be used, and its 
use will have difference meanings.  Jonathan Moreno expresses that the term vulnerability is not 
going away, and that the term is often used to make crucial decisions regarding the lives of 
individuals and populations30 particularly when the patient is unable to provide informed 
consent.  Since informed consent is typically used in health care settings, context is important to 
consider.  Employing the concept of vulnerability in this way is of the utmost importance.  
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However, the term reaches beyond the scope of informed consent.  Vulnerability is what it 
means to be human31 and has application in other venues and contexts. 
i. Refugees 
In its legal sense, the term refugee represents protection that may be granted to individuals who 
meet the definition of ‘refugee.’ Refugees are generally people outside of their country who are 
unable or unwilling to return home because they fear serious abuse and loss of life. The term 
refugee is a legal term and implies a legal status. The United Nations Human Rights Commission 
(UNHRC) defines a refugee as “someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because 
of persecution, war, violence, or a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.”32 A feature in what is 
included in determining refugee status is that refugees cannot return home. Not being able to 
return home is most likely due to fear of war, religious, ethnic, and tribal violence, which are 
also the leading causes of what forces refugees to leave their country. Refugees and the plight of 
refugees is rigorously examined in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. The purpose of highlighting the 
classification of refugees, specifically refugee women who live in non-FGC communities and 
chose FGC, is to highlight their vulnerability and their need for protection under the framework 
for vulnerability adopted by UNESCO [Article 8].  
 Since the traditional and cultural practice of FGC is extensive in Africa, it is prudent to 
mention the African context as it relates to refugee women and the communities of women and 
their families now living in the U.S.  In a recent publication authored by Alexandra Toppings, 
she mentions that FGC affects three times more women and girls in the U.S. than previously 
thought.33 While the article is aimed at eradication of the FGC, the information is critical to the 
reality of the practice in the U.S. For instance, Toppings notes “FGM is happening in New York, 
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and in Boston.” 34 The article is not clear about whether the women are refugees in the legal 
sense of the term or whether they are U.S. citizens; however, what is important is that these 
women are from contexts where FGC was/is part of their custom. 
 As refugee women relate to vulnerability, the idea of protection is a substantive theme in 
the scholarship on refugees35 and is a benefit of overwhelming concern to refugees and those 
who care for refugees. Refugees are vulnerable to a number of efforts that promote harm.36 For 
example, according to the UNHCR women are susceptible to sexual and gender based harm.37  
While all refugees are open to potential harm and abuses that includes human rights violations 
and various forms of violence, women remain particularly vulnerable. Women share the 
vulnerabilities that are experienced by all refugees. However, women and girls have special 
protection needs that reflect their gender. 
ii. Women 
       According to Morawa, women are included in list of those who are vulnerable. Further, 
Morawa explains that the Convention of Belem do Para asserts that states will take special 
consideration of the vulnerability of women to violence by reason, their race or ethnic 
background, or their status of refugees or displaced peoples. Consideration should also be given 
in the same way to women who are exposed and in danger of being violated, minors, persons 
who are disabled, elderly, socio-economically disadvantaged, and those who are affected by war 
or deprived of freedom.38 Importantly however, as it concerns women and the designation of 
vulnerability assigned, Ruth Macklin offers it is mistake to construe women in general as a class 
of human beings who are vulnerable, even though in parts of the world women are powerless and 
lack self- determination with both family and cultural context.39 This is true in cultural contexts 
where they are powerless on a number of fronts, including the classifications noted earlier in this 
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section. On the subject of context, Ruth Macklin further describes that in the context of 
multinational regions, that throughout whole countries and certain cultures the powerlessness and 
oppression of women make them vulnerable.40   
 Interestingly, Ruth Macklin offers the concept of being medically disadvantaged. This 
classification is relevant to women and girls who undergo FGC, either with permission or 
without. Often in FGC communities what is lacking is the adequate medical attention needed to 
perform the surgery and to care for women and girls after the surgery. Therefore, special 
attention must be given to those who are medically disadvantaged, particularly women in both 
FGC contexts and non-FGC contexts who undergo FGC surgeries. Women are deemed a 
vulnerable population and employing respect for human vulnerability is critical in ethically 
examining FGC and determining a sufficient model of care.  
 Relating to gender and vulnerability the specific need for protection consists of protection 
from sexual and physical abuse, exploration that leads to human trafficking, and protection from 
gender discrimination which makes being female a barrier to accessing goods and services. One 
theme that is central to gender specific protection is protection from FGC, which is described as 
violence against women and a violation of human rights. It is noteworthy to mention that gender 
violence is one viewpoint that opponents of FGC use as a platform to eradicate FGC. In light of 
cultural diversity, however, and the situation where refugee women who now live in non-FGC 
contexts make the decision to undergo FGC surgery, the cultural custom is not gender violence; 
rather it is an autonomous choice. Vulnerability relates to refugee women and FGC in protecting 
their right to self-determination. 
 On the other hand, however, protection must be given to those women who do not wish to 
undergo FGC. Women, namely refugee women who involuntarily experience FGC are in need of 
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protection. Undergoing FGC without consent or permission threatens both the autonomy and the 
dignity of women.41 Involuntary FGC is not only unethical, involuntary FGC is characterized as 
one form of gender-based violence. For instance the UNHCR considers “FGM to be a form of 
gender-based violence.”42 In addition, the FGC literature describes FGM not only as a violent act 
against women it is described as a form of persecution, especially in human rights law. The 
UNHCR deems all forms and types of FGC a violation of the human rights of women and girls. 
Furthermore, FGC is established by the UNHCR as a well-founded fear of persecution for both 
women and their daughters.  The literature reflects that there is both the fear of being forced to 
undergo the procedure and the fear of facing persecution for refusing to force their daughters to 
have the surgery. Because sexually based gender violence can occur at any time during the stages 
of the refugee cycle, the idea of “human security raises the awareness of threats against the 
physical security of refugee women,”43 and in need of protection. 
 Women from ethnic minority groups are also classified as those who are deemed 
vulnerable and in need of protection. Ethnicity and FGC as it concerns vulnerability is discussed 
later in this chapter. Feminist writers and scholars use the term vulnerability, but have not 
examined the concept in depth.  It seems, generally, that vulnerability is associated with and is 
central to women.44 Hollander asserts that gender, danger, and violence are integral to being 
female and argues that vulnerability to violence is “a core component to femininity but not 
masculinity.”45  Leading scholars would agree with the claim that violence is related however, 
would disagree with the generality made.  Macklin contends, “it is a mistake to construe women 
in general as a class of human beings who are vulnerable.”46  However, Macklin makes a more 
specific claim concerning women and vulnerability.   
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From a global and international perspective, women in many parts of the world “lack 
power and self-determination within family and in the culture and are subjected to physical harm 
and psychological degradation.”47  Vulnerability with respect to physical and psychological harm 
is more specific and pervasive in the lives of women.48  Nancy Jecker asserts that feminists call 
for attention to vulnerability in a myriad of ways in which unconscious racism, sexism, 
homophobia, ageism, and ableism pervade our judgments about people and policies.”49  
Additionally, Jecker illustrates how fear, exclusion, and discrimination are pervasive in the 
context of research design and to change the tenure of research these issues must be addressed.50  
Feminist scholars uniquely take into account the social structures that cause vulnerability.  
For example, sociologists frame the family as a natural universal social structure.51 However, in 
the context of family, it is customary for the structure of a family to be patriarchal in nature and 
deemed as a private component of society.  In describing the ethics of care, Virginia Held writes 
that the family structure is a “private sphere beyond politics which government, based on 
consent, should not intrude.”52  Concerning social structures and vulnerability, when describing 
health choices particularly related to women, Lisa Cahill describes contextual considerations 
which include addressing the social barriers and constructs that do not afford women equality but 
fosters their oppression,53 and poverty, therefore, leaving them powerless, and contributing to 
their vulnerability.  
Feminist researchers and writers have illustrated how the obvious power structures are 
prevalent and prevail in society, for instance, financial and profit making structures, government 
structures and “the cultural power of men.”54 These structures have constructed “private”55 
spaces for woman and children that are not in the best interest of woman.  These constructed 
spaces leave them open to harm and injury,56 therefore rendering them vulnerable.  It is in light 
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of injury and harm, (vulnerability) that Jocelyn Hollander argues that a “vulnerability to 
violence”57 is centrally associated with being a woman, an idea in which feminist scholars based 
on the scholarship would agree.58  The concept of vulnerability asks us to respond, however 
scholars propose that responsiveness suggests obligation and responsibility.59   
Ruth Macklin echoes this sentiment of the vulnerability of refugee women. She explains 
that in the context of multinational regions, throughout whole countries and certain cultures the 
powerlessness and oppression of women make them vulnerable.60  As discussed, women make 
up approximately half of the world's refugee population. Refugee women are particularly 
vulnerable, and the circumstances of their refugee status put refugee women at risk for harm and 
injury and in need of protection. The impact that violence has on women refugees is devastating. 
The pervasiveness of sexual and physical violence, and human rights abuse among refugee 
women, and girls, is staggering.61 For instance, one such example of violence experienced by 
women fleeing persecution is gender-based violence. Gender-based violence takes the form of, 
“domestic violence, trafficking, enforced prostitution, and sexual violence.”62 These forms of 
cruelty and aggression include “rape, forced impregnation, forced abortion, sexual slavery, and 
the intentional spread of sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS.”63 
Refugees, especially those who have insufficient means, are not only susceptible to 
external threats, for example the oppressive governing social order, but they are open to internal 
threats, as well. External threats are vulnerabilities that threaten one’s opportunity to participate 
in the mainstream of life. One example of an external threat that impedes the ability for refugee 
women to participate in life in a holistic way is not having “equal access to food, water, and non-
food items.”64 Not having access is a fundamental issue facing refugee and displaced women and 
their children. Internal threats are features of individuals such as age, sex, and genetics which can 
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influence a biological response to not having access to food and non food items”65 An 
opportunity to participate in the mainstream of life rather than on the margins should be afforded 
not only for refugee women. Seemingly, to provide both refugee women with access to 
assistance and support is what morality might recommend. Affording access is what it means to 
be treated with dignity.  
iii. Children 
       Children, namely girls, are not the focus of this dissertation. However, it is noteworthy to 
mention the vulnerability of girls as it concerns FGC surgery. Its importance lies in the unethical 
nature of undergoing FGC against the will of young girls or the guidance of the parents, which 
places girls in very vulnerable circumstances. In a recent study done by the Center for Disease 
Control, the report describes that the number of women and girls living with or at risk from FGM 
in the US has increased from an estimated 168,000 to 513,000.66 These figures reveal that the 
number of girls, under the age of 18 years old, and at risk for undergoing FGC, has quadrupled, 
since the last prevalence study was done in 1977.67  
As it concerns vulnerability, girls who are at risk to undergo FGC against their will are 
deemed vulnerable. Girls from infancy to five years old, depending upon the cultural region are 
the primary focus of FGC.”68 The girls who are forced to undergo FGC are powerless and do not 
have the ability to protect themselves or their own self -interest. It is here that Carol Levine’s 
argument that the inability and powerlessness of protecting one's interest because individuals 
have inadequate means to do so,69 is understood and brought to fruition.  
Bringing the vulnerability to fruition then requires a response examined later in this 
chapter, the response to protect. Children, it is argued, are not capable of giving consent. In the 
FGC research according to Efua Dorkenoo, young girls often experience FGC without the 
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consent of their parents.70 Because of the embedded cultural tradition it is a “given” if you will, 
that the FGC traditional custom is followed. Interestingly, the scholarship on FGC describes that 
there are instances, however, where mothers have taken their girls to other countries so that they 
are not forced to undergo the surgery. The involuntary status of FGC fosters the asylum status 
highlighted in the literature, where families will flee their home to protect their daughters from 
FGC.71 Certainly, forcing a child and her parents to undergo the surgery is a violation of the 
human rights of the child, a prominent theme in the FGC debate.  
The debate argues that children’s rights include their right not to have surgical changes to 
their bodies before they are old enough to decide for themselves.72 Doing so is, without question, 
a violation of the bodily integrity of girls and women who do not choose FGC. Therefore, human 
rights law grants children special protection.73 In addition, the role of the parent in giving 
guidance and direction in the exercise of children’s rights must be valued and followed.74 It is 
important to very briefly mention some of the alleged negative circumstance of FGC and young 
girls. As it relates to health, girls suffer some of the same consequences that the research reports 
women experience. For instance, Loretta Kopelman found that “psychological disturbances in 
girls due to circumcision are not uncommon.”75  The research explains that women, who had the 
surgery as children, and against their will, have psychological effects that can be characterized as 
anger and trauma.76 The psychological effects have the ability to follow a person through her 
life, thus affecting girls who are circumcised into adulthood.  
On the other hand, however, some of the research reflects the embedded nature of FGC 
as it relates to girls and is part of a wider cultural ethos connected to reasons for FGC. An 
example of theses reasons is illustrated in field studies conducted that highlight the two main 
reasons attributed to circumcising women and girls.  The first reason noted is that the practice 
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reduces a women’s sexual desire, thus preserving the young girl's virginity until she is married. 
In Africa, a circumcised female is a prerequisite for marriage. The girls in parts of Africa are 
married quite young. Marriage is associated with security and security with the economic nature 
of the traditional practice. Other scholarship on FGC offers that circumcising girls is used as a 
way of protecting young girls against sexual violence such as rape, a reason that is not often fully 
investigated.  
 The second reason for circumcision given by the women who were interviewed is that 
circumcision works as a “catalyst to speed up a woman’s full achievement of her femininity.”77 
Concerning femininity, in some parts of Africa, the belief system in some FGC communities is 
one that suggests that the clitoris grows to the size of a male organ, an idea associated with the 
notion of aesthetics. One reason for the aesthetic viewpoint is that some women in Africa 
describe their genitalia as ugly and look similar to that of men. It is reported that having genital 
modification (FGC) not only beautifies the genitalia to look more feminine, but also purifies the 
female genitalia.  The idea of purity, a rationale also linked to the surgery, is that the larger the 
clitoris the “dirtier and uglier it is. The state of being uncircumcised was termed dirty and had to 
be washed away.”78 It is important to note here that both purity and aesthetics are reasons 
attributed historically to circumcision. In the historical literature on the FGC, hygienics is 
associated with the idea of purity, a notion embedded in the early Egyptian culture. Hygienics 
and purity are named as primary reasons for circumcision of both males and female. While most 
women agree that the procedure is painful, they embrace circumcision as a rite of passage to 
being a woman. Circumcision then serves as a way for women to embrace their femininity while 
beautifying the genitalia, a third reason for circumcision highlighted also by WHO. It is 
important to mention in this regard young girls, Nevertheless as it relates to the vulnerability of 
  
211 
 
young girls, the reasons for FGC continue to put young girls in the position of vulnerability and 
must be protected as articulated by human rights law. 
II. Applying the Concept of Vulnerability to FGC via Human Rights Law 
The focus of this section will demonstrate how the concept of human vulnerability is applied to 
women who have experienced FGC, particularly through their ethnicity, gender, liberty, and 
health status. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights offers a 
framework for applying human rights to FGC. [Article 3] includes human dignity as foundational 
to human rights and cannot be separated from the human condition79. As it relates to bioethics, 
the principle of respect for human dignity holds a place of prominence in the framework.80 
Human rights also can provide needed guidance on challenging issues related to health that effect 
people and populations of people globally.81  
 Not only does respect for human dignity endow centrality and status, according to Roberto 
Andorno, respect for human dignity is a requirement and is characterized as the “cardinal 
principle of legal norms relating to bioethics.”82  That is, respect for human dignity is first. 
Andorno further clarifies that human dignity is not defined by the Declaration in a clear and 
precise way, but it would be a mistake to see the concept as only a rhetorical strategy.83 Bioethics 
works from the framework that individuals have an inherent and immeasurable worth.  Each 
human life is regarded as valuable and worthy of respect. Since health care ethics is related to 
rights and privileges of all human beings, for example the right to life, and the right to choose, 
then respect for human dignity is paramount.84 Human dignity is the foundation on which human 
rights are based.85   Respect for human vulnerability cannot be separated from human dignity.86 
Michael Kottow writes, “a discussion of vulnerability must necessarily also refer to integrity and 
dignity, all of which are intertwined in an intimate and inextricable way.”87  
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Regarding human dignity and human rights, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
affirms the dignity of all human beings and recognizes the “inherent dignity of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, and is at the heart 
of most international human rights instruments.”88 Especially those instruments banning torture, 
slavery, inhumane or degrading treatments, and discrimination of sorts.”89  However, concerning 
bioethics, the concept of dignity is not enough to solve the problems raised in the context of 
health care ethics.90 In order for dignity to be applicable to the context of the patient and health 
care practitioner relationship, the notion of dignity needs substantive and tangible concepts.91 
Some of these concepts include, for instance, ‘informed consent,’ ‘confidentiality,’ and self-
determination found in other bioethical frameworks for example, the Georgetown construct of 
bioethics and the Global bioethics structure, which are framed and articulated by employing the 
term “rights.”92  For example, the principle of autonomy (self determination) as it is articulated 
by the Declaration [Article 10] affirms that respect for autonomy conveys the liberty of persons 
to make decisions without prejudice and is based on the fundamental principle of human 
dignity.93 Women from FGC communities who live in non-FGC contexts are afforded the right 
then to participate in the cultural life of their community, even outside of the context of the 
cultural community, that is, to choose FGC as a life plan without prejudice and bias. To affirm 
the right to involvement [Article 27] inspires the right to participate in the cultural life of a 
community.94 Because of the cultural differences between FGC communities, and non-FGC 
contexts, particularly the U.S., and US healthcare systems, refugee women who choose FGC 
surgeries are susceptible to having both their dignity and autonomy threatened. One example of 
how women can be vulnerable is by having the request for care refused.     
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Important for the investigation of women under examination, this dissertation not only 
focuses on the individual dimension of dignity which is the foundation of all rights and freedoms 
and leads to self-determination, Andorno explains that the category of dignity called the 
collective sense of human dignity95 is just as important. The collective sense goes beyond 
individual focus on human dignity and refers to the value of humanity as a whole and includes 
future generations.96 The inclusion of future generations its critical to the application of human 
dignity and vulnerability. Its significance lies in the protection of future generations of women 
from FGC communities who will choose to undergo FGG. Since human dignity and human 
rights afford promotion of self-determination, future generations of women are susceptible to 
their dignity and autonomy being threatened which leaves them open to what Florence Luna 
describes as a layer of vulnerability.97 
As it relates to layers of vulnerability, Luna explains that the concept of vulnerability is a 
concept of relation.98 In other words there is a relationship between the person under 
consideration and the context or life situation. It is this particular context or circumstance that 
renders a person vulnerable.99 An example of the context and the circumstances that render 
refugee women vulnerable is FGC surgery in a non-FGC context. There are different layers of 
vulnerability for women who chose FGC in non-FGC communities, specifically health care 
systems. The use of vulnerability from the layered approach may also prove useful in the context 
of clinical care for women who choose FGC surgery in an effort to remove and eliminate layers 
of vulnerability for women who choose FGC in environments where the request for care is not 
normative.  
Human rights law affords the expression of individuals to engage in their specific culture 
and cultural customs as long as the cultural traditions do not violate the human rights of all 
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people as guaranteed under the international human rights law.100 The international human rights 
system fosters and promotes a wide rage of rights 101 as investigated earlier in this dissertation. 
As the international human rights law concerns FGC and vulnerability, and discerns what the 
care should be for refugee women who are in need of care, consideration must be given to the 
following categories. They include gender, liberty status, health, and ethnicity.102  
i.  Gender and FGC 
 Gender is foundational to the FGC debate. The history of circumcision began with the 
circumcision of men and boys. While the exact date of its beginnings is unknown, historians 
suspect that FGC predates Christianity and Islam.103 The postmark of the FGC into mainstream 
debates however took place in the early 1960’s. Gender played and continues to have a 
prominent role in the debate.  What is interesting, however, in the consideration of gender as it 
relates to vulnerability and human rights, are the differences made in the observation concerning 
female and male circumcision. Nevertheless, circumcisions without consent, clearly seems to 
violate the bodily integrity of both males and females. Yet, when observing male circumcision, 
there is an inclination not to accept the resemblances of the surgery and the relationship between 
the two surgeries. Gruenbaum adds, not only is there a tendency to dismiss male circumcision 
because it seems far less harmful than FGC, FGC is seen as a “different phenomenon despite the 
strong similarities in reasons given for performing both male and female circumcision.”104 
Further, Gruenbaum explains that male circumcision is deemed a Jewish tradition paralleling the 
custom of entering a Jewish male child into the covenant of Abraham on the one hand and on the 
other the crippling and painful mutilation practiced by societies in which women are sexually 
and socially oppressed.105 One practice is a sacred rite, the other a “morally reprehensible 
behavior.”106  
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 As it relates to vulnerability and international human rights, male circumcision and FGC 
are a violation of the right to freedom, bodily integrity, and autonomy if done involuntarily and 
without consent. The violation of these rights, according to the Declaration, renders men, and 
women, girls and boys vulnerable when placed in a situation where they cannot choose. For both 
genders undergoing circumcision without consent threatens dignity, self-determination, and 
bodily integrity, make them vulnerable and in need of protection. It is noteworthy that men are 
not a category on lists to denote vulnerability. In an analysis by Morawa on categories and 
criterion, the group in which boys are assigned is age, which then allows them to meet the 
vulnerability criterion.   
 Relating to the women, the international human rights law framework designates women as 
a vulnerable population.  As mentioned in the earlier section on women, there are scholars who 
are against using gender as a category of women as vulnerable populations.107 Rendering women 
for the sake of gender does not make women vulnerable. Most lists, however, designate women 
as a vulnerable population. What is troubling about classifications and groups, especially as it 
relates to refugee women who choose FGC surgery in a non-FGC context, is that there is no 
consideration given to eradicating the vulnerability. Another concern with classification or 
categories is the potential to foster discrimination against certain groups.  Prejudice and bias 
promotes discrimination, which serves a barrier to health care, particularly in environments 
where there is a lack of cultural competency and cultural sensitivity.  According to international 
human rights law, members of minority groups, for instance- racial, ethnic, and religious groups 
are entitled to special protection to be free from discrimination. To discriminate against 
individuals, and in particular refugee women who choose FGC, or other groups of people (who 
are in need of health care) is an act contrary to respect for human dignity and is deemed 
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repugnant to many principles in the Declaration.108 The act of discrimination is in conflict with 
the promotion of respect for human dignity and human rights of all people and in fact is “the 
primary reason for the document.”109 It is in light of discrimination that protection is needed. The 
most profound justification for human rights is human dignity and is the fundamental reason 
behind the prohibition of discriminatory practices.110 It is important to mention that 
discrimination and non-stigmatization is one of global bioethics principles outlined in the 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights [Article 11]111. While discrimination and 
non-stigmatization are not areas of exploration in this dissertation, the principles are unearthed 
here and warrant further investigation with respect to women who choose FGC and the 
vulnerability.   
 Carol Levine argues that the use of vulnerability fosters stereotyping.112 Labeling women 
as vulnerable, according to Florence Luna, suggests that the assignment of vulnerability is a 
permanent condition that persists without resolution.113  As vulnerability relates to care, 
permanency is not in line with the goal of care.  Since the goal of medical care is to improve the 
quality of life for patients by facilitating positive outcomes, there is a need for the practical 
application of respect for vulnerability via the human rights framework. Using this framework 
will assist to avoid the permanency of a vulnerable situation. In the practical application of 
vulnerability via human rights, the health professional is responding to vulnerability in a way 
that affirms the inherent dignity of the individual thus paying attention to conditions that would 
not support the patient to thrive. An additional reason to work with vulnerability via the human 
dignity construct is the principle of human dignity holds a prominent place in the Declaration 
and in intergovernmental instruments concerned with bioethics.114 Andorno refers to the 
principle of human dignity as “the shaping principle.”115 Therefore the Declaration assigns the 
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first place to the principle of human dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms [Article 
3.1] in which all other principles are constructed. Therefore, because of the weightiness of the 
principle of human dignity when considering what the care should be for refugee women who 
choose FGC, vulnerability must be responded to in light of respect for human dignity, human 
rights, and fundamental freedoms.   
 A positive outcome to consider is to eliminate the vulnerability, a theme explained by 
Luna.116An example of eliminating the vulnerability is observing women and FGC. For instance, 
while gender identity and gender definition are not at time highlighted to the degree of strong 
consideration, regarding reasons for FGC, gender identity is one reason for FGC surgery. What 
is important here concerning vulnerability and human rights law is that for women considering 
FGC, due to gender definition, gender identity becomes what Luna refers to as a particular layer 
of vulnerability. The layer identified is the situation or the circumstance that renders women who 
choose, FGC surgery vulnerable.117 Human rights law affords refugee women choosing FGC 
surgeries, bodily integrity, autonomy and a right to participate in their culture. In other words, 
women who make this decision are free to do so.  
ii. Liberty Status and FGC 
 Liberty status is one of the criteria to meet the terms of vulnerability. Alexander H. E. 
Morawa explains that while the list offered on criteria for vulnerability is not exhaustive, liberty 
status is a general category that characterizes the criteria concerning how the vulnerable can be 
separated out.118  Morawa names refugees as vulnerable. Liberty status refers to the right and the 
power of an individual to act, think, and believe or be able express oneself in the way he or she 
chooses.  In addition to the right to think and believe as wished, liberty is the condition of being 
physically and legally free.  The refugee status in some cases impedes the notion of liberty.   
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In the set of circumstances framing refugees and specifically refugee women, because of 
their refugee status, they are under terrifying threat and are susceptible to arduous injury if they 
are not in a safe environment, such as the U.S. However, specifically for the refugee women 
observed in this dissertation, the threat is related to health care. That is, the threat of not being 
able to make autonomous decisions about health decisions, namely to undergo FGC surgery 
without interference in a harmful for adverse way. The interference in this circumstance is the 
refusal to honor the wishes of the patient, which threatens the ability to choose.   
Related to the context of women refugees, Carol Levine’s definition of vulnerability is 
useful. What makes her definition of vulnerability useful, especially as the concept relates to 
FGC who choose FGC is Levine, includes in her definition of vulnerability the concept of 
incapability,119 a notion used in health care ethics to describe an individual’s inability to make 
medical decisions.120 An inability and incapability to exert agency renders one vulnerable and 
susceptible to injury and harm. Levin further discusses that vulnerability is associated with an 
individual’s ability to protect his or her own interests and explains “incapability of protecting 
ones interest is because individuals have insufficient power, intellect, education, resources, 
strength, or other needs that attribute to protecting one’s own interest.”121  Levine’s description 
of vulnerability accurately describes the circumstance of refugee women in a non- FGC 
environment with regard to their liberty status. For women in the environmental context where 
FGC is countercultural, perhaps the education, namely health care literacy makes women 
choosing FGC surgery vulnerable. That is, refugee women may not know they have the right to 
self-determination. This lack of knowledge may serve as a barrier to protecting their self-interest, 
liberty and health status. 
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iii.  Health Status and FGC 
 Health status is another criteria needed to meet the terms of vulnerability. Alexander H. E. 
Morawa explains, one of the fiercest topics in the debate concerning FGC is the discussion on 
alleged health consequences and potential health risks caused by FGC. The health consequences 
associated with the practice are at the heart of the debate and present serious ethical dilemmas 
and queries. There are supposed physical and psychological complications associated with FGC. 
Concerning the health consequences, there are both short term and long-term complications. It is 
important to note here that some of the research on FGC does not reflect which type of 
circumcision is associated with specific health risks and implications rather the literature reflects 
that there is “possible” immediate complications for all types of circumcision.122  
 The alleged short-term consequences that are linked to the FGC include severe pain, 
bleeding, and shock from the intense pain. Other assumed and potential negative health 
implications are risks of infection such as HIV/AIDS, and hepatitis B and C. The presumed long-
term complications are associated more often with Type III, infibulation.123These suspected 
long-term outcomes include difficulty with menstrual flow and urination, both of which can 
cause infection. Untreated urinary tract infections can “ascend to the kidneys and bladder, 
potentially causes renal failure septicemia which can lead to death.”124 _In some cases, Type III, 
or infibulation, can cause damage to the sexual organs. Other complications attributed to the 
surgery and particularly Type III are obstetrical complications, infertility, and cysts, among other 
things.125 Many of the health risks that are associated with the surgeries result from unhygienic 
circumstances. One example of the unhygienic conditions described in the scholarship, is the use 
of dirty instruments. Often the unsterilized instruments are knives, razor blades, scissors, thorns, 
and pieces of glass. Some of the scholarship on health risks especially characterizes “un-
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sterilized” to mean that instruments are used over and over again, without sterilization, a reason 
attributed to the high rate infection.126 Other reasons associated with the health risks are the 
dismal lack of medical treatment as well as the substandard medical treatment and care available 
to women after the surgery is performed. Health professionals are often unfamiliar and do not 
have the knowledge necessary to treat and care for women who undergo the surgery. The health 
professional’s unfamiliarity and lack of knowledge concerning FGC can also render women 
vulnerable. In other words, the unintended incompetency of the health practitioner makes for a 
situation that causes women experiencing FGC undue susceptibility to possible harm. It is the 
moral notion of competence that must be present when considering what the care for women 
experiencing FGC should be, a theme investigated further in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
 It is critical to note that the literature on the health consequences of FGC is abundant, and 
some scholars argue that it is one-sided and unbalanced, as there are opposing points of view. 
The conflicting viewpoint of the literature concerning health consequences is that the volume of 
literature on FGC and the health consequences is a dramatization of western views regarding 
FGC that frames the health consequences in a dismal light. This is not to say that women 
undergoing the procedure have not experienced negative health consequences, as is the risk with 
all surgeries. The potential outcomes must be examined in a larger context that includes an 
ethical analysis of care for women who undergo the surgeries. Nevertheless, it is the 
circumstances related to health that makes women considering FGC vulnerable. Other matters 
related to health status described in the scholarship refer specifically to emotional, psychological, 
and spiritual harm. For some women, the effects of the psychological trauma include a breech of 
trust and confidence in family and community.127  Other women, depending on their age, have a 
different experience.  
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 When exploring the health status of women who experience FGC surgeries, not all women 
share the same experiences. Ylva Hernlund explains, concerning psychological trauma, that the 
psychological impact and well being of women who have undergone FGC requires more 
research.128  It is important to note that the some of FGC literature that describes the 
psychological and the emotional effects of FGC are associated largely  with young girls and not 
with women who whose life plan is to have the surgery. Regarding other situations related to 
health status mentioned above, there is little research found in the scholarship on the emotional, 
and spiritual harms of FGC to women experiencing it.  The highlighted health effects are namely 
the potential physical health consequences of FGC. Under international human rights law health, 
individuals are entitled to enjoy the “highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.”129 For refugee women who choose or who have experienced FGC surgery, health status 
is a particular situation in which vulnerability is rendered.130 However, if the surgery is done in a 
way that is medicalized the refugee woman choosing FGC is not vulnerable as it relates to the 
relation of her health status.  
iv. Ethnicity and FGC 
A distinguishing factor that is related to refugee women, vulnerability and FGC is the idea of 
ethnicity. Cultural Diversity, Chapter 5 of this dissertation, unearths in systematic and full detail 
how ethnicity is intimately linked to women who will experience FGC.  The chapter makes the 
connection of how ethnicity is closely associated to cultural diversity. For the purposes of this 
section, it is important to mention that ethnicity is one criterion for the assignment of 
vulnerability. Ethnicity is defined as a group or population of people whose members identify 
with each other and share cultural traits and shared history. The feature of ethnicity is critical to 
the entire discussion on FGC and especially to vulnerability and human rights, as the focus on 
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the women in question are from different ethnic groups. According to Morawa, ethnicity is one 
of the criteria that help meet the terms of vulnerability. He further illustrates that ethnicity is at 
times co-mingled with residency status, minorities and indigenous people, and rural 
populations131 These minority groups include racial, ethnic, religious, or linguistic aspects, and 
are entitled to special protection to enable them to maintain their culture free from 
discrimination. [Article 2] further explains, “persons belonging to ethnic groups…have the right 
to enjoy their own culture.”132 The Declaration, in addition, articulates that the exercise of the 
rights described in [Article 2] “shall not prejudice the enjoyment by all person of universally 
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms [Article 8(2)].”133  
 Individual cultures that have characteristics that distinguish themselves as spiritual, 
material, intellectual, or emotional features are what make up culture.134  These aspects of 
individual cultures also embrace and embody “lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, 
traditions, and beliefs,”135 all features of FGC communities. Human rights are rights that apply to 
all people. Furthermore the Declaration notes that, since human rights are universal, they 
“guarantee the particular expression of individual cultures.”136 As it relates to the vulnerability of 
people who are of a different ethnicity, care demonstrated includes protection of the right to 
practice traditional customs.  
III. Applying Human Vulnerability and Voluntariness 
A. Voluntariness and vulnerability 
The principle of vulnerability is related to that of voluntariness. In exploring the relationship 
between vulnerability and voluntariness three concepts present relative to refugee women and 
FGC. The first is the current involuntary nature of the practice and the second is the voluntary 
decision made by women to undergo FGC. The third concept used is social vulnerability. An 
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exploration of social vulnerability helps to determine how to apply vulnerability to refugee 
women who undergo the surgery either involuntarily or voluntarily. The topic of human 
vulnerability is connected to autonomy since an autonomous individual can choose or volunteer 
for what happens to her body.  
 Refugee women are women who now live in a different cultural context that affords 
choice, not only for themselves, but also for their daughters. These women voluntarily undergo 
the procedure. Applying vulnerability to women who voluntarily choose to undergo the surgery 
necessitates further study. Investigating the vulnerability of future generations also requires 
examination. Completing the analysis of vulnerability will help to determine the vulnerability of 
these groups of women and assist in establishing what care should be. The concept of 
voluntariness has become an important feature in bioethics137 and is one basic dimensions of the 
concept of autonomy. It is employed as the second element of informed consent and third of 
three conditions of autonomous action.138 Voluntariness as it relates to the individual receiving 
care must be in a position to have the power to choose without outside control or coercion. 
Additionally, voluntariness is the ability of the individual to determine the desired intention 
without being under the controlling interference of another person, illness, or disorder that can 
diminish voluntariness. An example of diminished voluntariness is a person who is mentally ill 
and unable to volunteer. Mental illness can interrupt an individual from autonomous choice and 
intention.  
Voluntariness is a concept salient to the notion of care, particularly when applying the 
concept to the autonomous decision of those whose healthcare decisions and intentions may not 
be a normative one. The idea of voluntariness is particularly relevant to refugee women who live 
in cultures where FGC is not part of the established norm and who will voluntarily undergo the 
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procedure. Chapter one of this dissertation established that for women to undergo FGC surgery 
involuntarily is ethically unacceptable. One the other hand, however, the scholarship on FGC 
makes clear that there are women who embrace the surgery and who voluntarily undergo the 
medical intervention.139 Since the surgery is historically a cultural tradition that is transmitted 
from one generation to another, one ethnic group and community to another, it is probable that 
there will be future generations of women who will also embrace their cultural tradition and will 
voluntarily undergo the surgery. The concept of voluntariness is useful in this context of care.  
 The notion of voluntariness describes acting in accord with one’s intention. When 
employed by an autonomous individual, the person has a desire for a specific action and is 
compelled to do so without being swayed, or under authority or domination of another.140 It is 
important to mention, although not addressed in this dissertation that the mental or emotional 
condition is at times a concern and must be taken unto consideration. One of the queries raised 
when considering the notion of voluntariness concerns the intentions of the individuals 
influenced by outside factors. For instance, are the intentions or life plans of an individual 
influenced by one’s values and beliefs or are they influenced by the interdependence of 
community and culture in which we live?  
 In the previous section of this chapter, the notion of influence was examined, and it was 
determined that there are factors that influence an individual's autonomous intention. These 
factors include the social determinants such as gender, ethnicity, and the values and beliefs of the 
community in which an individual belongs. With respect to voluntariness, being influenced by 
non-coercive values and actions does not mean that the life plan or the intention of the individual 
is not an autonomous one. The investigation on influence further determined that the decision of 
the individual should not diminish and that care must be taken to respect the autonomous wishes 
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of the individual. Furthermore, due to the nature of the social-self and the social-identity of 
individuals, it is impossible for there not to be a certain measure of influence.  
 Nevertheless, it is crucial to note, that according to the scholarship on the voluntariness in 
the bioethics literature, influences are both negative and/or positive.141 Negative influences are 
associated with coercion, also a subject often reflected in the discourse on FGC. Coercion is 
most often associated with a threat. It is at this juncture that the influence becomes a negative 
one. Importantly, the idea of coercion exists only when the “intended and credible threat 
displaces a person’s self-directed course of action.”142 When the displacement of an individual’s 
intention occurs the decision is no longer an autonomous one.  
 This understanding of negative influences and coercion is particularly useful when it is 
associated with the autonomous choices of individuals especially as it relates to ethical decision 
making about one's healthcare, namely FGC. When the autonomous decision is made that is not 
normative, meaning the decision does not attend to the standards of the established norm, the 
idea of influence is assumed to be a negative one. An example is the controlling influences of the 
healthcare practitioner who is providing care for a refugee woman who chooses to undergo FGC.  
Not only is there an opportunity for disagreement between the patient and the healthcare 
professional, there is also a chance for the health practitioner to refuse to provide care. The 
refusal becomes a controlling influence that can thwart the voluntary intention of the woman 
receiving care. The notion of controlling influences is a theme that draws robust debate in the 
scholarship on FGC. However a noteworthy observation is made in exploring the scholarship on 
FGC. The focal point of controlling influences is often toward the community ethos in which 
women who have experienced FGC live, rather than negative influence of the practitioner.   
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 Since the notion of voluntariness is associated with autonomy and providing care, the 
health practitioner must take precautions not to become the actor in the controlling influence. To 
facilitate voluntariness, positive influences are employed, namely the type of treatment and 
actions that foster autonomous decision making. Therefore, when providing care the healthcare 
professional must be careful not to impose on one’s self directed intention. As it relates to future 
generations of young women who will have intentions to undergo FGC surgery the idea of 
voluntariness is critical when applying it to care of women who will choose. Women who 
voluntarily undergo FGC, that is, women who make an autonomous decision to choose remain 
susceptible to vulnerability. Illustrated by Ganguli-Mitra and Biller-Andorno, vulnerability is 
inherent to various clinical contexts.143 What is of paramount importance is the vulnerability of 
women who choose to undergo FGC, or who have already experienced the surgery, are in need 
of care, and they have inadequate or no access to health care.144 Not having access to healthcare 
or having substandard healthcare is commonplace for immigrants, certain marginalized groups, 
and ethnic minorities.145 While healthcare is intimately linked to patient preferences, having no 
access or inadequate access deems women experiencing FGC vulnerable.   
As it involves healthcare, inadequate and substandard care can be deemed in two ways, 
concerning FGC, vulnerability, and women. One-way the inefficiencies of care is realized is the 
lack of cultural competence, education and sensitivity regarding FGC. The lack of cultural 
aptitude includes, but are not limited too both the emic and etic perspectives of the women and 
the cultural context in which FGC occupies. In addition, education about the practice is critical 
and is also absent. What is also necessary to the idea of voluntariness and vulnerability is the 
moral precept of responsiveness.146 Responsiveness requires that health care practitioners remain 
vigilant to the possibilities where vulnerabilities might arise. Another way that inadequacies and 
  
227 
 
substandard care  can be understood is contextual. Context has to do with the conditions in which 
FGC surgeries are performed. An example of conditions is the unsanitary condition of the 
instruments used and the environmental circumstances. Because women from FGC communities 
embrace their cultural traditions, namely FGC, the decision to undergo FGC surgery is 
meaningful and important, and therefore the practice is imminent. As it further relates to 
conditions, some of the research regarding FGC in the U.S. reports that FGC is affecting more 
women in the U.S. than once predicted.147 Further, women from FGC communities are 
undergoing the surgery here in the U.S. often underground, perhaps by medically untrained 
individuals and environments that are not conducive to perform medical surgery. Living in a 
cultural context that is a non-FGC one with the desire and plan to undergo the surgery, whether it 
is in the healthcare system or underground, leaves women who voluntarily choose FGC open to 
harm that may otherwise be negated if the intervention was done within the confines of the 
healthcare system.  
B. Involuntariness and Vulnerability 
A major feature of FGC and the human rights debate is the involuntary status in which FGC is 
often performed.  In the investigation of FGC, presented in Chapter 4, it is argued that women 
who undergo FGC involuntarily are women who live in a cultural context in which they are 
accustomed to FGC. There are women who experienced the surgery as girls and did so 
involuntarily and without giving consent. The involuntary designation, that is, women who are 
exposed to the involuntary nature in which FGC is currently practiced, is ethically unacceptable 
and leaves women open to injury. According to the Declaration, which articulates those who are 
vulnerable are individuals, particularly women, whose autonomy, dignity, or integrity are 
capable of being threatened. Articulated by the Barcelona Declaration it is the danger of losing 
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self-determination that renders an individual vulnerable. Additionally, respect for autonomy 
includes expressing appreciation for the right of individuals to embrace views, intentions, to 
make decisions and to live based on their values and belief. Respect for autonomy then is to 
respect the individual autonomy of others and to acknowledge their right to embrace views, 
beliefs, and values of their choosing. Further, employing respect for autonomy means that 
respect is given to the right of individuals to make decisions, life plans, and takes action based on 
their beliefs and values, even when there is disagreement between the beliefs and practices of a 
culture. 
 Therefore, generally understood autonomy or individual autonomy refers to the ability to 
be one's own person, to live one's life according to the values, views, and beliefs embraced by 
the individual, without manipulative, oppressive, or external forces. In addition, autonomy is 
considered to be a principle derived from and based on a more fundamental principle, human 
dignity. Since human dignity is a fundamental principle, autonomy finds its justification and 
validation for its use in the human dignity and human rights framework.148 A denial of the self-
determination that fosters involuntary action, namely FGC surgeries against a woman’s will, is at 
the very heart of vulnerability.  It is noteworthy, however, to mention here that vulnerability is 
not only associated with the autonomous right of the individual, it is at times a characteristic of 
the individual and the context in which the individual is situated.149 Concerning human rights 
and human dignity, because human rights are articulated as a principle that shapes how care is 
employed, the involuntary status of women having FGC against their will deems them 
vulnerable. The reason for the vulnerability assignment for women who do not choose is the lack 
of voluntariness.150  
 The lack of voluntariness related to FGC is what is referred to in the literature as the 
  
229 
 
grossest form of physical harm.151 In addition, it is the involuntarily nature of FGC that is 
regarded as torture, gender violence, and a violation of the human rights for women and girls 
who are forced to undergo the cultural traditional practice.152 The involuntary position of women 
who do not choose FGC surgery, namely when the surgery is performed without consent, is 
unethical. The unethical designation is clear, as the forced FGC is abuse of ones right to freedom 
and right to choose. In light of forced FGC, or as it is referred to in the literature, “forced 
excision,”153 places women in harms way and leaves them susceptible to vulnerability and in a 
position where there is lack of autonomy. It is the involuntary position of women in FGC 
communities who decide against FGC and are forced to do it regardless of their wishes that make 
women vulnerable. However, it is this particular group of women rather than all women who are 
vulnerable.  
 While there are a host of rights violations as it relates to the involuntary position of refugee 
women who choose not to undergo FGC surgery, and are forced against their wishes it is here 
that the matter of gender oppression is realized. Certainty women who involuntarily undergo 
FGC are powerless and therefore vulnerable.154 It is interesting to note Ruth Macklin argues, 
women who undergo FGC against their will are not powerless in a way where more powerful 
individuals are benefiting from actions performed on the individuals who have less power, for 
example research subjects, although the issue of power is often part of the FGC discourse. 
Macklin further explains that no one benefits from the alleged harms inflicted on women who do 
not choose.155 The powerlessness is realized in the act of taking away the agency of women to 
exercise her self-determination on her own behalf.  Taking away the autonomous choice makes 
individuals, particularly women, powerless and vulnerable and in need of care, that is protection. 
Intriguingly, however, refugee women who experience FGC are often part of a larger social 
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group. Therefore refugee women, in non-FGC communities have layers of vulnerability, not only 
individual vulnerability but also in the context of social vulnerability.   
C.  Social Vulnerability 
 Social vulnerability is a concept used most often in research ethics. Social vulnerability in 
the health care and research contexts has to do with the participants who are part of the social 
group that is undervalued.156  That is, those specific groups for which society has insufficient 
regard or values below their worth as human beings. For example refugee women who choose 
FGC surgery and are in need of care, some minorities groups, mentally ill etc.  Social 
vulnerability also refers to the inability of communities and societies to survive the adverse 
effects and influences of stressors to which they are exposed, for example war, natural disasters, 
etc.  Social vulnerability suggests, in addition, the resilience of communities when confronted by 
external stresses on human health and stressors such as natural or human-caused disasters.157 
More specifically social vulnerability is present when there are impacts due in part to 
characteristics inherent in the social interactions and systems of cultural values, namely FGC. 
According to Kipnis, social vulnerability is a function of the social perception of certain types of 
groups, which includes stereotyping and can lead to discrimination. This kind of negative 
perception devalues the members of the particular group and includes the interests, values, or 
their contributions to society.158 A more comprehensive examination of the strong social 
characteristics, i.e., ethnicity, gender, cultural values, and social status associated with FGC is 
observed in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. What is important to note here is how social 
vulnerability as it is connected to health care refers to groups of people who are regarded to have 
diminished worth and therefore deemed vulnerable.  
 Concerning vulnerability, Mitra and Andorno argue, regarding undervalued social groups, 
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that the designation of vulnerability is not intrinsic to the individual, rather it is the overlay of 
characteristics of the person, and the environment in which she find herself.159 Luna proposes a 
similar approach to vulnerability as it relates to the specific situation and circumstance in which 
a person is involved. She refers to vulnerability as a principle that is observed in relation to a 
situational context where there are layers of vulnerability.160 It is the “ particular situation that 
renders someone vulnerable.”161  
 The traditional practice of FGC is firmly established within the context of culture and 
ethnicity of social groups; both are intimately linked to what may constitute as an undervalued 
social group. Since the notion of an undervalued social group is subjective in nature, for the work 
of this dissertation undervalued is to mean insufficient regard for other. While diminishing the 
value and worth of other can be characterized as an abuse toward other and an infringement of 
the human dignity and human rights framework, the  
lack of regard is associated with the individual characteristics of other address by Luna.162 
Refugee women who live in a non-FGC context bring with them their values and theirs beliefs 
and are different that the US value and cultural ethos.  
Luna refers to vulnerability as a concept that is acquired. In addition, Luna describes that there 
are layers of vulnerability163. She also argues that vulnerability is not constant, that once the 
reason for the vulnerability is addressed, the patient (or research subject) is no longer vulnerable. 
However, if the characteristics of the individual are part of the make up of the person in question, 
for example refugee women whose choice to honor their cultural tradition, values, beliefs, 
namely their “own characteristics” then the rendered vulnerability cannot be lifted. An example 
of vulnerability that is not persistent is a refugee woman who now lives in a non-FGC cultural 
context and voluntarily undergoes FGC surgery; once the situation is resolved the woman is no 
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longer vulnerable.164  
 The acquired layer of vulnerability rendered changes according to Luna if the woman’s 
situation changes. Perhaps it is one layer of vulnerability that is removed because, according to 
Kipnis, it is belonging to an undervalued social group that renders a person vulnerable.165  In 
other words, if a group of people who are diminished in value because they are part of a 
particular group, for instance, women who choose to undergo FGC in non-FGC contexts, the 
layer of vulnerability seems to be one that cannot dissipate. It is part of the characteristic of the 
person. Perhaps it is not the ethnicity or cultural values and beliefs in which they receive 
insufficient regard, it is the discrimination that makes the vulnerable and susceptible open to 
harm and abuse. It is critical to note here that in his approach to vulnerability Kipnis is 
specifically talking about the context of research. Even so, whether it is the relationship with the 
participant and the investigator, or the patient and the healthcare practitioner vulnerability, is a 
noteworthy consideration.  
 One example of the harm employed is discrimination that is realized in the 
patient/healthcare practitioner relationship when the goal is not quality of life for the patient via 
her autonomous choice. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, discrimination is a violation of 
human dignity and human rights therefore the principle of vulnerability must be rendered. In 
thinking about what the care should be for this particular group of women, vulnerability is a 
useful concept. Concerning vulnerability, for women who choose to undergo FGC, the principle 
of vulnerability makes clear the need for a watchful eye for the different kinds of vulnerability166 
and the obligation to protect.  
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IV. Applying Vulnerability and Care to FGC 
A. A responsibility to protect 
In the discourse on human vulnerability, the concept of protection is a predominant theme.  In 
fact, as demonstrated in the Barcelona Declaration, vulnerability is the object of a moral 
principle requiring care for the vulnerable. As vulnerability relates to care for those who are 
vulnerable one way to realized care is through the responsiveness. The examination in this 
section will not only investigate the concept of protection and vulnerability, but also explore 
whether the idea of protection can be realized in lessening the harm that is associated with FGC 
in its current context, which is ethically problematic.  Additionally, scholars have argued that the 
idea of protection is not only for “all people living today, but it refers a chain of generations who 
will collectively form one community whether living now or in the future.”167 Future 
generations, particularly women who will choose to undergo FGC, are a feature of this 
dissertation.  The notion of protection and vulnerability has implications for the model of care for 
this specific population and will be further examined in Chapter 7.  
The concept of vulnerability asks us to respond. In responding to vulnerability, the action 
carried is to protect. Michael Kottow explains that human vulnerability “requires active 
protection from negative forces and prevention of harm.”168 Some scholars argue that 
responsiveness suggests obligation and responsibility.  While the notions of obligation, 
responsiveness, and responsibility are not the primary focus of this dissertation, the literature 
demonstrates that responsiveness is a compelling concept, in constructing approaches adaptable 
universally which respond to vulnerable populations.  Robert Goodin argues there is a social 
responsibility to respond to those who are vulnerable.169  To advance the idea of responsibility 
and respond to those who are vulnerable, Daniel Engster writes, “the moral obligation to meet 
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others’ claims for caring thus rests upon the intuitive idea that human life and basic well being 
are valuable and should be supported.  
Our unavoidable dependency combined with the value we place on our lives thus 
commits us to caring for others in need.”170  Related to the inescapable dependency of human 
beings is an additional understanding of responsibility and vulnerability. Hen ten Have explains, 
there is an “ethical responsibility between human beings.”171 The responsibility is due to our 
fundamental interconnectedness as human beings.172 That is, the moral obligation to take action 
towards other is not from a place of rationality or reasonableness, rather action is from a place of 
our common humanity.173  Conversely, Joan Tronto cautions that vulnerability has serious 
implications, most specifically, that vulnerability contradicts the illusion that we always, at all 
times have self-determination and equality, an idea that warrants further exploration as applied to 
vulnerable populations.  To ignore the issues that accompany autonomy, reliance, and unequal 
power distribution is disconcerting 174 particularly as it relates to persons who are without basic 
needs for survival and therefore, are suffering.  
Robert Goodin assists in the effort of re-conceptualizing vulnerability by making clear 
that there is a moral responsibility to protect those who are “susceptible to injury or wounded-
ness either figuratively or literally”175 The concept of protection is a broad term and encompasses 
diverse meaning depending upon the context in which the word is used. In its most literal sense 
protection is a term employed to mean a person or thing that prevents someone or something 
from suffering harm or injury. Protection is a legal term and refers to the legal or other formal 
measures intended to preserve civil liberties, and rights. It includes a document guaranteeing 
immunity from harm to the person specified in it. Concerning human rights, we have determined 
that protection, a right to protection, is fundamental to human rights. This protection is facilitated 
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by the state for the security of all people. While the US constitution guarantees protection, 
Helton notes that there are several treaties that extend protection to refugees, including those 
seeking asylum. For example, the interest for the right to protection is clearly reflected in the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.176 There is a 
specific document however on the protection of refugee women. According to the UNHCR’s 
Guidelines On the Protection of Refugee Women, protection for refugee women is at the heart of 
the responsibility that the international community bears towards refugees.177 The document 
acknowledges that most of the world's refugees are women and children and further explains that 
female refugees are particularly vulnerable to physical violence, sexual abuse, and 
discrimination.”178  
 The concentration of this dissertation is on refugee women who are living in the U.S., 
specifically in need of care, concerning the choice to undergo FGC surgery. Therefore, the 
emphasis is on discrimination as it relates to protection, a theme illuminated throughout this 
chapter. What is important about the guidelines offered in the UNHCR is refugee women are 
deemed a group who are especially deprived, rendering them vulnerable to actions that leave 
them susceptible to situations and the contextual features that can cause a nonphysical form of 
injury, namely discrimination in a health care environment. It is important to note here that all 
human beings are vulnerable to discrimination. However those who have a different ethnicity, 
the elderly, those who are disabled or gay are at greater risk.179  Therefore, the specific action 
that threatens refugee women who choose FGC surgery, who are in need of care, is the 
protection that safeguards their right to choose without interference. According to the Guidelines 
on the Protection of Refugee Women, women who are refugees are victims or are potential 
victims of human rights abuses,180 namely their autonomy and dignity are in danger of being 
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abused. What I mean by abused is refugee women who choose FGC surgery in a non FGC 
environment may be manipulated into making a different decision or denied the care that 
represents the patient's quality of life decision based on her personal autonomy, verses the 
preferences of the observer, i.e., the healthcare practitioner.  Protection, in this sense, is to 
preserve and strengthen the right to choose. Because FGC is associated with culture, religious 
beliefs, and traditions, it is noteworthy to emphasize that the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights affords the right of people to participate in their culture, as discussed in Chapter 5 on 
Cultural Diversity. That is, the right to culture is a human right. In addition to the right to 
participate in culture, the right to self-determination, there is a right to be protected against 
discrimination.  
At the core of protection is responsibility. Described by the Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights [Article 8] the Declaration addresses the principle of human 
vulnerability and human integrity and further explains that individuals and groups of special 
vulnerability should be protected. That is, there is a responsibility to protect. Protection as related 
to health care ethics is realized in two ways; it includes research ethics and the clinical care. In 
the context of this dissertation clinical care is emphasized. Protection is not defining the needs of 
those who are deemed vulnerable.181 Rather, protection is employing safeguards necessary to 
meet the requirements of ethical conduct.182 Ethical conduct has to do with the framework of 
bioethics, which serves as an ethical construct in which the actions and behaviors of health 
practitioner are guided. The Georgetown bioethical framework includes autonomy, beneficence, 
non-maleficence, and justice. On the other hand, the global bioethical framework is made fifteen 
principles, which include the principle of vulnerability and integrity. Therefore, the ethical 
conduct is not only a guide rather it includes a demonstration and reflection of the principles in 
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the relationship between the patient, particularly women who choose FGC and the health 
practitioner.  
Vulnerability requires care. Vulnerability is the intention, if you will, of rendering 
particular individuals and groups of people vulnerable.183  The designation of the principle of 
vulnerability makes clear that there is a moral obligation to act. Vulnerability signals that there is 
an opportunity for the human rights, dignity, and integrity of individuals and populations of 
people to be thwarted. The moral obligation to act can be characterized as responsiveness.  Joan 
Tronto describes responsiveness as a moral quality that arises out of care.184 Not only does 
responsiveness occur as a result of care, Tronto further explains that, by its very character, care 
involves responding to situations and circumstances of vulnerability.185  As it relates to 
vulnerability and protection, an understanding of the layered approach argued by Luna, helps to 
call attention to the importance of observing the relationship between specific groups of people 
and particular individuals, and certain situations and contexts.186 For example, care involves 
having an awareness and watchful eye on particular groups of people, namely refugee women 
who choose FGC in non-FGC contexts, specifically non-FGC health care contexts where the 
competency about FGC is insufficient.  Protection for those who are rendered vulnerable is 
realized in the context of care. 
B.    Human Vulnerability and Care 
 The principle of respect for vulnerability is an important framework in constructing a 
model of care for refugee women who choose to undergo FGC and are in need of care.  
A common thread in the dialogue on human vulnerability is the susceptibility to injury and harm 
and the need for protection. Harm and injury can be physical and nonphysical. Injury can include 
mental, emotional, and spiritual harm which can render individuals vulnerable and in need of 
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care. Requiring care as it is related to refugee women who will choose to undergo FGC surgery 
goes beyond the confines of physical care in the healthcare enterprise. This is not to say that 
FGC is not associated with health consequences, and that those who experience the surgery are 
not in need of care- they are. However, as it relates to the specific situations associated with 
human beings, which some argue makes every person vulnerable,187 there are situations that 
render individuals in danger of having their autonomy threatened. Another condition that renders 
women vulnerable is discrimination. Since vulnerability can present in different ways, the scope 
of care is specific to the situation that renders individuals vulnerable, that is refugee women who 
are living in non-FGC environment and choose to undergo the surgery and are in need of care. 
Care for this specific group of women is found within the confines of protection for their 
situation, namely to safeguard against the threat of discrimination, and the danger of their 
autonomy and dignity unrealized. Limited capacity to understand their right to self-
determination, specifically in the context of healthcare decisions is also a consideration. 
 The vulnerability of the other imposes certain moral obligations on us, according to 
Ganguli-Mitra and Biller-Andorno, that is, a moral obligation to protect the vulnerable other.188 
However, before there is a moral duty to protect human vulnerability must be respected.189 That 
is, to consider the fragility of the human condition. Similarly, the underpinnings of the ethics of 
care framework, examined more fully in Chapter 7, is established on the grounds that there is 
compelling moral significance of attending to and meeting the need of others in which we take 
responsibility,190 namely the health care practitioner providing care for women who undergo 
FGC surgery. It is in the context of care that the vulnerabilities and needs of the patient are 
realized and attended too. Since care is a relationship between the carer and the cared for, it is in 
the relationship that the principle of vulnerability is applied. It has been established that 
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responsiveness is connected to care. In the relationship between the health practitioner and the 
patient, responsiveness necessitates that the health professional is attentive and aware of the 
possibilities for abuse that arise with those who are vulnerable. In fact, it is the obligation of the 
health care practitioner to do so.  The development of a capacity for responsiveness by the health 
care professional is an important moral quality in caring.191 Its importance lies in understanding 
the needs of other, protecting the autonomy and dignity of women who choose to undergo FGC 
surgery, and the attentiveness of the health practitioner to be aware of potential abuses that arise 
in caring for specific vulnerable peoples and populations.  
  In connecting care to the principle of vulnerability, the concept of attentiveness is 
necessary if care is to be realized. According to Tronto, attentiveness is one of the ethical 
elements of care.192 While the ethics of care is more fully examined in Chapter 7, it is important 
to mention here as attentiveness presupposes responsiveness.193 It is noteworthy to mention 
because in caring for the vulnerable, particularly women who undergo FGC surgery, an 
attentiveness and awareness to their contextual features can produce opportunities for 
vulnerability. That is, conditions where women who choose FGC surgery’s autonomy or dignity 
are in danger of being jeopardized, or discriminated against because of their ethnicity. By no 
means are these the only places of vulnerability for women experiencing FGC. For example, 
Carol Levine illustrates that some persons may be incapable of protecting their own interests 
because they may have insufficient education or resources among attributes that could be barriers 
to them protecting their own interests.194 Certainly, a refugee woman living in a different cultural 
environment may not have health care literacy that allows her to protect her health care interests, 
namely the right to choose her own direction for care.   
 Attentiveness allows for the health practitioner to be concerned with the needs of the 
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patient. According to Tronto, if the health care professional is not attentive, that is, ignoring the 
needs of the patient, then, the practice is one of an unethical nature.195 
In other words, there are ethical implications of caring for those who are vulnerable, particularly 
as it relates to human rights and women who choose to undergo FGC in a context where this 
choice is not normative. What I mean by ethical implications is that the results of care are not 
beneficial to the patient, and the care given should not be inconsistent with the health care ethics 
framework found in both the Georgetown construct and the global bioethics frameworks. For 
example, one ethical implication of not recognizing the potential for vulnerability is receiving  
biased, and judgmental responses, or care that is not culturally competent or knowledgeable 
about FGC.  
 The bioethical frameworks demand a moral obligation to behave in a manner that benefits 
the patient and ethically performs the work of care. To not do so is what Tronto refers to as a 
“moral failing.”196 According to the Barcelona Declaration, care is central to the expression of 
vulnerability. In other words, “vulnerability is the object of a moral principle requiring care for 
the vulnerable.”197 Vulnerability and care cannot be separated. Therefore, as it relates to care, 
vulnerability requires a response to act. The attentiveness required assists the health professional 
to be keenly aware of potential human rights dangers in the context of care.  There is a sense of 
responsibility to do so, especially as it relates to protecting those who are deemed vulnerable in 
health care situations. Robert E. Goodin argues that we bear special responsibility for protecting 
those who are vulnerable.198 However, Tronto cautions that care does not mean that the carer 
assumes that they can define the needs of the vulnerable.199 This seemingly paternalistic method 
of care usurps the autonomy of the patient. At times the dangers that are faced by the patient are 
at the hand of the carer, protection for women who choose FGC surgeries. The protection 
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necessary is one that safeguards against their autonomy or dignity being threatened.200 This 
shows the influence that human vulnerability has on constructing a model of care for not only 
women who choose FGC surgery, but also for those experiencing all of the consequences of the 
surgery.  
 One of the influences of the principle of human vulnerability is that it elicits action on 
behalf of the vulnerable. Women undergoing FGC require attentiveness and responses that do 
not impedes the benefits afforded to those who are in our care. For patients to not benefit from 
care is counterproductive to the goals of medicine, and renders care that is ineffective and 
insufficient. The principle of vulnerability gives rise to a level of attentiveness that may not 
otherwise be present, i.e., to protect those who are in our care. Explained earlier in this chapter, 
care is by its very nature responding to situations and circumstances of vulnerability.201  
 There is undeniable ethical significance of the principle of vulnerability and care. The 
significance lies in the moral responsibility to attend to the needs of particular other for whom 
we take responsibility.202 According to Virginia Held, in order for persons to thrive, their 
flourishing hinges on the care that those who need care receive. Human flourishing can be 
associated with quality of life, especially for women who choose FGC. Since quality of life is 
based on the ethics of personal autonomy, which means people make decisions and express their 
own judgment concerning the quality of their own lives,203 protecting the vulnerable, namely 
women experience FGC is being attentive and responsive to possibilities of actions that threaten 
the dignity and autonomy of the patient.  
V.   Conclusion 
 The concept of respect for human vulnerability is regarded as a significant principle in 
discerning an adequate model of care for refugee women who will choose to undergo FGC. The 
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significance of the principle of respect for vulnerability lie in the Universal Declaration of 
Bioethics and Human Rights assigns first place to the principle of respect for human dignity, 
human rights, and fundamental freedoms.204 In other words, all of bioethics, including notions of 
care, begins with respect for human vulnerability. Considering the concept of the principle of 
vulnerability allows for the ethically grounded standard to illuminate the inherent dignity and 
equality of all human persons, especially women who chose to undergo FGC.  In doing so, a 
determination can be made concerning the reality of the vulnerabilities women experiencing 
FGC in a non- FGC context who are in need of care. One of these realities includes 
discrimination.   
 The idea of vulnerability is a daunting subject.  It is daunting because the discourse 
concerning vulnerability suggests that all of humanity is vulnerable to some degree regardless of 
the context. More specifically, vulnerability refers to those individuals whose autonomy, dignity 
or integrity are in danger of being ignored, abused, or unrealized.  Vulnerability denotes 
powerlessness, upstages our affair with self-reliance and self-sufficiency, and illuminates our 
reliance, a reality not easily embraced.  
 The principle of respect for human vulnerability is a relational concept and is realized in 
the context of relationship, namely between the patient and the health practitioner. [Article 8] of 
the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights make clear that when 
caring for other, respect for vulnerability and personal integrity must be observed. In addition, 
the principle of respect for human vulnerability allows for guidance in a situation that might 
otherwise cause indecision about how to proceed with care. The principle of respect for human 
vulnerability compels us to respond. In fact, respect for vulnerability makes clear there is an 
obligation to respond.  That is, there is a moral responsibility and obligation to protect.205 
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Vulnerability as illuminated asks us to take action. 
Refugee women experiencing FGC in non-FGC contexts are prone to specific 
vulnerabilities highlighted earlier in this chapter. They are specific because the particular women 
observed belong to groups that are often deemed vulnerable- namely women with different 
ethnicities and socioeconomic levels. Layers of vulnerability emphasize the importance of 
paying attention for opportunities where the vulnerabilities of the cared for are exasperated rather 
than put an end. In practice, the response is action. The action realized is in protecting the 
autonomous decisions that bear witness to the quality of life decision of the patient who chooses 
to undergo FGC. The principle of respect for vulnerability emphasizes the need for attentiveness 
and responsiveness for those whom we take responsibility. The ethics of care advances the 
notion that there is a course of action within the context of the relationship between the health 
professional and the patient.  The outcome of attentiveness and responsiveness is protection. The 
ethics of care asserts that there is a moral importance to responding to and meeting the need of  
the other and in discerning what is morally best, namely protection. In light of the principle of 
respect for human vulnerability, which hinges on human dignity and rights and freedoms, the 
ethics of care affirms our moral responsibility to protect those who are deemed vulnerable.  It 
also obligates us to protect those who are incapable of taking action that fosters quality of care 
for the patient, especially for refugee women who choose FGC surgeries.   
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Chapter 7: A New Model of Care  
 Care ethics is a theory that receives, at times, controversial attention.  This concluding 
chapter is first an examination of the scholarship on care and a report on the findings.  
Specifically, this chapter will focus its attention on what the new model of care should be for 
women who choose to undergo FGC. The chapter will report the outcomes from the analysis of 
earlier chapters, as the ideas and principles examined are key in constructing a new model of 
care. The results of the inquiry on care theory will help to construct a new model of care that will 
make positive steps toward the overall health and care of the patient, since the patients, 
specifically refugee women who will choose to undergo FGC, are in need of help. Drawing on 
their mutual focus on relationships that are not equal and dependent; and the attention given to 
attempting to understand “what morality would recommend, and what is morally best for us to 
do,”1 the ethics of care and the theoretical-juridical and expressive-collaborative models have 
implications for discerning the ethical dilemmas that are present in the health practitioner-patient 
relationship. The implications are framed and contextualized to develop a model of care.  
I. Defining Care 
 Care theory is a dominant feature in health care. At a very basic level, care is relational. 
That is, care is first and foremost a relationship between individuals.2 On the one hand, there is 
an individual who needs care and support from another individual, and on the other hand, there is 
a person who gives care.3 This relationship is called the activity of care.4 Although there are a 
host of different scenarios that make up the context of relationships- for example, family 
members and friends- for the purposes of this dissertation, when referring to care and the care 
relationship, the main actors are the patient and the health practitioner, specifically, women who 
choose to undergo FGC surgery and their health care practitioners. When speaking about the 
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relationship of care, Ruud ter Meulen explains, people offer help and care because they can 
identify with what it is like to be in the position of needing support.5 They are concerned about 
the needs of those who are sick and those who are in need.   
             The findings from the analysis on care show that when the word care is used, it is 
understood that the expression describes the interrelatedness and the “daily affirmations of 
connection.”6 For example, many individuals use the language, to take good care. Virginia Held 
explains that the phrase is used to mean a multiplicity of things, however when expressed with 
feeling, as sometimes it is not, it means to stay out of harm's way, or “I care what happens to you 
so take care of yourself.”7Care is expressed as a term of affection, used when someone has been 
sick or when persons are bereaved. Others use care to express a need to be watchful or prudent. 
Held argues that the expression is very different than the work and tasks of care. Taking care of a 
person for whom there is responsibility, who is dependent or needs care, is a fundamental 
component of care. 
 The practice of care is an activity. The distinction is between care as the activity of taking 
care of someone and the mere “caring about” of how we feel about certain issues.8 While there 
are many nuances and difficulties with the distinctions of care, many scholars agree that what is 
relevant to the ethics of care is the activity involved for caring for those for whom we have 
responsibility. The practice of care extends beyond “warm fuzzies” and lip service to the energy 
and engagement between persons.9 Joan Tronto and Bernice Fisher describe care as a variety of 
activities that include “everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that 
we can live in it as well as possible.”10  Tronto further explains that the world referred to in her 
description of care goes beyond the relationship of care between two people. The world, notes 
Tronto, “includes our bodies, ourselves and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave 
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in a complex and life sustaining web.”11 It is in Tronto’s illustration of care that care is holistic. 
That is, care involves every dimension of life. It is through the existence of individuals in the 
world that people live and seek to thrive.  
 Another finding garnered in the exploration of care is that it manifests itself differently 
according to the diversity of individuals and groups. Therefore, in defining care, an important 
feature is meeting the needs of individuals in relation to their particular circumstances and 
wishes.12 This also suggests that care must make room for diversity of cultures. In other words, 
the care relationship must allow for a diversity of values, customs, and beliefs that impact the 
care relationship. Care then includes meeting the need of the patient based on the situation that 
brings her to the care relationship, which is comprised of understanding the contextual features 
of the person in need. An illustration of this situation can be found in women who choose FGC 
surgeries in a non- FGC context.  
 The contextual features concern both the context in which women currently live and the 
cultural context in which they see themselves in the world.  Care, then, is fostered through 
relationships. Care in the normative framework of the ethics of care is a relational activity. It 
attends to relations between the person who is engaged in the task of caring and the person being 
cared for. If care ignores the relational component of care, it remains reduced to the dominate 
culture framework of individual interests, abstract meaning of salient moral issues, and unbiased 
and rules- based approaches. Care quickly becomes performance based instead of relational and 
concern for the well-being of other. For example, care that ignores relations leaves open the door 
for abuse seen so often in elder care centers and other care systems where individuals are 
dependent. Meeting the needs of the person for whom we take responsibility is an essential 
component of care.  
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 However, if care is left only to the act of meeting needs and void of intention and 
attitude then one could say that it is morally suitable for health care worker to intimidate 
vulnerable patients who depend on the caregiver who displays disinterested, cruel, and unkind 
attitudes. The character and kindness of the health care worker is related to the care that is 
extended. All care, described Held involves attentiveness, sensitivity, and responding to needs. 
There is a diversity of needs that range from basic, for instance drinking water to stay alive, to 
more delicate needs for example those needs that include emotional, psychological, and cultural 
needs.13 As the findings have indicated from the examination on culture, values, beliefs, 
practices, and customs are features that make up culture. When women choose FGC surgery, 
they do so based on the practices and beliefs of their culture and bring these values to the health 
care relationship. The exclusion of the values of care lends itself to the dreadful practice of 
abuse, oppression, and discrimination as realized in the case of women, minorities, and those 
individuals who are often marginalized and mistreated. The cultivation of the practice of care 
concerns itself with what Held illustrated as the effectiveness and efforts to meet needs, but to 
also be aware of the motives by the carer in which care is provided.14 The practice of care seeks 
good relations.  
 Care is expressed in various ways.  Since care is a relational endeavor, it manifests itself in 
four different ways. These four types of relationships of care are, ‘caring about,’ ‘taking care ‘of, 
‘giving care,’ and ‘care receiving.’ According to Tronto, too, ‘caring about’ others requires 
recognition that care is necessary.15 Recognition is a theme mentioned in Chapter 5 of this 
dissertation. Recognition is not only identification it also has to do with respecting and accepting 
differences, an idea reported on later in this chapter which is critical to working with women 
who choose FGC surgery. Caring about, involves an evaluation that the need of the individual 
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should be met.16 Important to the care of refugee women who choose FGC surgery is that ‘caring 
about’ is culturally influenced and is realized according to the individual.17 That is, some people 
will care about an issue, for example giving to the poor on the street, and others will not. 
However, in the health care setting, what is important to observe is that the need of individuals 
who require support must be met. A second type of connection realized in the relationship of 
care is, 'taking care of.”18 The process that entails ‘taking care of’ has to do with taking 
responsibility for the recognized need and discerning how to respond.19 Critical to the idea of 
‘taking care of,’ is engagement. 'Taking care of' is engaging in the action required to attend to the 
unmet need. Important to the care of refugee women who choose FGC surgeries in non-FGC 
contexts, ‘taking care of’ embodies the “notions of agency and responsibility in the caring 
process.”20  Regarding the idea of agency, to assert agency, one needs to exercise rational 
choice.21 According to Susan Sherwin, “women who choose some of the controversial practices, 
i.e., abortion and cosmetic surgery are exerting agency, clearly they are making choices and 
often those choices are rational under the circumstances.”22 For women who choose FGC 
surgeries, they meet the demands of autonomy and are making rational choices.  
 A third phase in the process of care offered by Tronto is care giving. Care giving, a process 
most related to health care ethics, means unequivocally meeting the specific needs of particular 
other and care. Care giving requires that the health practitioner and patient make contact. The 
fourth and final phase of the process of care is care receiving. Care receiving, explains Tronto, is 
the phase in care where the patient will respond to the care received.23 A response from the 
patient is the only indication that the need has been met.24  Care-receiving is critical in the 
relationship between the health practitioner and the patient, namely women who choose FGC 
surgeries and are in need of care, because the concept will also assist in signaling whether the 
  
257 
 
autonomous choice of the woman choosing was honored and if the patient's quality of life has 
been improved by receiving care. What is important in defining care, using some of the offerings 
of Tronto, is that each element in the process of care is connected, fostering a more balanced 
interconnection of care, especially as it concerns the health professional providing care for 
women experiencing FGC. Care will lead to some type of action.25 Defining care gives place to 
what care is. However in constructing a model of care for women who choose FGC and are in 
need of help, the characteristics of care determine what care should be. 
A. Characteristics and Constructing Care  
In an effort to establish a new model of care, this section will report the findings of the review 
and study the scholarship on care. The characteristics of care discussed here have implications 
for developing a model of care. Establishing a framework of care allows for implementation of 
characteristics and features of care that are either currently underrepresented or not represented 
at all. An example of a feature of care that is currently underrepresented is respect for cultural 
diversity and cultural competency26 as it relates to working with groups of people who have 
different cultural traditions, values, and beliefs. How care is applied, and, more specifically, how 
care is ministered to refugee women who will choose to undergo FGC is dependent upon the 
sensitivity to culture and the competency, i.e., cultural competency, of the health care 
practitioner.27 
In the inquiry into care, one of the findings is that there are four moral qualities of care.28 
They include, attentiveness, competency, responsibility and responsiveness.29 These features of 
care are interconnected. For instance, Ruud ter Meulen explains that responsiveness takes for 
granted that there is attentiveness, and responsibility takes into consideration that there is 
competency.30  The four characteristics are components of one whole, which is the activity of 
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care.31 Attentiveness refers to recognizing that there is a need that requires care as explained 
earlier. It also denotes that the carer is paying close attention to the needs of the patient and 
attending to the patient’s wishes. In applying attentiveness to the care relationship, it is 
incumbent on the health professional to respect the rights of the patient to choose by honoring 
the wishes of the patient rather than becoming a barrier. If attentiveness is not applied, then the 
needs of women choosing FGC cannot be recognized.32 In considering the characteristic of care 
and constructing a model of care for women experiencing FGC, the findings from the 
investigation on respect for human vulnerability are useful. For example, in investigating respect 
for vulnerability, one finding reports that the health care professional must be attentive to the 
opportunities for vulnerability to take place. That is, paying attention to occasions for autonomy 
of the individual seeking care to be threatened and ignored.33  To not do so in the activity of care 
is what Tronto refers to as a “moral failing.”34Attention forms the basis of relationship, and since 
care is first and foremost a relationship between the patient and the health practitioner, it must be 
part of the model of care for refugee women who choose FGC surgeries.35  
 The concept of responsibility is another characteristic realized in the activity of care. The 
examination of responsibility, as explained by Daniel Engster, “is the moral obligation to meet 
others’ claims for caring thus rests upon the intuitive idea that human life and basic well being 
are valuable and should be supported.”36 
In addition, according to Tronto, the process of care that refers to ‘taking care of’, places 
responsibility into a category that has to do with what is right and wrong.37 That is, when we take 
on the concern for care, we do so because we can participate in meeting the needs for care, and 
so we must.38  Virginia Held describes that there is a compelling moral un-deniability of 
attending to and meeting the needs of those for whom we take responsibility.39 That is, one 
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cannot deny the necessity of responding to the needs of those who are in our care. One example 
gleaned from the examination on the responsibility is the duty of the health care professionals to 
protect those who are vulnerable and are in vulnerable situations.  It is the responsiveness of the 
health practitioner that allows her or him to engage in both meeting the needs of women who are 
experiencing FGC and to protect those who are vulnerable. Engagement also indicates that there 
is conversation to determine the care needed. It is here that respect assists to facilitate a positive 
outcome in the activity of care. The lack of responsiveness can make the activity of care 
ineffective. 
B. Goals of Care 
This section will discuss the outcomes from an examination on the aims of care described in the 
scholarship on care. The outcome of the investigation revealed common themes and threads that 
help to shape and focus care. The examination of the goals of care will, in addition, help 
illuminate what might be the outcome for the health care professional involved in meeting the 
need of care. Garnering what reflects the goals of care has been a central theme in this 
dissertation. Its centrality lies in constructing a model of care for refugee women who choose 
FGC surgeries. As it relates to health care ethics, the goals of care are facilitated through the 
Georgetown framework of ethical principles. However, in discerning what the care should be for 
women who choose FGC the global bioethics construct is particularly relevant as demonstrated 
through this dissertation. An example of how global bioethics is specific to refugee women who 
choose FGC surgeries is the respect for cultural diversity investigated in chapter 5 and recounted 
further later in this chapter. Respect for cultural diversity allows for a more expansive point of 
view, a perspective necessary in caring for women who experience FGC. 
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Caring for other is the task of health care. The fundamental aim of healthcare is further 
articulated as the improvement of quality of life for all those who need and seek care.40 While 
quality of life has not been fully explored in this dissertation, it has been illuminated throughout, 
as it is a goal of care. An important outcome of the findings in the exploration of care and the 
goals of care is through the connection of autonomy and quality of life, especially for women 
who choose FGC surgery. For example, one way to consider the connection of care and respect 
for autonomy is through the features of patient preferences (autonomy) and how patient 
preference contributes to applying respect for autonomy to care. Patient preferences are 
“ethically significant and what is essential to care.”41 Since patient preferences can also be 
articulated as autonomous choice, the preferences of the patient become the ethical “nucleus”42 
of the relationship between the health professional and individual receiving care. 
 There is an unmistakable ethical significance to patient preference, i.e. autonomy that is 
critical to care, but especially to care for the group of women represented in this dissertation. 
Patient preferences are ethically significant because they manifest the value of personal 
autonomy that is deeply rooted in our culture. This is particularly true and challenging for 
women who are refugees and choose to undergo FGC, and for the future generations of women 
who will also choose to employ their beliefs and values associated with the cultural custom. 
Another way of articulating the goal of care is assisting individuals to achieve at least a basic 
level of well being.43  
 Another finding of the outcome on the analysis of the goal of care is how both the 
principles of beneficence and non-maleficence significantly contribute to the improvement of 
quality the of life and well-being, i.e., the goals of care. Within the framework of health care 
ethics, the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence describe the moral obligation to act for 
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the good and well being of others,44 namely refugee women from FGC contexts who live in non-
FGC contexts and make the choice to undergo FGC surgeries.  
The primary goal of non-maleficence, which is under rigorous examination in Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation, is to “do no harm.” On the other hand, the principle of non-maleficence designates a 
moral obligation to refrain from inflicting harm. As it relates to healthcare ethics, the health care 
practitioner has an obligation and duty not to harm those who are in her/his care.  In the larger 
framework of health care ethics, non-maleficence plays a critical role in patient care. For 
example, according to Jonsen, Siegler, and Winslade, the principle of non-maleficence is linked 
to the quality of life maxim, and it is the patient who determines what is harmful and what is 
not.45 The patient, in addition, decides what is quality of life. 
 The patient’s perspective on what indicates harm to her is critical to determining a model 
of care for refugee women experiencing FGC.46  Her perspective and outlook concerning her 
care is what Jonsen, Siegler and Winslade refer to as patient preferences.47 The significance of 
the preferences of the patient rests in the fact that patient preferences are “essential to good 
clinical care”48 specifically, care for refugee women who choose FGC surgeries. In the in-depth 
examination of the principle of non-maleficence, it draws attention away from the health 
practitioner and focuses on the patient. This not to say that the principle does not hold medical 
professionals to a standard, in fact it obligates them. However, in the complete examination of 
the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence, the outcome suggests that the patient 
determines her course of care. The obligation of the health practitioner is to minister care in a 
way that supports the patient’s desires regarding the course of care. 
C.  Obligation of Care  
 In determining and developing a new model of care for refugee women who choose to 
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undergo FGC, the concept of obligation is critical. Its importance lies in the question raised in 
this dissertation; does the obligation of care imply that the physician or health care professional 
has a duty and responsibility to honor specific health care needs for the female patient in a 
culture that is in opposition to the practice? While there may be opposition to the practice of 
FGC it is important to note that FGC is not illegal in the U.S for those women who are eighteen 
years of age and older. The opposition of the medical intervention is described as disagreement 
or lack of professional knowledge and training about the surgery. In a study and examination on 
the notion of obligation, the findings point to the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics 
and Human Rights, and the Georgetown health care ethics frameworks which positively 
determine the duty and responsibility of the health care practitioner to honor the specific health 
care needs of the patient, namely refugee women who choose FGC surgery. Care, and 
specifically health care is facilitated through these frameworks. 
 The result of the inquiry into the concept of obligation demonstrates that duty is intimately 
and specifically connected to the principle of non-maleficence and beneficence. The concept of 
obligation promotes an optimistic, less oppositional view and assists in answering the query of 
this dissertation concerning how health care professionals should respond to the care of women 
whose intention is to undergo FGC surgery. As the outcomes garnered from the investigation of 
the notion of obligation, the idea is, in addition, linked to respect for human vulnerability and 
respect for cultural diversity, examined in this dissertation as two features that must be included 
in the constructing a new model of care for women experiencing FGC.  Both respect for human 
vulnerability and cultural diversity are specific to global bioethics framework, which has its 
underpinnings in human rights.49 Reported in the section above, the principles of beneficence 
and non-maleficence are clear about the obligation to care. 
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 The conclusion of exploration into the principle of beneficence finds that the acting on 
behalf of others, specifically women who choose FGC surgery, is the essence of the principle of 
beneficence. In fact, the findings obtained in the scholarship on the principle of beneficence, 
refers to the principle as “the moral obligation to act for the benefit of others.”50 In other words 
there is an obligation to facilitate care, i.e., health care for the benefit of those in need. The 
significance and the implication of the principle of beneficence is that the principle gives 
guidance and action about how the concept is applied to refugee women who choose to undergo 
the FGC surgery. In addition to the significance of beneficence and how it is applied to women 
experiencing FGC, beneficence gives necessary guidance for the care of women who choose to 
undergo FGC. As mentioned in chapter 4 , one of the dilemmas raised by FGC in the U.S. is that 
the custom is quite foreign to the U.S. health care system. A further finding in the outcome of the 
examination on obligation is that one of the primary characteristics of the care of women 
experiencing FGC is the responsiveness of the health practitioner.51 That is, for the health care 
practitioner to act on behalf of the other.  To attend to the welfare of others represents and 
exemplifies the goal of medicine.52 Acting in the interest of and for the benefit of others is 
intimately tied to the objective of medicine. Explained earlier, health professionals are obligated 
to act in a manner that ensures positive outcomes and does not undermine the patient’s 
autonomous choice. The results of the examination of Frankena’s framework of beneficence 
finds that there is support for acting on behalf of others, particularly refugee women who choose 
FGC surgeries. Frankena’s framework also provides the guidance of health professionals and 
illustrates that the primary concern of care is beneficence rather than non-maleficence. To 
discern that the aim is to act on behalf of those who are in need of care affirms that Frankena’s 
framework is needed in the model of care for women who choose FGC surgery. Concerning 
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obligation, “Obligations of general beneficence rest on the mere fact that there are other beings 
in the world whose condition we can make better.”53 
 A further result in consideration of the principle of non-maleficence is observed through 
the lens of remediation. Remediation fosters prevention of the alleged harmful consequences 
associated with FGC surgeries, namely certain types of cutting that are reported to be the most 
severe of the surgeries and present the most long-term health complications.54 Being able to 
lessen the harm by using less invasive interventions assists in framing a response to the ethical 
tension between the health professional who is concerned with non-maleficence (do no harm) 
and the patient whose life intention is to undergo FGC surgery. A major conclusion drawn from 
the examination on obligation via non- maleficence and beneficence is that lessening the harm 
contributes to the outcome of the obligation of care.  In actual practice, FGC surgeries are safer 
under the guide of medically trained professionals rather than unskilled and unprepared hands.55  
Non-maleficence, then in this way, supports a construct of what the care is for women who 
choose FGC.  
 The investigation of non-maleficence and beneficence afforded further findings crucial to 
the construct of care for women experiencing FGC surgeries.  Related to the obligation of care 
and a positive outcome for the patient is the idea of harm reduction. Harm reduction is 
minimizing the health consequences associated with FGC surgeries. Harm reduction, as it 
concerns women who choose FGC surgeries, is a feature of non-maleficence and is essential to 
the obligation of care. If the surgery can be done in a way that reduces harm, it has implications 
both for healthcare professionals and for women who voluntarily choose to undergo FGC. One 
outcome of the exploration on harm reduction is that it facilitates guidance for health care 
practitioners who encounter women who intend to pursue FGC. The surgery can be done in a 
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way that prevents harm incurred by unsanitary and non-medical environments that can cause 
damage to patients. Related to the harm reduction and positive outcomes for the patient, the 
examination affords a significant finding for the model of care. That is, it is critical to approach 
FGC as the medical procedure that it is, therefore ethically bound to all of the standards, 
processes, values, and norms that other medical procedures adhere too. It is not only cultural 
tradition it is a medical intervention.  
 With regard to obligation, further findings of the study find that respect for human 
vulnerability concludes that there is a moral obligation to care. This type of care is in the context 
of protection.  [Article 8]: Respect for Human Vulnerability and Personal Integrity which is 
included in the construct of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights, describes that the “principle of ‘respect for human vulnerability and personal integrity’ 
should be observed and also makes clear the obligation of care.”56  The Declaration explains that 
vulnerability is the object of a moral principle, which necessitates care for those who are in 
need,57 particularly women who choose FGC surgery.  Findings report that the Barcelona 
Declaration expresses that “the vulnerable are those whose autonomy, dignity, or integrity is 
capable of being threatened.”58 The implications here are women who choose FGC surgeries in a 
non-FGC context will need care in the form of protecting autonomous choice, an important 
feature in a construct for the new model of care.  
 Since health care ethics is related to the rights and privileges of all human beings, which 
include, for example, the right to life, and the right to choose, then respect for human dignity is 
paramount.59 In reporting the further findings, garnered respect for human vulnerability cannot 
be separated from human dignity.60 Vulnerability requires care. Vulnerability is the intention, if 
you will, of rendering particular individuals and groups of people vulnerable,61 namely refugee 
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women who choose FGC surgery. The designation of the principle of vulnerability makes clear 
that there is a moral obligation to act. The results of the examination of vulnerability, denotes 
that there is an opportunity for the human rights, dignity, and integrity of women who choose 
FGC to be thwarted.62 The Barcelona Declaration notes care is central to the expression of 
vulnerability. In other words, “vulnerability is the object of a moral principle requiring care for 
the vulnerable.”63  Applying vulnerability to women who choose FGC surgeries, vulnerability 
denotes an obligation on the part of the health care professional to provide care and must be 
included in the as a feature in the construct of care for women who choose FGC surgeries. In 
fact, it is the obligation of the health care practitioner to do so.   
II. Models to Care 
A. Ethics of Care 
 The ethics of care is the feminist approach to mainstream bioethics.  The scholarship in the 
ethics of care illuminates diverse meanings and interpretations of the ethics of care, but 
consistently focuses on caring relationships, an implication for care.  Included in the 
interpretation of the caring relations between people are the experiences of particular others, their 
individual insights, points of view, and emotions.    
The ethics of care is also a moral theory grounded in the context of bioethics.  Because bioethics 
and global bioethics alike “draw deeply from a moral and great religious ethical traditions.64  The 
results from the inquiry of the theory reveal that it is applicable to women who are experiencing 
FGC and are in need for care. One reason for the ethics of care's appropriateness is that 
according to Ruud ter Meulen, care is in the first place a relationship between individuals65.”  
The ethics of care focuses on caring relationships. That is, “there is a compelling moral salience 
to responding to the need of particular other for whom we take responsibility.”66 The ethics of 
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care values relations of care and embraces the mutual dependence that connects people. It places 
importance on the experiences of others individual insights, their points of view, and their 
interests.  As it relates to the practices and understanding of others, the ethics of care lends itself 
to the need to have a more balanced perspective of others, namely refugee women who choose 
FGC surgery. Concerning the provision of care for patients from other cultures, these 
perspectives are called the emic and etic perspective investigated in chapter 5 and reported more 
fully later in the section on attentiveness to cultural features.  
  The findings of the outcome on the analysis of the ethics of care, is that Virginia Held 
offered several features as a moral theory. One of the features of the ethics of care and perhaps 
one of the most important findings in the study of this theory is the conception of person.67 The 
ethics of care pay close attention to cultivating relationships and meeting the needs of particular 
other,68 relevant to care for women who choose to undergo FGC surgery. The theory 
demonstrates the centrality of the carer as a caring person. The ethics of care begins not with the 
focus on self-sufficient or self reliant individuals endowed with the faculty of reason, rather it 
begins with persons as “moral subjects capable of actions and of shaping lives and institutions 
and societies over time through cultivating in themselves and others certain characteristics and 
practices and values.”69  These characteristics, practices and values begin with self-awareness 
and are inclusive of moral responsibility and are interconnected with the social context in which 
a person is reared.70 It is in the interconnectedness of the social context that the ethics of care 
finds it relevance in constructing a model of care for women who choose FGC surgery. Related 
to cultural diversity, the context in which a person is reared, namely women who are 
experiencing FGC, influences health decisions and the quality of life of the patient. This is also 
true for the health professional whose cultural context may be otherwise different from the 
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patient. The person in the ethics of care is a relational person with specific social relations to 
family and the wider context of other social groups and communities. These social relations are 
critical to persons as moral agents since context has influence and meaning for how a person 
responds to their moral responsibility, particularly the health care practitioner.   
 Another feature found in the outcome of the investigation on the ethics of care includes the 
emphasis on the value of emotion. In the analysis, Held notes, however, “not all emotion is 
valued, but in contrast to the dominant rationalist approaches, such emotions as sympathy, 
empathy, sensitivity, and responsiveness”71 are encouraged and critical to the process of moral 
decision-making and knowing what is the right thing to do, particularly in relational and personal 
contexts. The connection, or link if you will of the emotional characteristic of care is that both 
sensitivity and responsiveness are themes explored throughout this dissertation, particularly as it 
concerns constructing a model of care for women experiencing FGC. Sensitivity is particularly 
important as it is linked to cultural sensitivity examined in Chapter 5 and a critical feature of a 
new model of care. These emotions noted by Held in the context of relations, moral 
responsibility, and care, are active and not static.  Arriving at what morality advocates, or would 
recommend includes not only reasonableness and logic, it includes emotional responses and 
imagination. Imagination here is not used in a fanciful way but in a way that garners 
resourcefulness in discerning morality. 
A final feature found in the investigation on ethics of care framework offered by Held is that it 
“rejects the view of the dominant moral theories that the more abstract the reasoning about a 
moral problem the better because the more likely to avoid bias and arbitrariness, the more nearly 
to achieve impartiality.”72  The ethics of care respects the moral claim that the particular other 
has with whom the relationship is shared. The dominant moral theory however, neglects actual 
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relations and disallows relationships to take priority over the requirements of partiality.73 Yet the 
ethics of care sees that the moral claim of other trumps the generalized moral rule against bias. It 
recognizes the prominence of the moral claim of particular other to the shared relations and 
understands that it is more important than universal rules of impartiality.  
 The conclusion of the results on the ethics of care as that it provides a sense of balance 
to what tends to be unbalanced in traditional moral theories. Traditional moral theories have a 
propensity for rules, rights, abstract reasoning and an individualist orientation. The ethics of care, 
on the other hand, considers what is missing and what is obscure. It attends to persons in 
relations of care, the self as the moral agent, community, and the nuances of contextual 
considerations.74 It is the influence of what is missing in other moral theories that makes the 
ethics of care a paradigmatic theory applicable in working with sociocultural contexts, that is 
contexts in which women who choose FGC.  
B. The Theoretical-judicial and Expressive-collaborative Models  
The theoretical-judicial model and the expressive-collaborative models are two models that 
provide a conception of morality and a view about the nature and the point of morality.75 They 
are not moral theories. The theoretical-judicial model defines morality as rules and guidelines 
that determine what should be done. Margaret Urban Walker describes the theoretical-judicial 
model as an “internal guidance system of an agent that could be modeled after some kind of 
theory and represented by a cluster of beliefs.”76 On the other hand, Urban Walker offers an 
alternative view for moral inquiry, namely the expressive-collaborative model. The expressive 
collaborative model does not depend upon a set of rules or guidelines for moral inquiry, rather it 
relies on a “continuing negotiation among people”77 to reach moral understandings. The 
negotiation between people allows for the experiences of individuals from different contexts, 
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namely women who from FGC environments to define their moral lives,78 and includes respect 
in meeting the needs of others. 
 The outcome of the examination on the theoretical-juridical and expressive-collaborative 
models of care, find that that the models has implications for what care should be for refugee 
women who choose FGC surgery. The models offer a framework that describes what care looks 
like in practical setting. The theoretical-juridical model offers a moral guide that defines what is 
included when we care for others.  Its counterpart, the expressive-collaborative model 
emphasizes the critical nature of attentiveness, and responsiveness. Given the investigation into 
both attentiveness and responsiveness and their fundamental nature in the care relationship, both 
models are conducive. An important finding in exploring this model is it also includes the 
concept of respect in an effort to apply attentiveness and responsiveness in specific situations 
with particular persons, namely women who choose FGC surgeries and are in need of care. The 
activity of care is more than achieving certain goals. Care includes doing so in a manner that is 
attentive, responsive, and respectful.79 Caring characterizes a mixture of the theoretical juridical 
and expressive-collaborative models of care.80  
 The theoretical-juridical model, for example, regards morality in terms of rules and 
guidelines that determine what should be done. Using the Georgetown and Global Bioethics 
frameworks investigated in this dissertation to discern what care should be for women 
experiencing FGC surgery are guidelines for how care should be done. The frameworks, for 
example, include, respect or autonomy and human vulnerability, respect for cultural diversity, 
and the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. The outcome of the query into the 
expressive-collaborative part of the model reveals that this arm depends on an open and ongoing 
dialogue among individuals to reach moral understandings81 that are fundamental to the activity 
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of care. To reach an understanding of what the patient desires is critical to the relationship 
between health care practitioner and patient. It is in the framework of the expressive-
collaborative model that allows for the care of patients, that is, women experiencing FGC, to 
have a positive outcome. Upon further analysis of the expressive-collaborative arm of the model, 
the results indicate that the paradigm emphasizes the significance attentiveness, responsiveness, 
and respect, in the reality of care relationship.  The care relationship is predicated on meeting the 
needs of particular other (who are in specific circumstances) who seek help.82 As mentioned 
earlier, the probe and consideration of attentiveness, responsiveness, and respect are central to 
the model of care for women who choose FGC surgeries. Responsiveness is highlighted to make 
the connection to cultural sensitivity and care, which is a construct needed in determining what 
care should be for refugee women who choose to undergo FGC.  
 The results of the investigation into responsiveness show that it is related to 
communication with a mutual understanding of the patient whose cultural context is different 
from that of the health professional. It is here where the expressive-collaborative is relevant and 
assists with the practice of responsiveness need in the model of care that meets the needs of 
women who choose FGC surgery. Joan Tronto explained that responsiveness is not putting 
ourselves in the position of others rather it is considering the others' position from the place 
where it is expressed,83 namely from the position and the cultural context of women who choose 
to undergo FGC surgery and are in need of care. In this way, the health professional is involved 
from the perspective of the patient and not from the assumption that the patient’s viewpoint is the 
same.84 
 The interrogation of the concept of attentiveness garners significant findings. The most 
meaningful outcome of the query is that attentiveness is necessary if care is to be realized. 
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According to Tronto, attentiveness is one of the ethical elements of care.85 It was further found 
that some scholars conclude that attentiveness presupposes responsiveness.86 It is important to 
mention this finding because, in caring for the vulnerable, a concept fully examined in chapter 6 
particularly applicable to women who undergo FGC surgery, attentiveness and awareness are 
key to the contextual features that produce situations where women experiencing FGC are 
vulnerable. That is, conditions where their autonomy or dignity are in danger of being 
jeopardized or discriminated against because of their ethnicity. Attentiveness allows for the 
health practitioner to be concerned with the needs of the patient. According to Tronto, if the 
health care professional is not attentive, ignoring the needs of the patient, then the practice is one 
of an unethical nature.87 The bioethical frameworks demand a moral obligation to behave in a 
manner that benefits the patient and ethically performs the work of care. To not do so is what 
Tronto refers to as a “moral failing.”88 
   Since the focus of this dissertation is on a specific group of women in a distinct situation, 
with the aim of seeking and finding care, the results of the examination of the features of the 
theoretical-judicial and expressive-collaborative model are reasonable and justifiable in the 
establishment of a new model of care. The models not only make room for the inclusion of the 
Georgetown and Global bioethics frameworks that are fundamental to cause of providing ethical 
care, the models offer practical application for a model of care for women who choose FGC 
surgeries, especially in contexts where FGC surgery is not normative.  The theoretical-judicial 
and expressive-collaborative models, and particularly the expressive-collaborative arm permit 
the inclusion of expanded features and components for a new model of care that supports women 
who choose FGC surgery. 
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III. Expanded features and components for a new model of care  
A. Attentiveness to Cultural Features 
Many of the approaches and models of care avoid the inclusion of cultural sensitivities, and 
competencies. These features are critical if there is going to be adequate health care provision for 
women refugees who have experienced FGC and for those women who will choose to undergo 
FGC. The findings from the examination on cultural sensitivity and cultural competency have 
lead to how to include attentiveness to cultural features as a component in a new model of care. 
An example of the attentiveness to the cultural features of women from FGC cultures is paying 
attention to the strong value of community over individuality which must be honored if there is 
going to be sufficient and attentive care for this group of women.89 There is a changing 
demographic in America and the shift requires “that all practitioners and students of all health 
professions develop cultural competence, communication.”90  
 In the previous section, the results of the investigation on attentiveness were explained. 
The findings illustrate that attentiveness carries significant weight. Care cannot be fulfilled if it 
doesn’t include the essential feature of attentiveness. To validate the place of attentiveness in the 
activity of care, particularly for women who choose FGC surgery Tronto describes attentiveness 
as one of the ethical elements of care.91 Further, if the health professional is going to be 
responsive they must first be attentive.92 The attentiveness includes paying attention to the 
cultural features of the patient, for example, the diversity of values and beliefs brought by the 
patient. In health care ethics, respect for cultural diversity is associated with the care of the 
patient. Respect for cultural diversity is also one of the features of global bioethics. Within the 
framework of the patient-health practitioner relationship, both the health practitioner and the 
patient bring to the relationship duties and responsibilities to the larger world in which their 
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relationship takes place.93 In the context of care, the outcomes associated with the survey on 
respect for cultural diversity inform that culture will influence the preferences of the patient, 
especially women whose life intention is to undergo FGC surgery. These aspects of culture 
include lifestyle, values, beliefs, and traditions. The findings of the probe into contextual features 
unearthed that the health care choices made by the autonomous individuals are influenced by 
contextual considerations.94 For instance, one contextual feature in which health care 
professionals must consider is the varying influence of community and family, which inspires 
life decisions and health care decisions, in particular.  As it relates to the scholarship, in the case 
of FGC, the health practitioner observes the contextual features of the patient in conflict not only 
with his/her culture, but also the practitioner's commitment to the patient.95 The scholarship 
describes that some health practitioners disagree that contextual features, i.e., cultural 
considerations of the patient are important in determining ethical decisions about care, namely to 
consider the care of women experiencing FGC. However, scholars argue that the beliefs and 
practices of the patient's cultural orientation that are culturally different than the health 
practitioner’s is “real and in varying degrees obligatory”96 for the patient. Therefore, it is 
incumbent upon the health practitioner to respect the cultural diversity of the patient and to 
consider cultural diversity in determining care for women experiencing FGC. Health 
practitioners have a moral obligation to do so.97 Women who have chosen to undergo FGC 
surgery do so based on their experiences, ideals, values, and their beliefs.  Respect for cultural 
diversity that includes an understanding of the beliefs and ideals of the patient and how they 
guide thinking, actions, decisions,98 are vital and necessary for good patient care. Not only are 
these cultural characteristics integral to care, they frame how individuals view health and the 
need for care.99 
  
275 
 
B. Attentiveness, Cultural Competency and Respect   
A common theme in the scholarship on care theory is the responsibility for the other, 
attentiveness, and responsiveness.100 These elements of care have an explicit characteristic that 
the person receiving care is part of the caring relationship and must be included.  Conversely, in 
the examination of the literature there is an implicit quality as it relates to the idea of inclusion 
and particular attention to cultural features.  Attentiveness to cultural aspects, cultural 
sensitivities, and the application of cultural competency should not be implied; rather, these 
notions must be straightforwardly and candidly expressed and implemented. One of the findings 
from the investigation on cultural competency is a framework that can be implemented. These 
outcomes are discussed later in the section on attentiveness to cultural features. It is important to 
note that the research also found that responsiveness and attentiveness are aspects of any 
framework of cultural competency. What is critical here is that one of the findings garnered from 
the exploration of cultural diversity and care, responsiveness, and attentiveness are fundamental 
to care and a model of care for women who choose FGC surgery must include these elements. 
When refugee women come to the United States, now a multiethnic society, they bring their 
health care needs. Sensitivity to values, beliefs, and behavior and applying understanding can 
improve “communication and care.”101  
 Reported earlier, the health care profession must not only be attentive, but also must be 
aware and pay close attention to the cultural features of the patient. One reason as found in the 
outcome of the study on vulnerability is that some groups of people who are in the racial 
minority are often exposed to discriminatory behavior.102  The attentiveness ministered, however, 
is not only for the patient but also for health care providers who must be aware of their 
propensity for the lack of cultural know-how.  
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Attentiveness refers to recognizing that there is a need that requires care as explained earlier. It 
also denotes that the carer is paying close attention to the needs of the patient and attending to 
the wishes of patient. When applying attentiveness, it is incumbent on the health professional to 
afford the patient the right to choose by honoring the wishes of the patient instead of becoming a 
barrier. If attentiveness is not applied, then the needs of women choosing FGC cannot be 
recognized and go unfulfilled.103 
C. Cultural Competency 
 This section will discuss the findings of the examination on cultural competency. These 
findings have implications for a new framework of care that includes respect for cultural 
diversity and cultural competency. Cultural competency entails understanding the importance of 
social and cultural influences on patient belief and behaviors.104 The application of cultural 
competency assists in taking positive steps to responding to the western system of health care 
that is unfamiliar with FGC. The unfamiliarity produces biased and negative attitudes that foster 
prejudiced responses that could be injurious to FGC patients.105  Such attitudes and a failing to 
understand the contextual features and societal factors of this group of women could serve as 
unethical barriers to care. Care includes integrating cultural competency into a new model of 
care that will serve as a strategy for addressing these barriers examined in Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation.  Cultural competency as a component in a new model of care promotes giving 
attention to the influence of societal factors and cultural features and how refugee women 
choosing FGC experience and receive care.  
 The analysis into both cultural diversity, and cultural competency garnered findings that 
support the diversity of cultures and the right for individuals to participate in their cultural 
traditions and practices.  This outcome is supported by the Universal Declaration on Cultural 
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Diversity which asserts, “the defense of cultural diversity is an ethical imperative, inseparable 
from respect for human dignity, culture should be regarded as a set of distinctive spiritual, 
material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group and encompasses 
lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.”106 Culture, it is said, is 
the lens with which individuals see the world, and the lens extends to health and healthcare.107  
 These cultural beliefs and practices are brought to the health care relationship, which exists 
between the patient and the health care professional. Accordingly, the outcome of the 
investigation finds that cultural traditions and beliefs influence health decisions and particularly 
the health decisions of women who choose FGC surgery. Scholars maintain there are four factors 
in which health care providers must be sensitive, religion, ethnicity, race, and class.108 
Understanding the cultural context of the patient who is choosing to undergo FGC surgery 
improves communication and enhances care.109 The cultural sensitivity framework and approach 
assists in advancing the occurrence of cultural connectedness between the health practitioner and 
the patient who is in need of care.110 However, there must be more that a cultural connectedness 
and sensitivity.  
 In the analysis of cultural competency, the conclusion of the investigation garners that 
since there is diversity of cultures in the US healthcare context, it requires that health 
professionals, practitioners and students in health professions, have the ability to communicate, 
understand, and respect the diversity of cultures.111 In other words, health practitioners must 
understand, appreciate, and work with other cultures and belief systems.112 In order to gain the 
ability to communicate and understand a framework in which to do so is useful. Cultural 
competency, as the findings support, is a practical framework in health care to deal with cultural 
barriers in the clinical encounter. Cultural competency entails understanding the importance of 
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social and cultural influences on the patient’s health beliefs and behaviors.  
 The cultural competency framework considers how characteristics of culture interact at 
different levels of health care, for example, in the decision making process of the patient. One 
example to note in the findings on the inquiry into cultural competency and sensitivity is on 
religious beliefs. Geri-Ann Galanti explains about religious beliefs, spiritual practices, and health 
care, that while religion is not a subject of conversation in hospitals; the customs, traditions, and 
beliefs of patients are. These aspects of religion are often sources of conflict, disagreement, and 
misunderstanding;113 however, these aspects play a fundamental role in how patients make 
decisions about care and about quality of life. Since religion is one of the most common themes 
that typically justify the cultural significance of FGC, health practitioners would do well to gain 
an understanding of the religious influences. 
 While the results of the research on cultural competency found that the framework includes 
organizational and structural cultural competency, it is clinical care that is related to refugee 
women who choose FGC surgery. The focus is on the clinical care. That is the relationship 
between the patient and the health practitioner. This is not to say that the organizational and 
structural cultural competence is not important-it is. The importance is the long-term systemic 
change that must be realized at the organizational and structural levels as well, an idea that needs 
further investigation. The “defining landmarks of cultural competency is for health care 
practitioners to learn how the behavior of various cultures affects decision making,”114 and to 
understand how these sociocultural features can be a barrier to care. The sociocultural 
characteristics are critical to the encounter and must be understood and managed if the model of 
care for women experiencing FGC will have a positive outcome. Importantly, in the examination 
of the framework of cultural competency, further findings reveal that the construct is linked to 
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other aspects of care examined earlier in this dissertation. They are responsiveness and 
attentiveness. If the model of care for women who are experiencing FGC is going to have a 
positive outcome which includes quality of life for the patient, care must include attentiveness to 
the cultural features of the cared for and responsiveness which including reasoning in a culturally 
competent way.   
 One of the conclusions drawn from the examination of competency is that an ethical 
feature of care is competence, described earlier in chapter 4. Observing non-maleficence through 
Frankena’s framework, aiming to promote good first, links competence and cultural competency 
to care in the following way. First, in promoting good and a positive outcome for the patient, 
which includes preventing harm, this means that the health professional must be competent. The 
competency, however, goes beyond the skill required in medicine; competency includes cultural 
competency in the context of clinical care.  The health professional is obligated to be educated 
about FGC in general and FGC surgeries specifically.  The result of the investigation into the 
cultural competency framework yields the application of the construct, which is necessary for the 
integration of the framework into the model of care. Because the social-cultural factors are 
critical to the clinical encounter, Betancourt reports that cultural competence curricula, has been 
developed for providers.115 The aim of the educational interventions is to “equip health care 
providers with knowledge, tools, and skill to better understand and manage sociocultural issues 
in the clinical encounter.”116  Attention must be paid to communication. It is important to note 
that the findings of the research also show that cultural competency is often referred to as “cross 
cultural,” or “cultural sensitivity,” education and training.117  To include competence as a part of 
the “moral quality of care”118 is critical. In not doing so, we have failed. The conclusion of the 
cultural competency investigation makes clear that the concept is indeed a framework by which 
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to minister care to refugee women who choose FGC surgeries and who are in need of health care. 
D. In a Caring Way: respect for a particular other 
This section will present the results of examining the concept of respect. In the UNESCO 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, ‘respect for’ precedes two concepts: respect for 
human vulnerability and personal integrity, and respect for cultural diversity and pluralism. In 
the examination of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
discussing autonomy it notes, “the autonomy of others is to be respected.”119 In the Georgetown 
bioethics framework, respect is linked to respect for autonomy investigated in Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation. The findings illuminated from this examination require that respect in the care 
relationship is to recognize and accept the right of the every individual to hold views and values, 
to make choices, and to take action that are based on their values and beliefs.120 Therefore, 
respect involves not only a respectful manner but also a respectful approach and action.121 
Respectful action taken is manifested in a way that appreciates the value and decision making 
rights of women who choose FGC surgery. Respect allows for the health practitioner to empower 
women to act in a way that supports self-determination.122 
 Further findings with regard to respect, include that it is central to the care relationship. In 
his list of three basic aims of caring as a practice, Engster describes what he calls a third virtue of 
caring: respect.123 Because of the centrality of respect to the care relationship, an adequate model 
of care must include respect. In the relationship between the patient and the health professional, 
respect regards other as equal. Showing equality in the health care relationship, the health care 
professional can garner trust from the patient therefore providing a passage to fruitful 
communication, which is needed in the care relationship. Ministering respect promotes non-
partiality and intolerance for prejudice, which, according to findings from the analysis on 
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cultural diversity, is probable.  Respectful care can influence positive responses to cultural 
practices that are significantly different from the dominant cultural practices of the health 
professional, especially in the US healthcare context.  
 As respect is concerned in providing care for women who choose FGC, respect then is 
critical as it supports women who make the autonomous choice to undergo FGC. They 
understand what they have chosen and are more than capable of expressing their needs. For a 
health care practitioner to treat women experiencing FGC with disrespect is degrading and 
borders on the complete disregard of human dignity.124 Engster further explains, “one respects 
others by treating them in ways that do not degrade them in their own eyes or in the eyes of 
others.”125 In the examination on cultural diversity, one of the findings is that disrespect for the 
diversity of cultures and an unwillingness to take into account the cultural traditions, which 
include religion, beliefs, and values of the patient can lead to discrimination and prejudice.  
 The outcome on the investigation on respect finds that the notion of respect is promoted in 
the UNESCO articles on vulnerability, cultural diversity, and autonomy. As it concerns 
vulnerability, examined fully in chapter 6, respect is related to human vulnerability. In fact, the 
outcome of the research found that respect for human vulnerability is an obligation.126 That is, 
we have a responsibility to regard the fragility of every human being as it is the human condition. 
The outcome of the examination into respect for vulnerability further finds that “we are all 
essentially vulnerable and in need of care.”127 Therefore, care must include respect for particular 
other.  
The outcome of the analysis of cultural diversity completed in Chapter 5, mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph of this dissertation, also garners results as it relates to respect and care. For 
example, when dealing with different cultures, without respect for the differences found in the 
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diversity of cultures, which can facilitate mutual understanding, the cultural significance of FGC 
is missed and care in not realized.  The findings from the examination on respect for human 
vulnerability afford similar findings related to respect. Concerning care and particularly care for 
refugee women who choose FGC who are in need of care, action and intervention are not the 
primary responses: respect and care should be.128  
IV. Conclusion 
 This paragraph summarizes the strategies toward an inclusive and collaborative practice of 
care that will establish a new model of care for refugee women who will choose to undergo FGC. 
Included is an expanded view of how the topic of FGC and care is treated currently and what 
must change. Drawing from the models of care and the other features reported from the 
examination of the components of subsequent chapters, an expanded, more inclusive, and 
collaborative practice of care is realized.129  
Traditionally, FGC surgeries have been handled by mainstream media, and the medical 
profession with an unyielding prejudice, and an unbalanced, and uninformed view. Unfortunately 
these claims have been made popular without a balanced assessment of the evidence.130 FGC 
surgeries are seen through the perspective of an outsider or the etic point of view, rather than an 
emic one. These points of view have left the discourse as one without respect for differences, 
therefore the framework of cultural competency must be included in an expanded framework of 
care, if the health practitioner is to meet the goal of health care, the improvement of quality of 
life for the patient.131   
 The realization of an expanded view of care is fostered through the lens of cultural 
diversity, specifically by applying the Georgetown health care framework and the Global 
bioethics framework, which heretofore has been absent from the FGC discourse. 132The cultural 
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practice of FGC is extensive in Africa. However, there are communities of women and their 
families now living in the U.S. The current reality is that FGC is being done in the U.S., 
particularly in New York, and in Boston.” 133 Many women who have had genital surgeries 
embrace it as a procedure for cosmetic beautification not unlike western women. For example, 
the US cosmetic surgery obsession and the globalization of the images of women’s bodies has 
increasingly popularized the ideals of a smooth and clean genital look that is reminiscent of the 
aesthetic standards associated with FGC surgeries. One example is labiaplasty done by cosmetic 
surgeons in the U.S. and Europe. The globalization of FGC and the increase of women 
experiencing the medical intervention is an indication that FGC is not going away. 
 An expanded and inclusive model of care honors the uniqueness and complexities of 
particular other, specifically, an individual’s refugee status, culture, ethnicity, and the 
autonomous choice to undergo a practice in a society that often knows little about FGC. It 
includes respect for cultural diversity. Respect for cultural diversity is the lens by which the 
cultural custom as viewed less negatively. Since the right of people to participate in their culture 
is a human right, respect for cultural diversity and pluralism is fundamental to the inclusive and 
expanded model of care for women experiencing FGC surgery. All of the elements and 
characteristics of culture also called sociocultural features have un-paralleled influence on health 
decisions. For example, as it concerns ethnicity, women choose FGC to indicate they belong to a 
particular community or tribe. In addition, FGC is intimately associated with marriage. To honor 
these features of refugee women who choose FGC surgery, the moral qualities of care are 
realized. These moral qualities of care, attentiveness, competency (cultural), responsibility and 
responsiveness are interconnected and part of the holistic construct of care,134 and they must be 
included in the new construct of care for women experiencing FGC.  
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 Therefore, harm reduction and medicalization play a significant role in the new model of 
care for women experiencing FGC and are included. Frankena’s framework of beneficence, 
which includes non-maleficence, is applicable in the model of care. Using Frankena’s frame of 
beneficence allows for the use of harm reduction. Since there have been small successes made in 
the eradication of FGC and an increased suspicion that the occurrence of FGC in the US is more 
frequent than previously thought,135 harm reduction is a worthwhile and credible response and 
must also be included in the model of care. Harm reduction, according to the Article 4 in the 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, is morally acceptable as the idea of harm 
reduction is to minimize harm, particularly the alleged harmful consequences associated with 
FGC surgeries. It is the patient who determines not only quality of life but also what they view as 
harm. Since FGC is not going away, it is critical to include harm reduction in the expanded view 
of care. The idea of abolition is not the solution.136 
The medicalization of FGC is also a part of the new model of care. Medicalization is deeply 
associated with and connects to non-maleficence. In communities where culture is the dominant 
rationale behind the practice, medicalization can be “socially acceptable.”137 In fact the results of 
the research found that medicalization was being taken over by the modern health sector and as a 
result there may be very low circumcision related so called health consequences.138 
 Concerning care, responsiveness necessitates attentiveness.139 Responsiveness in the 
expanded view of care understands the needs of others rather than putting ourselves into their 
position when this is impossible to do.140 Instead, consideration is made for the other's position, 
in the way that it is expressed.141 The attentiveness to the moral principle of vulnerability allows 
for paying attention to vulnerability. Since care is relational, it suffices that respect for 
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vulnerability, which is characterized by our common humanity, is a feature of care for women 
who choose FGC surgery.  
 In considering models of care, the theoretical-juridical model offers a moral guide that 
defines what is included when we care for others.  Its counterpart, the expressive-collaborative 
model emphasizes the critical nature of attentiveness and responsiveness. The ethics of care 
embraces the activity of care. Most importantly in discerning what the model of care should be 
for women who undergo FGC surgery, the major feature and the central focus of the ethics of 
care is on the persuasive moral importance of attending to and meeting the needs of those for 
whom we take responsibility.142 In fact, it is an obligation to do so. Lastly, a model of care for 
women who experience FGC includes care in a respectful manner. Ministering care in a non-
respectful way does not promote a positive outcome for the patient and cannot promote quality 
of life, the most fundamental goal of medical care.143 Care includes doing so in a manner that is 
attentive, responsive, and respectful.144 
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